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Abstract
This dissertation contains three essays that examine who benefits and who bears the burden
of local government policies, like postsecondary education and the minimum wage. The
essays develop general equilibrium structural models to understand the distributional benefits
and to assess alternatives.
The first chapter, “Costly Centralization: Evidence from Community College Expan-
sions,” examines the implications of public good provision by different levels of government.
Higher levels can correct externalities from spillovers, but are often limited to uniform poli-
cies and changes in the spatial distribution of public goods and taxes affect where households
live. The general equilibrium migration effects can undermine the value of a higher level of
government provision because the implied changes in the housing market affect household
consumption as well as the aggregate property tax revenue to fund the public good.
I study this trade-off in the context of Texas Community College financing. Leveraging
recent increases in the tax base sizes, I find that the communities that joined and their
neighbors saw increased aggregate home values and prices after the expansions. This suggests
they benefited and more centralization is good on the margin. I then estimate a general
equilibrium structural model to measure the optimal level of government provision using
Austin Community College as a concrete example. Not all expansions of the tax base are
welfare-improving and centralization is not socially optimal because the migration effects are
large– general equilibrium housing market distortions reduce the optimal level of government.
The second chapter, “Optimal Minimum Wage Setting in a Federal System” with Matthew
Wilson, also measures the relative trade-off of centralized and decentralized government pol-
x
icy. In a competitive multi-state labor market with two types of workers, increases in one
state’s minimum wage redistributes to the low-skilled employed from the newly unemployed
and high-skilled. A binding policy is optimal if the benefits from redistribution outweigh the
costs from migration, which are relatively steeper for local governments. Centralized policy
reduces horizontal migration externalities, which improves decentralized minimum wage set-
ting. Our results indicate that decentralized and centralized policy-setting are complements,
and the extent to which they are depends on mobility and regional heterogeneity. We then
calibrate a model of the continental US and find that joint policy setting leads to a small
welfare gain over centralization, and closely resembles the social planner’s optimal policies.
The third chapter, “College Choice, Private Options, and the Incidence of Public Invest-
ment in Higher Education” with John Bound, studies the general equilibrium effects of state
subsidies to public colleges. State funding directly impacts the value of attending the public
college since it determines their quality and tuition. Much of the previous work focuses on
this channel and implicitly assumes only those who attend the publics benefit. However,
since state funding affects the value of the publics, it also affects the relative demand for the
privates. Funding decreases increase private college market power, which alters who they
admit and the prices they charge. Changes in the college market spill over to the labor
market. We calibrate a general equilibrium model of the US higher education system and
labor market to illustrate and quantify these mechanisms. Unlike the previous approaches,
we find that most of the benefits go to high-income-modest-ability students who only have
access to the high quality privates when state spending is high.
xi
Chapter 1
Costly Centralization: Evidence From Community College
Expansions
1.1 Introduction
A key function of local governments is to provide public goods and services, which they often
finance with property taxes. Prospective residents then choose where to live by trading off
public good quality with the associated costs.1 Tiebout (1956) argues that when communities
compete without spillovers, local provision is preferred. However, when the public good spills
over to nearby areas, spending is too low and households can free-ride– they benefit, but
avoid paying taxes. Higher levels of government can correct the externalities (Oates 1972),
but are often limited to uniform policies and changes in the spatial distribution of public
goods and taxes affect where households live. The general equilibrium migration effects can
undermine the value of a higher level of government provision because the implied changes
in the housing market affect household consumption as well as the aggregate property tax
revenue to fund the public good.
This paper studies the trade-off between different levels of government provision to fund
spatially delineated public goods. In this case, which level of government should set policy?
Moving from pure decentralization to pure centralization creates ambiguous welfare effects
that importantly depend on the spatial nature of the public good and its spillovers, as well
1In 2017, local governments collected $509 billion in property taxes, or 30 percent of their total revenue
(Urban Institute 2019), while average household property taxes varied from less than $200 to more than
$10,000 at the county level (Cammenga 2019).
1
as general equilibrium household and housing market responses. Changes in the level of
government affect both the level and variance of public goods across space that have im-
portant distributional implications for welfare. Although not often considered, intermediate
levels of centralization, where a few communities are not part of the tax base but still receive
spillovers, can balance the distortions from decentralization or centralization alone.
I address this question in the context of Texas community college financing. Since 83
percent of the land in the state is not part of a tax base, households can live in nearby
areas where they still benefit from the public good but do not pay taxes to support it. I
first leverage recent expansions of the tax bases across the state, which gradually increased
the level of centralization, to test whether they are too small. I then estimate a general
equilibrium structural model of household sorting and public good provision to measure the
value of different geographic tax base configurations and the optimal level of government
provision. These analyses also inform optimal policy for other settings where we expect
spillovers to be present, like environmental pollution, as well as place-base policies.
The results indicate that the community college tax bases are too small. Exploiting the
staggered timing of recent expansions, I find that both home prices and aggregate home
values rise in the newly annexed and other neighboring communities. The net benefits
from the change in public goods and taxes are capitalized into home prices, while values
additionally capture the effects from household sorting. Increases imply the communities are
better off and that increased centralization is welfare-improving on the margin.2 However,
large changes in the boundaries may not have the same positive effects if the benefits are
spatially concentrated or if household sorting responses create negative externalities.
I then estimate a general equilibrium structural model to measure the optimal level of
government provision using Austin Community College as a concrete example. Since only
17 percent of the land in the state is currently part of a tax base, the previous results do not
2Aggregate home values and prices provide information about the overall attractiveness of a community
and its resources. Increases in both therefore reflect benefits to the community as a whole, but do not imply
that all households living there are better off.
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indicate how much they should expand. Using information on household location decisions,
housing expenditure, and home sales, the model informs how households respond to changes
in public goods and taxes. Combining the model with the policy variation from the recent
tax base expansions, I then decompose the public good contribution of community college
expenditure across space. I find that the returns to spending are large near the campus
regardless of whether a community is in the tax base but decrease with distance, and decrease
slightly more sharply for those not in the tax base.
The additional public good benefits from joining the tax base are an inverted-U shape in
the distance from the campus. Residents in communities close to the college can more easily
access it, even when not part of the tax base. Joining therefore leads to few new services
and redistribution to the original tax base. The value of joining increases with distance, up
to a point. Communities farther away have less easy access when not part of the tax base,
but the expansion stretches the geographic scope of the services. However, the four farthest
communities only receive a new tax burden after joining.
Austin Community College centralization, which increases the number of communities
in the tax base from nine to 26, raises average per capita welfare by $29 over the current
boundary configuration, or about $23 Million for the metro area. This welfare gain is equiv-
alent to 15 percent of the college’s yearly tax revenue. The benefits are concentrated in the
newly annexed areas. All but six of communities that join receive additional public goods
that are worth the new tax burden. The implied increased value of living in those areas leads
to in-migration and the resulting change in prices from added congestion pushes almost all
of the gains to the original landowners. With more property value to fund the public good,
the statutory tax rate falls and the original tax base also benefits, but this largely acts as
redistribution towards the high-income close to the college.
Household sorting from the change in the distribution of public goods and taxes across
space also imposes negative housing market externalities on neighboring college districts in
the metro area. Those areas become relatively less attractive and residents leave. Landown-
3
ers, therefore, bear most of the burden. The distributional changes in prices and public goods
also leads some low-income households to lose access to inexpensive communities, making
them worse off as well; centralization reduces community heterogeneity in public goods and
taxes, which stops some households from finding a good match for their preferences. The
state, as an even higher level of government, could play a role to correct these externalities.
However, Texas cannot legally levy income or property taxes, and so the maximum possible
level of centralization in this case is limited.
However, not all expansions of the tax base are welfare-improving and centralization is not
socially optimal. Large changes in the boundaries create negative externalities from house-
hold sorting. On average, the changes impose negative pricing effects on poor households
who dislike high rental costs, but benefit the high income near the college and landowners.
While many expansions that increase the level of public good spending are worth the added
congestion, centralization goes too far. In fact, there are nearly 150 tax base configurations
with higher social welfare than centralization. For example, an Austin Community College
tax base that covers all but one community (school district) raises per capita welfare by an
additional $222 over centralization. The general equilibrium sorting externalities play an
important role and a partial equilibrium approach that does not account for them would
expand the tax base more than is optimal.
The housing market externalities from expanding geographic coverage of the tax base
can be so large that adding new areas lowers the total property value to fund the public
good. Some expansions therefore lead to higher statutory tax rates while simultaneously
imposing an additional tax burden on more communities. Although a large tax base helps
reduce free-riding, general equilibrium responses can create unintended consequences that
undermine the value of centralization. When the extra revenue finances additional spending
or public good quality, the negative consequences are exacerbated.
The main contribution of this paper is quantifying spillovers, and the relative merits
centralization and other levels of government public good provision. To do so, I build on
4
the fiscal competition and local public goods models (Epple and Sieg 1999).3 I extend the
previous work in two ways. First, my model allows for inter-community spillovers, which
are an important factor for determining the relative value of centralization, as highlighted
in Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972).4 Second, I combine information on household
sorting behavior with policy variation over time to estimate the public good production
function. This type of locational sorting model has been used to study pollution (Sieg et
al. 2004; Smith et al. 2004), private school vouchers (Ferreyra 2007), and open space
protections (Walsh 2007). The previous work using this framework considers a cross-section
of communities and relies on functions of the income rank as instruments to estimate the
value of amenities. My approach combines causal inference with a general equilibrium sorting
model, similar to Bayer et al. (2007).
This paper also adds to the empirical literature on public good spillovers and central-
ization, of which there is relatively little on either or their interaction.5 Solé-Ollé (2006) in
Spain and Jannin and Sotura (2019) in France find public good spillovers are large, similar
to the findings in this paper, but do not measure the value of different levels of government
provision, while Calabrese et al. (2012) find that centralization is often more efficient, but
assume that there are no spillovers. Closest to this paper, Banzhaf and Chupp (2012) esti-
mate the value of centralized environmental policy with spillovers. In my setting, spillovers
from production additionally create externalities from their impact on household location
decisions. These effects interact since migration changes the size of the tax base and there-
fore the per household cost of providing the public good, which further affects household
residencies.6 This paper also considers intermediate cases between decentralized policies and
3Kuminoff et al. (2013) and Holmes and Sieg (2017) provide an overview of this methodology and recent
advances.
4More specifically, “in the absence of cost-savings from the centralized provision of a [local public] good
and of interjurisdictional externalities, the level of welfare will always be at least as high (and typically
higher) if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform
level of consumption is maintained across all jurisdictions” (Oates 1972).
5However, there is a large theoretical literature beginning with Oates (1972) and Bewley (1981). Recent
examples include Cheikbossian (2008), and Bloch and Zenginobuz (2006). Besely and Coate (2003) study a
political economy approach to this problem.
6Simon and Wilson (Forthcoming) also study the effect of migration on the relative value of policy setting
5
centralization to understand the optimal level of federalism.7
1.2 Community College Taxing Districts in Texas
The Texas government divided the state into 50 community college service areas. Each
service area’s mission is to provide postsecondary education to the entire region, but is
only able to levy an ad valorem property tax on a subset, the taxing district. While the
service areas cover almost all of Texas, the taxing districts do not. If spillovers are positive,
households can sort to avoid property taxes but still receive some benefits. Increasing the
size of the tax base should limit free-riding. However, if the public good is concentrated near
the campus, expanding the tax base under the state required uniform tax rate would put an
undue burden on communities far away. This system where households can free-ride from
community college services by living outside the taxing district is common in the United
States and is also used in Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, and Wyoming.8
Since 1990, 49 communities in Texas, usually independent school districts (ISDs), across
seven service areas voted to join their taxing district. Groups of ISDs form coalitions to
provide the public good to the service area. As the coalitions grow, the level of centralization
increases and these expansions provide a test of its value. It is illegal for the state of Texas
to levy its own property or income taxes, and so the relevant units of governments to set
policy in this setting are ISDs and service areas, limiting the level of centralization.
The public good benefits of community colleges include having a more highly educated
workforce, less expenditure on social services, increased charitable giving, greater involve-
ment in civic life, improved social cohesion, and a reduced crime rate (Mellow and Heelan
by different levels of government in the context of US minimum wages.
7The focus here is on optimal geographic size of the government to provide local public goods, as in
Saarimaa and Tukiainen (2014), Weese (2015), and Tricaud (2019) who study jurisdiction mergers and find
support for similar mechanisms related to distance. There is also a related literature that studies which
public goods should be provided by local or central government; see Bednar (2011) for an overview and a
discussion of other federalism issues in political science.
8Parts of Illinois were not part of a taxing district until 1990. Additionally, community colleges in 29
states rely at least partially on local appropriations, which would still allow households to partially free-ride
by living in low-tax community college regions and benefit from their neighbors.
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2014; McFarlin et al. 2017). A more educated society benefits not just those who receive
the education but has a positive externality on the other residents, providing social returns
in excess of the aggregate private returns.9 One potential concern of increasing commu-
nity college access for generating the public good is that it may divert students away from
bachelor degree programs and reduce the aggregate amount of human capital, even though
it has significant value-added for marginal students (Mountjoy 2019). However, Denning
(2017) and Action (2019) find that residency in a community college taxing district, which
increases access through reduced tuition, leads to more two and four year college enrollment
and graduation, and therefore unambiguously higher levels of aggregate human capital.
The community college also strengthens other local amenities. For example, 10 percent
of high school students were enrolled in dual credit courses in 2018, increasing the value and
quality of K-12 education. The state hopes that by 2030, at least 30 percent of high school
students will complete at least 12 dual credit hours (THECB 2019). Community colleges
also strengthen community infrastructure by training many first responders, like police and
firefighters, and health care providers (Austin Community College 2020). These benefits are
not just for those in the taxing district; for example, when a college trains police, those
officers get jobs throughout the surrounding area, not just in the tax base.
For communities to receive these benefits from having a community college, it needs to
be appropriately funded. A larger tax base gives the college more, and more stable access to
funding. This has become increasingly important over time as state appropriations continue
to fall. Over the past 30 years, state appropriations for Texas community colleges fell from
66 to only 23 percent of operating revenue, making colleges more reliant on local property
taxes (TACC 2019). Before voting to join the taxing district, the college and community to
be annexed agree on a service plan, which outlines how the college’s revenue will be used.10
A goal of the annexation is to expand the geographic scope of the benefits.
9Moretti (2004) provides a summary of theoretical and empirical literature on the social returns to human
capital. This includes the effects on crime and voting but also positive productivity spillovers, where increases
in the aggregate human capital in a city increases the wages of all workers.
10See Appendix A.1 for an example.
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The focus of this paper is on financing the public good, but community colleges provide
a private good as well for those who attend. Taxing district residents face lower tuition
and so they attend more frequently (Denning 2017; Martorell et al. 2018; Action 2019), but
households in other parts of the service area and state also attend. Given the private benefits,
why not finance community college expenditure with tuition alone or increase non-resident
tuition to compensate for the spillovers? This would instead impose free-riding along the
attendance margin. Households who do not pay tuition because they are not enrolled would
benefit from the public good without contributing to its financing. If the college relied solely
on tuition, police officers, for example, would have to pay more for their own training, likely
leading to an under provision of their services to help lower the crime rate.
1.3 Are Community College Tax Bases Too Small?
If the benefits of having a community college spill over to nearby areas outside the taxing
district, households can free-ride and therefore the tax base would likely be too small. The
extent to which households can free-ride depends on the size of the spillovers relative to
benefits in the taxing district and how these change with distance from the college. If the
benefits decrease sharply with distance, even for those in the taxing district, then commu-
nities may not want to join. The state required uniform rate may also put too large of a
burden on communities far from the campus, regardless of the size of the spillovers.11
I first estimate the effect of joining the tax base on the newly annexed school districts
(ISDs) using a differences-in-differences framework to test whether the current tax bases
are too small.12 If the value of the new services from joining the the tax base outweigh the
additional taxes owed, the value of property in the area should increase since the public good
is capitalized into home prices and more households will want to move in. Increases in prices
and aggregate home values therefore provide a measures of the net benefits. Annexations
11The taxing district may also be too small because of political frictions. The state requires that the tax
base is contiguous, which limits the number of communities that are eligible to be annexed.
12While the majority of annexations are of ISDs, when looking at the ISD level data, partial annexations
are treated as if the ISD were completely annexed. This is not a problem when looking at finer levels of
geography, like Census Tracts.
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may also impact the original tax base and the other ISDs in the service area through how they
affect the public good and household sorting. I provide suggestive evidence that the current
tax bases are too small since average home prices and aggregate values weakly increase in all
communities after recent expansions– more centralization on the margin is welfare-enhancing.
1.3.1 Data
The Texas Independent School District Self-Reports of Value from the state comptroller
provides information on aggregate property values. Beginning in 1991, each school district
reports the total property value within its borders by type. This data forms a balanced panel
from 1991 to 2016. To capture the effect on home prices, I use Census Tract level “repeat-
transactions” home price indices (HPI) developed in Bogin et al. (2019) and provided by
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). Census Tracts are matched to ISDs using the
correspondence tables from the Missouri Census Data Center.
To measure the distributional effects of increased centralization across space, the analysis
divides school districts into three types of communities: (1) those in the taxing district by
1991; (2) those that joined after 1991; and (3) those that have not yet joined. Table 1.1
presents summary statistics by community type from the 2016 Self-Reports of Value data
as well as the 2014-2018 American Community Survey from IPUMS (Manson et al. 2019).
The current taxing districts are mainly urban areas that only cover about 17 percent of
the land in the state, but 71 percent of the population. They also tend to be more highly
educated, and have slightly higher incomes, home values and rents. Since the taxing districts
must be contiguous, communities in the tax base are closer to the main campus. Additional
annexations add a tax burden to lower income, far away communities.
1.3.2 Impacts of Recent Annexations
To measure the effect of joining a taxing district, the estimation strategy leverages the
staggered timing of annexations and estimates a difference-in-differences using the following
9




βk1(j ∈ TD)t + φj + ξt + εjt (1.1)
where yit is the outcome of interest, for example, aggregate home values or home price
indices, φj are geographic fixed effects at the same level of the data, which are either school
districts or Census Tracts, and ξt are year fixed effects. The range of k is chosen so that the
effects are estimated using a balanced sample of ISDs.
Aggregate home values and price indices provide complementary information on the
benefits to a community. Values reflect the size of the total tax base including the effects on
migration and housing supply that can be used for public goods and services, while prices
reflect the gains to existing home owners.14 βk estimates the effect of joining the tax base
k years after the vote with β0, or the estimated effect for the year of the vote, normalized
to 0. If households value joining more than the added tax, βk will be positive for k greater
than 0, that is, the net benefit is capitalized into home prices.15 Although the tax burden
begins at year 1, β1 does not necessarily capture the difference in realized benefits. Prices
may adjust before the community begins to benefit if households are forward looking.
The main identifying assumption to measure the causal effect of joining the taxing district
is that in the absence of treatment, treated and comparison communities’ outcomes would
evolve similarly. Although this assumption is not directly testable, Equation 1.1 estimates
the relative differences in the few years prior to annexation. If the coefficients for βk, k < 0,
are zero, then this provides suggestive evidence that the parallel trends assumption holds.
Since all communities in the sample are eventually treated, the comparison communities are
13The date range is picked so that the event-study coefficients can be estimated for several years before and
after the vote for each ISD in the sample. Annexations in 1991 and 2016 are therefore excluded, although
they take place during the same period.
14High home prices have an ambiguous welfare effect on individual households conditional on public ex-
penditure. It becomes more costly to live in an area for both owners and renters but increases housing rents
for owners. The policy counterfactuals in Sections 1.6 and 1.7 decompose these channels.
15Ross and Yinger (1999) discuss the economic intuition behind home price capitalization and review the
literature to asses public expenditure capitalization (e.g. Oates 1969 and Brueckner 1982), while Baum-Snow
and Ferreira (2015) provide an overview of causal inference methods estimate similar hedonic models.
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those that will be annexed in the future and this design leverages the staggered timing of
votes.
The parallel trends assumption may fail if voters are only willing to join the tax base
during periods of high local economic growth, conditional on year fixed effects. Alternatively,
a college may only try to organize an annexation in harsh economic conditions when it
needs additional revenue. Since state appropriations have been falling for over 30 years,
business cycle fluctuations likely do not affect the college’s yearly incentives.16 Anecdotally,
the ballot measures are costly to organize and the exact timing of when they will reach
the ballot is potentially quasi-random. For example, Houston hoped to annex Katy, North
Forest, and Spring Branch ISDs in 2004 (Bricker 2008) but only North Forest and Spring
Branch voted in 2009. At the opposite extreme, Pflugerville appears to have arranged for
the proposition to be on the ballot in less than one year.17 The event-study specification
additionally helps overcome some identification issues of two-way-fixed-effect difference-in-
differences with differential timing (Goodman-Bacon 2019).
Panel (a) of Figure 1.1 plots the estimated coefficients for the effect on home values in
solid black circles. In the few years before the vote, the point estimates are very close to
zero, although they are somewhat imprecise. Denning (2017) provides additional suggestive
evidence that the timing of the annexations are quasi-random using student level data. He
finds no evidence of pre-trends on community college and four-year enrollment or graduation
rates, and the annexation is unrelated to student characteristics including gender, race,
economic disadvantage status, and limited English proficiency. He also finds that simply
holding a vote does not impact community college take-up by looking at failed annexations,
which suggests the timing is not correlated with other simultaneous changes in a community’s
human capital.
The year after the vote passes, aggregate values remain constant. Under the new tax
16There must also not be any other contemporaneous events, for example due to other propositions or
elections. One partially reassuring note is that the majority do not take place during an election year.
17The entire process may have been longer since it is unclear from news reports on the subject how long
the community planned before seeking resident signatures.
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burden, households do not appear to be immediately worse off. Over the next few years,
home values steadily increase before leveling off, which suggests that the benefits accumulate
over time as more households have access to the public good. The point estimates imply that
aggregate home values increase about 2.5 percent from joining the tax base on average. We
see a very similar pattern from the solid black circle in Panel (b) for the effect on home prices,
which increase by about 1 percent after the vote on average, although they are imprecisely
estimated. Given the relatively little policy variation, it is not surprising that the estimates
are noisy, but the home valuation and price data come from different sources on different
sets of houses in each ISD and together show a very similar pattern. The noise may also
capture important spatial heterogeneity in the benefits from joining the taxing district. For
example, some communities far from the campus could have very little access to the college
even after joining but would be worse off from the tax burden. In the structural model in
Section 1.5, I model the heterogeneity across space.18
The estimates from Equation 1.1 measure the unconditional effect of joining the tax
base for a community. However, after an annexation, there is an ambiguous effect on other
communities’ decisions to join. First, it may increase the incentive to free-ride. With a larger
tax base, the college has additional revenue to finance its operations that benefit both the
taxing district and areas receiving spillovers. The college may also build a campus in the
newly annexed community, stretching the college’s reach. Alternatively, since increases in the
tax base reduce the financial burden for any single community, the cost of joining decreases.19
To better capture the partial equilibrium effect of the annexation, the open square estimates
plotted in the figure control for the log of the number of other school districts in the tax
base, but the point estimates do not change much.20
18The results are consistent with Denning’s (2017) results on attendance, which links the effects shown in
Figure 1.1 to the mechanisms described in the previous section; there are positive social returns to additional
education and these are capitalized into home prices and values. Some of the estimated effect is likely due
to private returns as well.
19Di Porto and Paty (2018) find that when communities join an inter-municipal jurisdiction, it induces
others to as well in France.
20Appendix A.3 presents the estimated coefficients on the number of residential properties, which also
increase after the annexation. The appendix also estimates the impact on K-12 education to show the
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The annexation may also affect the other communities in the service area. With the
additional tax revenue, the initial tax base will see some combination of increased expenditure
and a decreased tax rate. Increased expenditure should benefit the communities receiving
spillovers while also making them more attractive for households to free-ride. Equation 1.2
estimates the effect of the size of the tax base on the initial taxing district and the remaining
parts of the service area:
log(yjt) = γ log(# in TD) + φj + ξt + εjt (1.2)
where γ is the elasticity of y with respect to the number of school districts in the tax
base. γ is identified based on the staggered timing of successful annexations and # in TD
is arguably exogenous because the initial tax base and remaining parts of the service area
do not control whether a community is annexed. The results in Table 1.2 provide further
suggestive evidence that the current tax bases are too small; all communities in the service
area appear to weakly benefit from a larger tax base and increased centralization.
1.3.3 Impacts on the Community College Market
How does the size of the tax base affect the quality of the public good provided? With access
to more revenue, the college can spend more on instruction to improve quality, increase the
geographic scope of its services, decrease the statutory rate to lower the tax burden, or some
combination of all three. Using a similar expression to Equation 1.2 at the community college
level, Table 1.3 presents the estimated effect of expansions in the tax base, measured by the
aggregate market value of property in the taxing district, on the tax rate and instructional
expenditure per student using all 50 colleges in the state.
Column (1) shows that increases in the size of the tax base lead to a lower statutory
rate. With more revenue, the college is able to decrease the tax burden on each individual.
However, the magnitude is quite small. The average tax rate over the sample period was
impact on other public goods. The results suggest that the K-12 spending per student are unaffected.
Appendix A.4 also suggests that there is no impact of annexation on aggregate firm property values.
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about 16 cents for every $100 in property value, or 0.16 percent. For the average household
in a taxing district, a 0.2 percent reduction in the rate is about $5 of tax savings each year
on a base of about $230. The decrease in the tax rate especially benefits households with
larger homes, who tend to be high income. The change may therefore be regressive. Since
the decrease in the rate is small, the college collects more tax revenue.
However, Column (2) shows no increase in instructional expenditure per student. Instead
of spending more per student, the college is likely spending its extra revenue in additional
areas as described in Section 1.2. Changes in the size of the tax base may not change college
quality but rather the geographic scope of who benefits. Increases in the size of the tax base
may also not lead to significantly more spending because, on average, expansions include
more lower income households far from the college. In that case, the new median voter after
the annexation has weaker preferences for per capita expenditure conditional on the cost of
providing the public good.
1.4 Household Sorting and Public Good Provision
The previous results provide suggestive evidence that community college tax bases are too
small, but how much should they expand? Or, what is the optimal level of government
provision? This section describes a general equilibrium model of household sorting and
public good provision with spillovers to understand the consequences of future expansions
and increased centralization.
The paper builds on the previous structural models of fiscal competition and public good
provision, beginning with Epple and Sieg (1999). This framework estimates how households
respond to changes in public good provision and taxes from the household location decisions
and housing prices in the data. Then, based on the model’s parameters and policy variation
from recent annexations together, I decompose the public good into its components, including
the spatially delineated benefits of community colleges. This paper uses causal inference
methods in the context of the model to estimate the public good production function. The
previous models in this framework use only a cross-section and therefore rely on instruments,
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usually functions of the income rank of the community.21
1.4.1 Household Behavior
The economy has a continuum of households in a metropolitan area divided into J commu-
nities with fixed boundaries. Each community j has a local housing market, and provides
a public good gj financed by ad valorem property tax tj. Households are differentiated by
income y and a preference for the public good α. They freely search for the community that
best suits their needs trading-off the value of the public good and the tax inclusive cost of
housing services, pj = (1 + tj)p
h
j . (α, y) are jointly log-normally distributed and households’
indirect utility function is given by:

















which implies housing demand by Roy’s identity
h = Bpηyν (1.4)
where B is a housing demand shifter, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between the public
good and private consumption, and η and ν are the price and income elasticities of housing,
respectively. If ρ < 0, then the single-crossing property holds, which is key to characterizing
the equilibria.22
Since households choose the community j that maximizes their indirectly function, the
21Kuminoff et al. (2013) reviews the other types of equilibrium sorting models, like the random utility
household sorting models, as in Bayer et al. (2004).




exp((y1−ν − 1)/(1− ν))
]−ρ[
exp((Bpη+1 − 1)/(1 + η))
]−ρ
which is monotonic in y for a given α, and vice versa, as long as ρ < 0. This is empirically tested later.
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set of households in each community is:
Cj = {(α, y)|V (α, gj, pj, y) ≥ max
i 6=j
V (α, gi, pi, y)} (1.5)
Epple and Platt (1998) and Epple and Sieg (1999) show that under the model’s assumptions
in an locational equilibrium, there must be an ordering of community pairs, {(g1, p1), ..., (gJ , pJ)},
such that there will be a set of households that are indifferent between two adjacent in median
income rank communities
Ij = {(α, y)|V (α, gj, pj, y) = V (α, gj+1, pj+1, y)} (1.6)




















. The sorting equilibrium therefore relates household
location decisions and prices to the public good.
The equilibrium has two additional properties that are useful for estimation– stratification
and increasing bundles. Let yj(α) be the implicit function defined by Equation 1.6. Then
stratification implies that for each α, households in community j have income y given by
yj−1(α) < y < yj(α). Increasing bundles states that for two communities i and j with pi > pj,
then gi > gj if and only if yi(α) > yj(α).
1.4.2 Communities
Aggregating household decisions from the previous subsection characterizes communities.
Equation 1.5 implies that the percent of households in, or market share of, community j is







f(lnα, ln y)d lnαd ln y (1.8)
16
where the functional form of the bounds of integration are determined by the choice of
the indirect utility function. Aggregate housing demand for j can similarly be found by





where lj is a measure of the amount of land in the community, and τ is the price elasticity
of supply.
The value of housing in j determines the size of the community’s property tax base to fund
the public good. j’s budget constraint is therefore tjp
h
jHj/nj = cj(gj, s), where c(·) is the
cost per household of providing the public good in state of the world s. In my application,
s indexes the communities in Austin Community College’s tax base.23 The budget, as a
function of prices and aggregate housing values in the community, and the housing market
clearing condition implicitly define the set of feasible policies or the government-services
possibility frontier (GPF). Within each community, (g∗, p∗) is a majority rule equilibrium if
there is no other point on the GPF that would beat it in a pairwise vote. Voters, therefore,
maximize their indirectly utility function subject to this feasibility constraint. Epple et al.


























Similar to Equation 1.7 from the sorting equilibrium, these equations relate household
location decisions and prices to the public good level in each community. If voters are myopic,
that is, if they believe that the distribution of households across communities is not affected
23The cost of providing the public good is community specific because it depends on the amount of
exogenous amenities in that location, like living near a river. It is also a function of the state of the world
because the size of the tax base determines the amount of spending and the tax rate. The extent to which
these change with the level of centralization depends on returns to scale for providing the services.
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While voters are potentially more sophisticated, this assumption make estimation tractable.
The model also assumes that c′(gj) = 1, which one would expect in the absence of wasteful
spending. This assumption further generalizes those in Calabrese et al. (2006).24
1.4.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists of a set of communities, a continuum of households with a distri-
bution of characteristics (α, y) each with housing and private consumption, a partition Cj
across communities, and a vector of prices, taxes and public good expenditure such that:25
1. Every household maximize its utility subject to a budget constraint.
2. All households live in one community and do not want to move (sorting equilibrium).
3. Over all levels of feasible (gj, tj), at least half of the voters in j prefer the chosen levels
over any other (voting equilibrium).
4. The housing market clears in all communities.
5. Each community’s budget is balanced.
1.4.4 Implications of Spillovers and Centralization
The model provides a framework to understand the general equilibrium implications of
spillovers and centralization. This section considers a two community example to illustrate
the mechanisms. Consider communities 1 and 2 where g1 < g2, p1 < p2, and community 2
24Estimation of the structural parameters does not require assumptions on the cost function, only its
derivative, c′(gj). However, when simulating alternative equilibria, changes in the cost for funding community
college expenditure come from the reduced form results because they implicitly incorporate other changes
in the equilibria like state appropriations and tuition payments. Other tax rates are fixed based on the
results on K-12 education in Appendix A.3. These assumptions then do not require further specification of
the functional form of the cost function or make additional assumptions on how state funding changes with
alternative policies. One reason why K-12 spending do not seem to change could be due to Texas’ elementary
and secondary equalization formula, which is not the focus of this paper.
25Calabrese et al. (2006) prove that the equilibrium is unique conditional on observed community sizes
and ranks.
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is part of the taxing district while 1 is not. Community 1 therefore receives benefits that it
does not help finance. Given the relative public goods and prices, household sorting is based
on Equation 1.7. K summarizes the relative value of living in each area. A larger K implies
that community 1 is more desirable and more households choose to live there.
ln(Q2 −Q1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
price difference





Positive public good spillovers lead g1 to be relatively large. If they were removed the
level of the public good in community 1 would decrease to ĝ1. The sorting implications are























The second right hand side term measures the change in the relative value of the public
goods. Since ρ is negative and g1 < g2, this term is positive; a decrease in the public good in
community 1 from the decrease or removal of spillovers will decrease K, all else equal. This
term is the first order effect on the relative attractiveness of each community. At the initial
prices, fewer households find it worthwhile to only receive ĝ1 for p1.
The first term on the right hand side captures the general equilibrium price response.
When the public good in 1 decreases, more households move to community 2, which creates
additional congestion and pushes up p2. At the same time, congestion in 1 and p1 fall. Taken
together, the price response from the change in demand for each community is a second order
effect that decreases the responsiveness of K.26 Overall, ∂K/∂g1 is positive. While spillovers
allow some households to free-ride, they also benefit the households providing the services by
reducing equilibrium congestion and renters in both communities benefit from the spillovers.
The mechanisms for centralization are similar, except it additionally affects the tax rate.
26More formally, Q is increasing in p and therefore Q2−Q1 > 0 since ∂Qj/∂pj = −QρBpηj > 0. ∂p1/∂g1 >
0 and ∂p2/∂g1 ≤ 0 based on the first order sorting implications on congestion and the equilibrium conditions.
Therefore the sign of this term is negative.
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If community 1 joins the tax base, the level of the public good provided and tax rate should
both weakly increase. A larger public good in 1 increases K but the increase in p1 from the
new tax acts in the opposite direction. The implications on households sorting and welfare
are therefore ambiguous. Communities that receive very little or even no change in benefits
from joining the tax base will be worse off. The change in the size of the tax base can also
affect the public good level and the tax rate and the residents initially in 2. Annexations
therefore redistribute across communities.
1.4.5 Brief Discussion of Model Limitations
The previous parts of this section present a tractable but highly stylized model of household
sorting and public good provision to understand the general equilibrium welfare implications
of spillovers and centralization. It is important to consider some of the key simplifications.
First, households in the model care about a single public good based on their preferences
α. This implies that all households agree on the relative importance of each amenity and
cannot sort based on how much they value a particular one. Even if benefits spill over to
areas outside the tax base, it may not be welfare improving to force households who do
not value the spending to finance it. In this case, the model would overestimate the value
of spillovers and annexations. Since α varies across households, this feature is partially
captured. Some have very little value of all public good spending, including by the college.
However, as discussed in Section 1.2, the community college provides a broad public good
by strengthening other services like K-12 education and community infrastructure.
The assumption on preferences and sorting implications of the model imply that com-
munities are vertically differentiated, which limits the number and type of substitutes a
household has. This may imply that the general equilibrium benefits or cost of annexing a
particular community are more concentrated than in reality. Vertical differentiation also does
not capture potential idiosyncratic preferences for communities and the model overstates mo-
bility. I conduct all analyses in both partial equilibrium where households are immobile and
general equilibrium where they are perfectly mobile to understand the implications.
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The model’s static framework of a single metro area also ignores some longer run benefits
of increased access to community college services. If more households attend college because
of centralization, this would lead to economic growth. Higher rates of attendance may
therefore increase incomes, while lowering inequality. Overall, these effects are likely small,
especially since take-up is costly for communities far from the campus, but would lead to an
underestimate of the value of centralization. Additional economic growth may also attract
more households to move to the metro area. In-migration would expand the tax base and
potentially allow for more public good spending, but also lead to additional congestion.
1.5 Model Estimation and Identification
The structure of the model provides a set of estimating equations to recover the underlying
parameters in three steps. First, I estimate the parameters governing household location
decisions and housing expenditure, θ1 = (µln y, σln y, λ, ρ/σlnα, η, B). Conditional on θ1, the
public good moments identify θ2 = (ρ, σlnα, µlnα). The housing supply elasticity, τ is taken
from Saiz (2010). Finally, the structural parameters and policy variation pin down the
relationship between the model implied public goods and amenities observed in the data.
The remainder of the paper focuses on the Austin area. In line with the assumptions
of Tiebout (1956), where households do not face a work-residency restriction, it is natural
to take a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) or commuting zone (CZ) as the household
sorting area. For Austin, the MSA and CZ consist of the same set of counties. All 39 school
districts that touch the area are included. This includes the entire Austin Community College
(ACC) service area as well as part of the service areas of five other community colleges;
Alamo, Blinn, Central Texas, Temple, and Victoria. Since school districts are important for
household location choice and are the most relevant geography for taxing district annexation,
the model treats them as communities.27
For each school district in the Austin area, the 2015 American Community Survey (ACS)
27Service areas and taxing districts are primarily made up of school districts, although this is not always
the case. Cities or counties can be annexed as well, and these boundaries do not necessarily line up with the
school districts.
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reports the number of households, the marginal distribution of household income, and home
and rental values.28 From the ACS data, I convert home values to rental values following
Poterba (1992). I additionally estimate the price of a unit of housing services for each ISD
in a hedonic regression following Sieg et al. (2002, 2004) using parcel level sale and house
characteristic information from CoreLogic Tax Roll Record File for 2015.
I combine the cross-section of data on household sorting with a panel of community
amenities and spending to capture the effects of changes over time. Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) reports yearly community college instructional expenditure
per student, the Common Core of Data reports the yearly ISD instructional expenditure per
student, and the the Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics and the Texas Department of Public
Safety report the yearly crime rate. See Appendix A.2 for more information about the data.
The remaining parts of this section, I show how the model implies a set of equations that
identify the structural parameters, θ. Quantities labeled with θ note that they are computed
from the model rather than observed in the data.
1.5.1 Household Sorting
The model implies both the population shares, and the income distribution of households
within each community. The first set of moments match ISD income quantiles conditional








f(lnα, ln y)d lnαd ln y
where K0 = −∞. Households with both the lowest incomes and lowest preferences for the
public good will live in the community with the lowest price of housing and lowest level of
public good provision. Since the ACS reports n1, I can back out K1 conditional on θ1. After
estimating K1, I apply the same procedure to find the remaining Kj conditional on Kj−1,
281-year estimates from the ACS are used when available. For smaller school districts, the 5-year estimates
are used. Data is from IPUMS (Manson et al. 2019)
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and θ1. These community specific intercepts are equilibrium parameters that are functions
of prices and public goods. The procedure to find Lj From Equation 1.10 is analogous.
The previous expression implies that the qth quantile of the income distribution in com-










f(lnα, ln y)d lnαd ln y
where K̂ denotes that it is estimated based on the observed population shares. Since the
ACS reports the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of the income distribution, the estimation
procedure matches those model implied log income quantiles to the data to form three
estimating equations, one for each quantile q:
ln yj(q, θ) = ln yj(q) + ε
y
j (q) (1.14)
where εyj is mean zero measurement error. These equations identify µln y, σln y, λ, ρ/σlnα and
ν.
1.5.2 Housing Market
Taking logs of Equation 1.4 and noting that the rental value of housing, r, equals the price
times quantity of housing demanded, gives
ln rjq = ln(Bt) + (η + 1) ln pj + ν ln yj(q, θ) + ε
r
jq (1.15)
where εrjq is mean zero measurement error. Using the same three quantiles as before, this
equation creates an additional set of moments that identify η and B, as well as ν.
1.5.3 Public Good Provision
The model provides two predictions about the level of the public good, given the observed
household location decisions and prices. First, rewriting Equation 1.7, the level of the public
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where gsj is the model implied public good based on the implications from the sorting equi-











I estimate the mean and standard deviation of the preference distribution to minimize the






where E[εgj |pj, Hj] = 0. Changes in the preference distribution will change the set of in-
different households between two adjacent communities, Ij, and the locus of median voters
and therefore differentially affect the implied sorting equilibrium and median voters’ optimal
policies. This strategy finds the preference distribution such that the two model implications
are closest across communities.29
1.5.4 Estimation and Results
From the previous section, there are seven model implied equations; three income quantiles,
three housing expenditure quantiles, and one public good. The structural parameters are
identified using cross-sectional variation from household decisions. The three income quantile
and three housing expenditure equations estimate θ1 using weighted non-linear least squares.
I then estimate θ2|θ1 from the public good equation. Table 1.4 displays the estimates.
Based on these results, the single-cross property holds since ρ is negative. The remaining
29The procedure is similar to Calabrese et al. (2006), but does not require additional assumption on the
cost of providing the public good because I estimate home prices, pj , from sales data.
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estimates are similar to the previous literature using this approach; for example, the correla-
tion between income and preferences for the public good is small and negative. Lower income
households may have stronger preferences because they are less able to purchase substitutes,
for example private K-12 education. η, the housing demand elasticity, is slightly larger in
magnitude than the estimate of -0.116 found for Los Angeles in Sieg et al. (2004), which also
estimates the price of housing services from home sale data.30 The estimate of the housing
supply elasticity, τ , is taken from Saiz (2010), who finds that it is 3 for the Austin MSA.
1.5.5 Public Good Decomposition
The model’s structure and the estimated parameters inform how households respond to
changes in public goods and taxes across space and recover the equilibrium level of the
public good under the decentralized status quo policy. To measure how the public good
would change under different policies, I assume the composite public good, g, production
function is Cobb-Douglas in community amenities observed to the researcher, X, including








where gjt is an equilibrium parameter from the model and X is data. ujt is a community-year
specific amenity that is additively separable in a community amenity, φj, a time amenity ξt,
and a community-year term εgjt. Therefore
log(gjt) = π1jt log(CCjt) + π2 log(ISDjt) + π3 log(Crimejt) + φj + ξt + ε
g
jt (1.19)
where π1 is a function of distance to the campus and whether a community is in the taxing








1distancej × 1(Not in TD). Since π1
30Other estimates of η using this methodology without home sale data range are relatively large in mag-
nitude. Walsh (2007) estimates η is -0.62 and Epple and Sieg (1999) estimate it is -0.7.
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is approximated to be linear in distance, I also assume that it is non-negative.31 Equation
1.19 estimates the contribution of community college spending across the service area and
taxing district to the public good using observed policy variation from the annexations and
changes in community college spending over time, conditional on other amenities that affect
household location decisions. By using two-way fixed effects, the πs are estimated using
within community variation, but they can also be interpreted as amenities themselves. For
example, if households value living near a river, as in Austin ISD, then this feature will be
captured by φ. ξ captures the value of amenities in a given point in time, like the quality of
public transportation in a given year or state level policies.32
For each public good component, X, the production function determines how changes in



















since prices in the model are a function of the public good, which is a function of amenities
through the production function.
The first term on the right side, ∂ log p/∂ log g, measures the elasticity of the price of
a unit of housing with respect to the public good. This term captures how changes in
the public good are capitalized into housing prices. When the public good increases in j,
the community becomes more attractive and additional households want to move in, which
31Allowing the parameter to be a higher order function of distance does not affect the implications much.




51(i = j), and ξt can be defined similarly for year fixed effects.
32The functional form assumptions provide a way to focus on the key features for understanding the
implications of community college expenditure policy. However, they likely obscure from other potentially
relevant features. For example, community college expenditure may produce spillovers across service areas.
In reality, these are likely small since those distances are large. The Cobb-Douglas assumptions also restrict
the relationship between amenities (Albouy et al. 2020). A high quality community college may a strategic
substitute or complement for ISD spending, but as a first-order approximation, these interaction effects are
ruled out.
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pushes up the price of housing. The extent of which depends on the structural parameters,
especially the elasticity of housing supply, τ . I estimate this term by simulating the general
equilibrium change in price in each community j for a 1 percent increase in gj financed by
additional property taxes, holding g−j fixed. The elasticity in this setting is about 0.6; a 1
percent increase in the public good leads to a 0.6 percent increase in the price.
∂ log p/∂ logX reflects how changes in amenities affect housing prices, as in the event-
study in Section 1.3. I estimate the elasticity for each public good component from Equation
1.19 with the log of the Census Tract repeat sales home price indices as the dependent
variable, using all of the policy variation from across the state not just the Austin area. φj
are estimated with Census Tract fixed effects.33 Estimating this specification at the Census
Tract level provides a fine level of geography to understand the heterogeneous treatment
effects of spending and annexation by distance to the campus.
This strategy builds on the previous literature to credibly estimate the value of amenities
using causal inference methods. Previous work using this type of model, following Epple
and Sieg (1999), rely on functions of the income rank of communities as instruments in
a cross-section to jointly estimate these parameters and the preference distribution. The
instrument is valid in the model since housing prices and public goods monotonically increase
in income rank. Instead, the approach used here estimates ∂ log p/∂ logX using policy
variation in panel data, and then calculates the model implied outcome– how much must
have the public good increased to be consistent with the observed change in home prices in
the data? The estimates are reported in column (1) of Table 1.5 along with the scaled public
good production function parameters in column (2).
The production function estimates imply that increases in community college quality
improve the public good, but that this benefit is concentrated near the campus. The value
of spending decays slightly more quickly for those not in the taxing district and therefore
33The repeat sales home price captures of the value of living in a particular Census Tract by removing
home characteristics, like the number of bedrooms. See Appendix A.2 for more information about the home
price and amenity data.
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the value of annexation is increasing with distance, up to a point; the public good benefit
from joining is an inverted-U function of distance.34 Communities more than 38 miles from
the campus do not benefit from the college, based on this specification, while the average
ISD that is currently not part of a taxing district is 42 miles away (Table 1.1). Expanding
the tax base by annexing communities far from the campus puts a tax burden on some areas
without an increase in benefits. In 2016, Brazos County residents attempted to start their
own community college, rather than join their service area’s taxing district, citing distance
as a primary reason. However, in the ACC Service Area, the boundary of the taxing district
is only 17 miles away. Marginal changes in the taxing district boundary would reduce
free-riding. This suggests that ACC’s tax base may be too small, although the estimates
here do not capture the general equilibrium implications of household and housing market
responses.35
1.6 Measuring the Value of Spillovers
The relative value of centralized and decentralized policy setting importantly depends on
the geographic nature of the benefits. The decomposition estimates imply that spillovers
are relatively large on the current boundary of the taxing district but decrease to zero. I
quantify the value of spending and spillovers by simulating household compensating variation
(CV) for a 10 percent increase in ACC’s expenditure (about $610 per student) financed by
an increase in property taxes.36 After this policy change, households in j receive (ĝj, p̂j).
Letting V0 denote a household’s indirect utility in the baseline, and V1 in the counterfactual
34The inverted-U shape is determined by the signs and magnitudes of π31 and π
4
1 . Since π
3
1 is negative,
the benefits of being in the taxing district decrease with distance from the college to 0. It is large enough
in magnitude that benefits reach 0 within the service area. A negative and small π41 implies that benefits
decrease slightly more quickly outside of the taxing district and so the benefits from joining are increasing
with distance as long as π11 + π
2
1distancej , or the value of being in the tax base, is positive.
35Note that, in general, there is a negative relationship between the crime rate and the price index, but
this almost entirely captured by the Census Tract and year fixed effects.
36The increase in taxes is calculated from summing over the communities’ budget constraints in the taxing
district using the facts that the marginal cost of the public good is 1 and the tax rate is uniform.
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with higher spending, partial equilibrium CV is then computed as:
V0(gj, pj, y, α) = V1(ĝj, p̂j, y + CV, α) (1.21)
CV in this setting is the amount of additional income (in 2015 dollars) a household would
need to receive to be just as well off after the policy change. A positive value implies a
household is worse off after a 10 percent increase in spending and associated increase in
taxes. This partial equilibrium measure reflects the short-run effects before the households









where Rsj is the per capita housing rents to landowners in state of the world s ∈ {0, 1},∫ phj (s)
0 H
s
j dp/nj. Welfare is reported so that a positive number implies a community is better
off after the policy change.37
Panel (a) of Figure 1.2 presents the partial equilibrium per capita welfare change for a 10
percent increase in ACC expenditure in each ISD based on households’ baseline residency.
A darker shade denotes that a community benefits more from the increase in spending. The
map is divided into three parts; communities labeled “TD” are part of ACC’s tax base, those
labeled “N” are in ACC’s service area but not in the taxing district, and those without a label
are not part of the ACC service area but are in the Austin MSA.38 In partial equilibrium,
only communities in the ACC service area have a change in their public goods or taxes, and
therefore a welfare change.
All but one community in the taxing district is worse off, on average. The increase in
the public good is not worth the additional tax burden to finance it. If the college taxing
district optimally chooses the level of the public good to maximize its residents’ welfare,
37Using an equivalent variation measure instead of CV leads to quantitatively very similar estimates.
38Appendix A.5 decomposes the welfare change into the effect on rents, housing prices, and public goods.
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we should expect this result. One community in the taxing district, however, is better off
because it is only 5.5 miles from the campus. It is also the wealthiest and residents have
the strongest preferences for the public good. The variation in the welfare change across the
taxing district highlights an important cost of centralization– not all communities agree on
the optimal level of spending because of community variation in household characteristics
(Tiebout 1956; Alesina et al. 2004). With spatially delineated public goods and a uniform
tax rate, the distributional effects are especially important because increases in spending
redistribute from less wealthy communities far from the campus to the wealthy nearby.
The increase in expenditure benefits those outside of the taxing district. Communities
near the campus have especially large per capita gains of up to about $775; they receive more
public goods at no additional cost. However, the benefits decrease with distance from the
campus and the four farthest ISDs in the service area receive no additional benefits. There
is substantial amount of free-riding on the border of the taxing district, but none far away.
Since household locations are fixed in partial equilibrium, the previous results do not
reflect how spillovers affect the housing market. Increases in spending and the tax rate in-
crease the benefits from free-riding and, in general equilibrium, households move in response.
Similar to Equation 1.21, the general equilibrium CV is
V0(gj, pj, y, α) = V1(ĝj′ , p̂j′ , y + CV, α) (1.23)
for a household who lives in j in the baseline and j′ when spending increases.
In general equilibrium, public goods and taxes both adjust from the changes in expen-
diture and household location decisions. If the increase in spending and taxes leads some
households to leave the taxing district, the size of the tax base will shrink. The college must
raise the rate, based on the elasticity from Table 1.3, to keep the level of spending constant.
The higher rate puts more of a burden on the tax base and pushes additional households to
leave, compounding the effect, while congestion works in the opposite direction. In princi-
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ple, changes in the size of the tax base from sorting could also affect expenditure, but the
estimates from Table 1.3 suggest they do not.39 Panel (b) of Figure 1.2 shows that the per
capita general equilibrium welfare gain for each ISD based on the household’s 2015 residency.
When households are mobile, they leave areas with a new large tax burden relative to
the change in the public good. This has two effects on welfare for the tax base. First, some
households move to a community that better suits their preferences, which drives down CV
and increases Wj. Second, the households that remain benefit from lower housing prices
and less congestion, although the tax rate slightly increases because the tax base shrinks by
about 1 percent. This benefits renters at the expense of landowners.
Of the 17 communities in the ACC service area but not in the taxing district, a 10 percent
increase in expenditure increases welfare in all but one. Additional expenditure particularly
benefits the communities outside the taxing district but close to the campus. On average,
these households value the increases in public goods more than the negative effects on pricing
from congestion. CV is therefore positive but lower in magnitude than the partial equilibrium
case. The higher housing prices additionally benefit landowners. Communities farther from
campus have lower gains from additional spending but still face higher prices. The partial
equilibrium estimates therefore understate the value of spillovers on communities far from
the campus because they do not capture the housing market externalities.
The increase in ACC’s expenditure also imposes a $27 welfare loss per capita for those
outside the service area due to the general equilibrium externalities. These areas become
relatively less attractive; many areas now have higher public good levels with no new tax
burden. As households leave, landowner profits decrease. Some low-income households are
also made worse off because the higher spending in ACC reduces the number of low public
good, low price communities. Increased competition for the remaining ones drives up prices.
39We may expect spending per student to increase because of decreases in average fixed costs or admin-
istrative costs. After an annexation, average fixed costs may not decrease because the college expands the
geographic scope of its activity. Administrative costs likely do not decrease because increases in the tax base
and annexations do not change the cost of assessing homes or collecting taxes. After a Danish reform that
increased jurisdiction size, Blom-Hansen et al. (2016) also find no increase in economies of scale.
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Overall, the welfare effects in general equilibrium are slightly smaller in magnitude than
in partial equilibrium but these two approaches attribute the burden to different groups.
In the short run, the policy redistributes from communities in the taxing district relatively
far from the campus to the closest community to the campus and those just outside the
boundary of the tax base. When households are mobile, sorting pushes some of the losses
onto landowners and more onto low-income communities in the tax base.
1.7 Centralized Community College Provision
Who benefits, and by how much, from centralization? I now quantify the value of centralized
provision for ACC using the compensating variation method described by Equations 1.21
and 1.23. Currently, 9 ISDs are part of ACC’s taxing district but 26 are in the service
area. Under centralization, the taxing district includes all 26, which is more than a 23
percent increase in aggregate property value. With the larger tax base, the college lowers
the statutory rate based on the reduced form elasticity from Table 1.3 and communities
joining the taxing district receive weakly higher public goods based on the decomposition
estimates. The partial equilibrium per capita welfare gains for centralization are presented
in Panel (a) of Figure 1.3. Households in the baseline 2015 taxing district labeled “TD”
have very modest welfare gains of $8.50 on average from the slight decrease in taxes. Since
higher income households consume more housing, the benefits are concentrated in wealthy
areas.
The welfare gains for newly annexed communities are an inverted-U function of distance.
Communities close to the campus receive very large spillovers and do not benefit much from
joining the taxing district but face a new tax burden. Before annexation, the college was
easily accessible. Additional resources spent in the district after annexation are substitutes,
rather than new benefits worth the cost. As distance from the campus increases slightly, so
do the benefits from joining. Communities between 21 and 38 miles from the campus had
less access to the college’s services before annexation and now benefit in excess of the new
tax burden from the additional resources. The four communities more than 38 miles from
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the campus have welfare losses from centralization of between $93 and $177. They have an
additional tax burden without a compensating increase in public goods.40
In partial equilibrium, the ISDs outside the ACC service area are unaffected. When
households can sort after the expansion of the tax base, the changes in household location
decisions will affect equilibrium housing prices and the distribution of welfare gains.41 To
account for these externalities, the general equilibrium welfare gains from centralization are
shown in Panel (b) of Figure 1.3 and decomposed in Panel (b) of Figure 1.4.
Centralization leads to a general equilibrium yearly welfare gain of $23M for the MSA
or $29 per household but those benefits are not equally spatially distributed. Households
that originally live in the newly annexed communities have an average benefit of about
$160. The increase in the level of the public good makes their communities more desirable,
which increases housing prices and therefore rents to landowners but makes renters worse
off from the added congestion. Comparing Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.4 for the annexed
areas, the general equilibrium effects on both housing prices and public goods are smaller
in magnitude than when households are immobile. Some households are priced out of their
original communities and move to lower (g, p) neighborhoods. Annexation has the opposite
effect on the areas very close to or very far from the college. With almost no increase in the
public good but a new tax burden, the ISD becomes less desirable. Congestion and rents
therefore decrease, which also mitigates the welfare losses from tax increases.
Households in the baseline taxing district also have a small welfare gain from centraliza-
tion valued at $8 per capita. When the newly annexed become more attractive, congestion
in these communities decreases but this has about equal in magnitude welfare consequences
on prices and rents. Although these mechanisms sum to about zero for Wj, they imply redis-
tribution from landowners to renters. Some also benefit from moving to the newly annexed
areas that now have better public goods, although this effect is small.
40Panel (a) of Figure 1.4 breaks down the welfare changes by community and source of benefit type.
41Changes in household location decisions and prices jointly impact the size of the aggregate community
college tax bases and therefore also affect equilibrium tax rates. In practice, this effect is small.
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Centralization additionally imposes negative externalities on the communities outside
ACC’s service area. These areas become less attractive and housing rents decrease. The
public good and price welfare effects are driven by household sorting. Some households
originally outside ACC service area now find it worthwhile to move into it where they pay
higher housing prices for more public goods.42 On average, the welfare effects from these two
sources are roughly equal in magnitude, but the price effect is especially large for households
in low median-income communities. After centralization, these areas become more vertically
differentiated. The change in the choice set for low-income and low-preference households
leads many to live in worse matches compared to the baseline because low-price-low-public
good communities become a scare resource.43
Given the potential benefits from annexation, why is the tax base relatively small com-
pared to the total size of the service area? The results from this section suggest that the
contiguity requirement plays an important role. Communities close to the campus have small
gains or even loses from annexation since the benefits are an inverted-U shape in distance.
If only free-riding communities on the boundary are eligible to join, then it is perhaps not
surprising that tax bases do not expand.
However, there are some communities on the boundary with positive welfare gains from
annexation. They may not join because of information frictions or perceptions about the
benefits. The new tax is salient, but they may not know how joining the tax base will
improve the public good in their communities. Households may also believe that the new
revenue will mainly benefit those close to the campus, in contrast with the results found
here, which would imply that annexation is a form of tax exporting. Incorrect beliefs likely
play an important role since community colleges spend resources before the annexation to
42The households that remain outside of the ACC service area have also experience a housing price change
from resorting, but the sign of the changes varies across the distribution of communities.
43In the baseline, the lowest housing price and public good area has a very large amount of land and is in
ACC’s service area. Since it is 31 miles away from the campus, its public goods and therefore housing price
increase a lot after annexation. Many households were originally able to live in a very low (g, p) community,
but now loose this option. Couture et al. (2019) also find that endogenous amenities from rising income
inequality leads to similar welfare effects on the low-income.
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educate the voters about the public good benefits, although that is outside the scope of
this analysis. Households far from the campus may also be reluctant to join if they believe
spending or the tax rate will increase in the future, for example because of declining state
funding, as highlighted in Section 1.6.
1.8 Welfare Implications of the Property Tax Base Size
Under the current configuration of ACC’s taxing district, some households free-ride. This
leads to low public good provision in many communities, but also decreases congestion in the
tax base. Centralization may not be optimal since expansions redistribute from the wealthy
communities close to the campus to the less wealthy far away44 or because it generates
negative externalities from household sorting.
How much should the tax base “optimally” expand? Let S be the set of possible boundary
configurations, then the optimal tax base size is:
S∗ = arg max
s∈S
∫
W(V (α, y, g(s), p(s)), R(s), j(s))f(lnα, ln y)d lnαd ln y (1.24)
for social welfare function W , which depends on households’ indirect utility and their lo-
cations, and landowner rents. For example, the social planner may incorporate the welfare
of all households in the MSA and set W(·, j) = W(·), whereas ACC may only care about
households in its service area and ignore the externalities on others.45
To measure the welfare implications of changes in the property tax base size, I simulate
the welfare effects of different boundary configurations for a utilitarian planner. Since the
tax base must be contiguous by state law, I divide the service area into three parts; the 2015
taxing district, and inner ring of communities currently in the service area but not the taxing
district, and an outer ring. The inner ring consists of 11 communities that are currently
44In 2015, the correlation between distance and median community income is -0.45.
45This method of computing social welfare has a closed form solution which makes it much more tractable
than using compensating variation as in the previous sections. However, it requires that housing rents are
attributed to households. I assume housing rents in j are equally shared so that each household who lives
in j in the baseline receives the same amount.
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eligible to join the taxing district because they border it while the outer ring consists of 6
that border the inner ring but not the taxing district. Within each ring, I calculate the new
equilibrium and total social welfare for every possible boundary configuration. There are
currently 9 communities in the taxing district, which implies that there are 11 possible ways
to have a 10 community tax base using only the inner ring, and so on.46
In partial equilibrium, the social planner considers the net benefits to each community
from annexation and the benefits to the tax base from a lower statutory rate. Households do
not move in response to the policy and there are no additional externalities created. Allowing
some communities close to the campus to free-ride could increase welfare if the cost of the
new tax burden after annexation is more than the benefits of the slight reduction of the
tax rate. Similarly, annexing far away communities that receive no benefits could increase
welfare if the reverse is true. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.5 plot the percent welfare gain
from the different boundary configurations considered. The social planner values additional
annexations because many households benefit from the added spending in their area more
than the new tax burden and expansions decrease the burden on the current taxing district.
Not all increases in the size of the tax base increase aggregate welfare. Annexing com-
munities near the campus only slightly increases their public goods and are not worth the
new tax burden, even after accounting for the decrease in the tax rate on the other house-
holds. Since the college is easily accessible before joining the tax base, annexation can lead
to wasteful spending rather than an improvement in public good quality.
In general equilibrium when households move in response to the new distribution of
public goods and tax rates, a change in the taxing district’s boundaries can create positive
or negative externalities on other communities and community college service areas nearby.
The welfare effect of the externality depends on features of the communities being annexed,
like the amount of land, and of their closest substitutes. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 1.5
plot the welfare gains from different configurations allowing households to move and housing
46The number of configurations is 211 for the inner ring and 26 for the outer ring, giving 2112 total.
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prices to adjust. The welfare effects are larger in magnitude and more varied than in partial
equilibrium since the sign of the externalities is ambiguous. In 113 cases, the negative
externalities are so large that welfare decreases from the status quo decentralized policy.
In general equilibrium, centralization is not socially optimal. A tax base that is one
community smaller raises per capita welfare by about $222 even though the residents in the
removed community benefit since it is about 35 miles from the campus. This highlights
that the externalities created from household sorting in response to changes in spatial public
good provision are first order. The removed community is just above the median of the
price and public good distribution. After annexation, its public good increases a lot and
it acts as another good substitute for high-price-high-public good locations, which pushes
prices in those communities down. High income communities are more harmed by the loss
in landowner profits than households who remain benefit from paying lower housing prices
from reduced congestion.
The change in sorting and congestion creates negative welfare effects on lower income
communities. Some households are crowded out of the middle-ranked communities and into
the lower public good and price areas. The increase in aggregate demand for low ranked
communities increases housing prices, where the lower income face a larger burden from
the change in the cost of living than they benefit from high rents to landowners. More
affordable, although low public good, communities become a scarce resource. Finally, the
removed community has little land and few residents so its gains do not affect aggregate
welfare as much as the externalities imposed on the remaining metro area. Of the 2112
boundary combinations considered, 146 increase social welfare over centralization, with tax
bases as small as 12 communities.
1.8.1 Returns to Scale and Property Tax Base Size
When the tax base expands, the college has additional revenue that it can use to lower the
tax rate or increase spending. The amount of additional funds depends on the extent to
which there are increasing returns to scale. The estimates from Table 1.3 imply that that
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there is only a small decrease in the tax rate, but no change in expenditure per student
after an increase in aggregate property value. A larger elasticity has an ambiguous effect
on the relative value of centralization. If additional spending mainly benefits high-income
areas, it can reduce the negative sorting externalities since fewer households would find it
worthwhile to move to the middle-income areas. Instead, if the spending mainly benefits the
middle-income neighborhoods, the externalities will be exacerbated. In that case, removing
communities from the tax base could lead to higher spending levels.
The implications of increasing returns to scale are shown in Figure 1.6. It plots the
percent welfare gain over decentralization for both centralized provision and the highest
welfare 25 ISD boundary configuration from Figure 1.5 under different assumptions on the
elasticity of expenditure per student. As the elasticity increases, so does welfare in both cases
since the level of the public good provided in many communities rises without an added tax
burden. At the same time, the welfare gap grows– increasing returns to scale compound the
negative externality effects and undermine the value of centralization.
1.9 Conclusion
Public good provision by different levels of government has important implications for eq-
uity and efficiency, especially in the presence of spillovers. This paper considers the relative
merits of different tax base configurations to fund community colleges. Evidence from recent
expansions suggests that all communities benefited from a higher level of government provid-
ing the services since aggregate home values and prices rose. However, the costs and benefits
are not uniformly distributed across space. Even in partial equilibrium when there are no
externalities from household sorting, not all potential annexations are welfare enhancing.
The state’s uniform tax requirement puts too much of a burden on distant communities that
receive very little in benefits even after they join the tax base and creates other wasteful
spending in nearby areas. In general equilibrium, changes in the geographic scope of the net
benefits in Austin Community College’s service area create externalities that undermine the
value of a large geographic tax base. Centralization is therefore not socially optimal.
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The results highlights two important general equilibrium considerations for policymaking.
First, changes in the level of government provision can create both positive and negative
externalities from household sorting that alter the distribution of benefits and burdens to
fund the public good. While centralization may help solve the free-riding problem, it has
other consequences for redistribution. In particular, the expansion of Austin Community
College’s taxing district leads to large negative welfare effects on low-income areas outside
of the college’s service area. Second, under current regulations, the college and voters likely
do not account for the externalities when deciding whether to expand. They may not care
about the costs imposed on other households. The state can play an important role as an
even higher level of government to help correct them.
The policy analysis considered in this paper follows current Texas law. The tax rate must
be uniform, the tax base must be contiguous, and the state is unable to collect property taxes,
limiting the scope of centralization. Since the tax rate to fund community colleges is only
about five percent of the total property tax bill, the uniform rate requirement plays a small
role for optimal policy. However, because the benefits from annexation are an inverted-U
shape in distance, the contiguity requirement implies that only those with relatively low
gains from joining can. In 2016, Michigan passed no longer required community college tax
base to be contiguous, although this has not lead to any more successful annexations.
Future work should study other public goods with different benefit and spillover produc-
tion processes. In this setting, the public good is produced in a single location by a coalition
of communities that choose one level of expenditure. Other spatial amenities with externali-
ties, like pollution and crime, involve more heterogeneity across communities in production,
which has an ambiguous effect on the returns to increasing the property tax base size. Cen-
tralization would limit the ability of households with different preferences to sort, but would
also limit the production of negative externalities.
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Table 1.1: Summary of ISDs by Date Joined Taxing District
Has Not Joined After 1991 Before 1991
Panel A: 2016 School District Statistics
Population 11,780 78,784 61,298
Percent with Some College 16.0 12.9 15.8
Percent with Associates’ Degree 4.5 3.7 5.3
Percent with College Degree 12.8 13.6 14.3
Median Income ($) 54,160 55,139 60,390
Median Home Value ($) 118,883 138,021 143,339
Median Rent ($) 572 680 715
Aggregate Home Value ($ Millions) 535 3,839 2,943
Percent Own Residence 59.1 56.7 56.3
Number of Businesses 288 1,088 962
Distance to Main Campus (Miles) 41.9 19.7 12.2
Panel B: 2016 Aggregate Statistics
Percent of ISDs 69.4 4.9 25.8
Percent of Land 83.3 3.2 13.5
Percent of Population 29.4 13.8 56.8
Note: Panel A presents summary statistics for Texas school districts based on the year they join a taxing district.
The first column presents the means for school districts not currently in a taxing district, the second for those who
joined after 1991 and the final for those who joined before 1991. 1991 is chosen because it is the start of the Texas
Comptroller data. Panel B presents aggregate statistics to describe overall coverage of the taxing districts.
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Table 1.2: The Effect of Annexations on other Communities
Initial Tax Base Remaining Service Area
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Home Log HPI Log Home Log HPI
Value Value
Log # Other School 0.273 0.079 0.335∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗
Districts in TD (0.179) (0.055) (0.084) (0.022)
School District FE Yes No Yes No
Census Tract FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 442 9522 2158 6795
Note: Columns (1) and (2) show the estimated effect of the number of school districts in the community
college taxing district on log of aggregate single family home values and home price indicies (HPI)
respectively for the initial tax base, that is communities that were part of the tax base in 1991 when
the sample begins. Columns (3) and (4) estimate the effects on the remaining communities in the
service area who are not part of the taxing district by 2016. All specifications include year fixed effects.
Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped with 999 replications, clustered at the school district level.+
p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 1.3: The Effect of Tax Base Expansions on Community Colleges
(1) (2)
Log College Log Instructional
Tax Rate Per Student
Log Aggregate Market Value -0.204∗∗∗ 0.013
(0.060) (0.031)
Observations 1031 1019
Note: Column (1) shows the estimated effect of the elasticity of the community college statutory tax rate
with respect to changes in the aggregate market value of property in the tax base. Column (2) shows the
estimated effect of the elasticity of instructional expenditure per student. All specifications include year and
community college fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by community college. The sample includes 50
colleges for 21 years (1998-2018). Differences in sample sizes are due to missing data. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.4: Structural Parameters
Name Parameters Estimate SE
Stage 1:
Mean log income µln y 10.897 0.005
Sd log income σln y 0.794 0.006
Income-preferences correlation λ -0.066 0.005
Income elasticity ν 0.976 0.002
Elasticity of substitution/Sd log preferences ρ/σlnα -0.316 0.007
Price elasticity η -0.226 0.119
Housing Demand lnB -1.174 0.062
Stage 2:
Mean log preferences µlnα -1.956 0.191
Sd log preferences σlnα 0.290 0.073
Elasticity of Housing Supply τ 3 -
Note: The structural parameters are estimated in two steps. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors correct
for the two-step procedure.
Table 1.5: Public Good Production Function Decomposition
(1) (2)
log pjt log gjt
Log Expenditure/Student 0.422∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.194)
Log Expenditure/Student × 1(Not in TD) 0.004 0.007
(0.003) (0.006)
Log Expenditure/Student × Distance -0.011∗∗ -0.019∗∗
(0.004) (0.007)
Log Expenditure/Student × Distance × 1(Not in TD) -0.0003+ -0.0005+
(0.0001) (0.0002)
Log ISD Spending/Student 0.169∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.087)
Log Crime Rate 0.006 0.011
(0.023) (0.040)
Observations 6808 6808
Note: Column (1) estimates the effect of log amenities on the log of Census Tract home price indices. The
specification includes year and Census Tract fixed effects. When data are missing, for example, because
school district spending data was not reported, we include an indicator variable to maintain the full sample.
Standard errors are computed by cluster bootstrap with 999 replications, clustered by ISD. Column (2)
scales the results from Column (1) by 1/0.6 to compute the public good elasticities. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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(a) Effect on Home Values
(b) Effect on HPI
Figure 1.1: Effect of Joining the Taxing District on Housing Values and Prices
Note: Panel (a) plots the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the effect of
joining the tax base on the log of aggregate single family home values in the school district using the
sample of school districts that are annexed between 1995 and 2011. The sample size is 1114. The solid
black circles estimate the effect including year and school district fixed effects, and the clear squares
additionally control for the log of the number of other school districts in the tax base. Panel (b) plots the
coefficients and confidence intervals for the effect on the log of HPI in the Census Tract including year and
Census Tract fixed effects. The sample size is 6808. Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped with 999




Figure 1.2: Per Capita Welfare Gain for a 10 Percent Expenditure Increase
Note: Panel (a) shows the partial equilibrium per capita welfare gain for a 10 percent increase in
instructional expenditure per student where household are immobile and (b) shows the general equilibrium
results where households are perfectly mobile. Each community is shaded according to the simulated per
capita welfare gain of residents by their baseline location. Darker shades indicate larger welfare gains. The
location of Austin Community College is marked with a graduation cap. Communities labeled TD are in
Austin Community College’s taxing district, N are in the service area but not taxing district, and the




Figure 1.3: Welfare Gain for Centralization
Note: Panel (a) shows the partial equilibrium per capita welfare gain from centralization where all 26
school districts in Austin Community College service area are part of the taxing district fixing households’
original location and (b) shows the general equilibrium results when households are perfectly mobile. Each
community is shaded according to the simulated per capita welfare gain of residents by their baseline
location. Darker shades indicate larger welfare gains. The location of Austin Community College is marked
with a graduation cap. Communities labeled TD are in Austin’s taxing district, N are in the service area
but not taxing district, and the unlabeled are not in either but in the MSA.
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(a) Partial Equilibrium (b) General Equilibrium
Figure 1.4: Welfare Decomposition
Note: Each figure is divided into the three community types: those in the current Austin Community
College taxing district, those annexed through centralization, and those not in the Austin Community
College service area but in the Austin MSA. Panel (a) decomposes the partial equilibrium welfare change
for centralization when households are immobile and Panel (b) shows the general equilibrium change when
they are perfectly mobile. The left most bar plots the average welfare per capita of baseline residents. The
next three bars break down welfare into its components, housing rents to landowners, compensating
variation for the housing price change only holding public goods fixed, and compensating variation for the
public good change holding the price of housing fixed.
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(a) Inner Ring Partial Equilibrium (b) Outer Ring Partial Equilibrium
(c) Inner Ring General Equilibrium (d) Outer Ring General Equilibrium
Figure 1.5: Welfare Implications of the Property Tax Base Size
Note: Panel (a) shows the welfare gain for each possible boundary configuration of the taxing district using
the 11 communities that border the baseline tax base (inner ring) holding residencies fixed in partial
equilibrium where households’ residencies are fixed. This gives 211 = 2048 configurations. Panel (b)
conducts the same exercise for the 6 communities that do not border the baseline tax base (outer ring),
where all communities in the inner ring also join. This gives 26 = 64 configurations. Panels (c) and (d)
compute the general equilibrium gain when households are perfectly mobile. Each circle represents the
percent welfare increase over the baseline for all households.
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Figure 1.6: Returns to Scale, Welfare, and the Property Tax Base Size
Note: The figure plots the general equilibrium model implied percent welfare gain over the 2015 Austin
Community College tax base as a function of the instructional expenditure per student elasticity with
respect to aggregate property value. The solid dark line shows welfare under centralization with all 26
school districts in the taxing district, while the dashed light line shows the welfare with 25 school districts.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Minimum Wage Setting in a Federal System (with
Matthew Wilson)
2.1 Introduction
After Kansas City, and St. Louis, Missouri set their own minimum wages above the state
level in 2017, the Missouri state legislature prohibited any city from setting its own policy.
While there is likely a political motive for a red state to overturn a progressive policy in its
blue cities, there are also potential economic benefits from centralized redistribution. The
central government can more efficiently implement such policies when workers are mobile by
internalizing spillovers, and a state may not want one of its cities to set a higher minimum
wage because of the externality imposed on the rest of the state. This may justify minimum
wage preemption laws in Missouri and 24 other states. However, since the state is constrained
to setting a uniform policy, as in Oates’ (1972) decentralization theorem, then local policy
setting may be preferred.
We examine optimal minimum wage setting in a federation with mobile workers to un-
derstand the relative benefits of centralized, decentralized, and joint policy setting with
interregional spillovers. Which level of government should set minimum wage policies? Al-
though our substantive focus is on the minimum wage, our framework has implications for
a broad set of policies where local governments supplement federal decisions, like the EITC,
income taxes, and Medicaid. Understanding the appropriate level of government decision
making is increasingly important as the US federal government has continued to shift more
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responsibility for these policies to states (Baicker et al. 2012).
Our work most directly builds on Lee and Saez (2012), who examine the role of the
minimum wage in the competitive labor market of a single jurisdiction, where workers are
implicitly immobile. They find that a binding policy is desirable, even when non-linear taxes
are available, if the newly unemployed have zero surplus from working and the government
values redistribution to low-wage workers. In their model, workers can migrate between low
and high wage jobs, though they face different costs from working in each. When a worker’s
sector is fixed so that labor supply can only respond on the extensive margin, the minimum
wage is second-best Pareto inefficient.1 With only one jurisdiction, their framework is unable
to consider the relative merits of having different levels of government set policy as well as
the externalities that result from horizontal and vertical government competition. Vertical
competition in a federation is particularly important for the minimum wage because it is a
price floor policy; only the higher one matters. If the central government that is restricted
to a uniform policy sets a binding minimum wage in the lower wage region, then it lowers
the costs associated with horizontal competition.
We adapt the Lee and Saez (2012) model to a two-jurisdiction framework with mobile
agents, regional governments, and a federal government to study the trade-off presented in
the decentralization theorem. Workers are not mobile across sectors, but the high-skilled
are mobile across jurisdictions.2 Our goal is to understand the conditions under which
setting a binding minimum wage is optimal for each type of government and analyze the
welfare implications of different policy setting authorities. Local governments compete for
high-skilled workers, which hinders their ability to redistribute through the minimum wage,
but the central government is restricted to a uniform policy. Our stylized framework only
includes two inputs for tractability, but the high-skilled can be thought of more broadly as
1Gerritsen and Jacobs (2016) allow for educational investment in the Lee and Saez framework and find
that a minimum wage is only optimal in the presence of non-linear taxes if the gains from more education
outweigh higher unemployment.
2Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and Lee and Saez (2012) both note that the extensive margin working
decision where workers are not mobile across sectors is the most important and relevant in practice.
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mobile factors of production that may respond to increases in the minimum wage, like capital
and firm location. In addition to the “tiered” US model of a federal uniform price floor in
which states may “top off,” or raise the floor, we consider federal uniform, decentralized,
and federal non-uniform policy setting.
We first provide theoretical results to understand the extensive margin decision of im-
plementing a binding minimum wage when governments maximize social welfare. The local
governments will set a binding policy if the welfare loss from unemployment is zero on the
margin, and the government values redistribution to low-skilled workers more than emigra-
tion. Our conditions are the same as in Lee and Saez, except governments are concerned
with policy induced migration. The federal government only cares about migration inso-
far as it affects total output and moving costs, leading it to have stronger preferences for
a minimum wage than local jurisdictions.3 Since the theoretical model only gives predic-
tions on the extensive margin, we proceed to calibrate a two region model to the aggregate
US economy to illustrate how mobility and regional heterogeneity in productivity impact
the relative benefits of centralization, decentralization, a hybrid system as in the US, and
centralized non-uniform policy in general equilibrium.
The key insight from the model is that different levels of government are strategic com-
plements in policymaking and the extent of this complementarity depends on input mobility
and regional heterogeneity in productivity. Higher levels of mobility increase the costs as-
sociated with horizontal competition, while higher levels of regional heterogeneity decrease
the effectiveness of uniform central policy. When jurisdictions are identical and inputs are
mobile, centralized authority leads to greater social welfare while additionally allowing local
governments to enact policy has no effect. However, when jurisdictions differ but inputs
are immobile and therefore there are no interregional spillovers, decentralized authority is
preferred. Simultaneously allowing the central government to also set a minimum wage in
3We also discuss joint policy setting by the local and federal government as well as federal non-uniform
policies and several alternative models, such as rent-seeking governments, economy-wide aggregate produc-
tion functions, and additional mobile factors of production, to understand how the model assumptions impact
the sufficient conditions for a minimum wage.
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this case does not change the equilibrium. For the more realistic cases with heterogeneous
regions and imperfectly mobile inputs, a hybrid system improves welfare since central uni-
form policy reduces horizontal competition and decentralized policy allows for a different
minimum wage in each jurisdiction.
Regional heterogeneity in redistributive preferences may also drive differences in the
minimum wage, as reflected in the Missouri example. Urban areas with high minimum wages
tend to be both more productive and more progressive. We find that progressivity has a
nonlinear effect on optimal policy since the minimum wage redistributes to the low-skilled
from the high-skilled and the newly unemployed. A government with a very progressive social
welfare function would not implement a binding minimum wage because of the negative
effects of additional unemployment, while a government at the other extreme would not
implement a binding policy because it does not value redistribution. Local heterogeneity
in preferences can also lead to higher minimum wages. If one local government enacts
a minimum wage because of its redistributive preferences, this can lead the other local
government to set a binding policy, since a higher minimum wage in one region decreases
the migration externality in the other.
To understand the welfare implications of tiered and centralized policy setting, we cal-
ibrate an economic geography model of the continental United States to match regional
heterogeneity in productivity, high-skilled location decisions, employment, and the federal
government’s optimal policy. Consistent with our earlier findings, this model predicts that
tiered policy setting yields a small welfare gain over centralization alone, as it allows the
federal government to more effectively redistribute from high-skilled to low-skilled workers.
Even though states are heterogeneous in productivity, and high-skilled workers are fairly
mobile, we also find that tiered minimum wage setting closely approximates the social plan-
ner’s optimal policies. Similar models have been used to study place based policies in general
(Kline and Moretti 2014), corporate tax cuts (Suárez Serrato and Zidar 2016), and income
taxes (Colas and Hutchinson 2020).
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While we focus on the trade-offs of different minimum wage setting authorities, the pre-
vious normative literature focused on different tax systems. Stiglitz (1982), Allen (1987),
and Guesnerie and Roberts (1987) find that the minimum wage is not optimal when non-
linear taxes are available, however, Guesnerie and Roberts find they may be desirable under
linear taxes. The literature has also considered more sophisticated minimum wage policies
in a single jurisdiction where government competition is implicitly absent, like a gradu-
ated minimum wage tied to firm size (Danziger and Danziger, 2018), in-kind redistribution
(Economedies and Moutos, 2017), monitoring job search (Broadway and Cuff, 2001), and
bargaining power (Hungerbuhler and Lehmann, 2009).4 Previous work on optimal tax that
incorporates government competition in a federation (e.g. Wilson, 1982; Gordon, 1983;
Hamilton and Pestieau, 2005; Gordon and Cullen, 2012; Divorkin, 2017) has not simulta-
neously allowed governments implement minimum wages. We connect these two previous
literatures by understanding optimal minimum wage policies as a tool for redistribution in
a federation.5
By putting the optimal minimum wage analysis into a federation, our work relates to
the literature on tax competition. In our model, when a jurisdiction increases its minimum
wage, high-skilled workers migrate to the other region, creating a horizontal externality that
is increasing in mobility. Similar to models like Wilson (1986), and Zodrow and Mieszkowski
(1986) on tax competition, agent mobility will lead to low local minimum wages. By adding
a federal government to the Wilson-Zodrow-Mieszkowski set-up, Keen and Kotsogiannis
(2002, 2004) find vertical externalities leave state taxes too high, which is in contrast with
our result that federal policy decreases the cost of local minimum wage setting. Our results
are therefore more similar to Janeba and Wilson (2011) who examine local public good
provision with both horizontal and vertical externalities. In their model, local provision is
4We examine the implications in a competitive labor market, but other work has focused on the optimality
when there are search frictions, as in search-and-matching model. See Flinn (2006), Dube et al. (2016)),
and Lavecchia (2018), for example.
5There is also a large empirical literature on the effects of the minimum wage. See Neumark (2018) for
a recent review.
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too low due to competition, but central provision is inefficient because it is determined by a
winning coalition in the legislature. In other political economy models, like Lockwood (2002)
and Besley and Coate (2003), central provision is inefficient for similar reasons, whereas it is
inefficient in our framework because the federal government is restricted to a uniform policy.
Our assumption is based on the US system, but this restriction does not need to hold. In
May 2019, European Commission Vice-President Frans Timmermans called for each member
of the European Union to set a minimum wage of 60% of its median salary.
Although not centered on the minimum wage, there is a complementary literature on the
interaction of mobility and redistribution, beginning with Stigler (1957) and Oates (1972).
Our focus in this work is on the implications of different levels of government undertaking
redistribution as in Oates (1977), Ladd and Doolittle (1982), Brown and Oates (1987), and
Dixit and Londregan (1998). Our approach to understanding this mechanism is similar to
Epple and Romer (1991), who also use a computational model to capture general equilibrium
effects. The importance of mobility for policy making in a federation has also been studied
in the context of public goods (Epple and Platt 1998; Caplan et al. 2000; Calabrese et
al. 2012; Simon 2020),6 income redistribution (Wildasin 1997; Armenter and Ortega 2011;
Gordon and Cullen 2012), and higher education (Wildasin 2000).7
2.2 Model
We consider a simple two-region, two-factor model to emphasize the role of regional het-
erogeneity and factor mobility in determining the relative effectiveness of centralized and
decentralized minimum wage setting. The economy, I, consists of two regions, i ∈ {1, 2},
low-skilled and high-skilled workers, local firms, and local and federal governments. We
consider each in turn.
Each region i has a unit mass of immobile low-skilled labor. Low skilled labor may
6There is also a relatively large literature on the value of centralized environmental policies with spillovers.
See Banzhaf and Chupp (2012) for a recent example.
7There is also a growing empirical literature on income taxation and mobility. See Kleven et al. (2019)
for a review.
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either be employed, l, or unemployed, u, so that ui + li = 1. If employed, they pay a
cost θ of working, which is distributed according to a known distribution µ(θ). There are
h̄ high-skilled workers who are (im)perfectly mobile across regions, so that h1 + h2 = h̄.
High-skilled workers face moving costs of ξ ∼ ζ(ξ), but do not face a working cost.8 We
interpret this as a normalization on working costs so that the low-skilled costs are relative to
those of the high-skilled. It also ensures that all high-skilled workers are in the labor force
for any reasonable minimum wage policy. Workers can only be employed in their region of
residence. Consumption, cj, for each worker j is given by her wage minus her cost of working
and moving costs paid, if applicable.
Our mobility assumptions are based on the high correlation between education level and
mobility, and the fact that low-skilled workers sluggishly respond to employment shocks.9
To better understand the implications of these restrictions on workers, we consider how low-
skilled mobility affects our theoretical results in the next section. Then, in section 2.5, our
calibration exercise varies ζ(ξ) to describe the relationship between the high-skilled migration
elasticity and optimal minimum wage setting authority. Although the model and calibration
are based solely on low and high-skilled workers for tractability, the high-skilled represent
input factor mobility more broadly. For example, firms may respond to a minimum wage
in their capital investment or location decisions and local governments compete for these
resources. Our choice of using the high-skilled as the mobile factor allows us to naturally
incorporate the mobile input into a social welfare calculation. We discuss how additional
mobile inputs affect our results later in this section.
Each region has a single perfectly competitive firm with production function γif(l, h).
Without loss of generality, we assume γ1 = 1 and γ2 = γ ≤ 1. Workers are paid their marginal
product, and if the high-skilled are perfectly mobile, they migrate so that wh1 = w
h
2 . Relative
8In our simplified framework, we abstract away from congestion costs, which are likely important for
high-skilled migration (Moretti 2013).
9Amior (2019) documents this relationship using the CPS. Our assumptions are similar to those in
Wildasin (2000) who examines the public provision of human capital in a federation, but we allow for variable
high-skilled mobility to understand the comparative statics. We discuss this assumption more explicitly later
in this section.
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low-skilled competitive wages across regions depends on γ and the relative stock of high-
skilled workers. We assume that the optimal minimum wage is never binding for high-skilled
workers, so that they are also always employed. Let Θie be the set of θ’s of the low-skilled
employed workers in i and Θiu the unemployed. For a given wage, workers with relatively
large values of θ are unemployed because they choose to exit the labor force. If there is a
binding minimum wage, others become unemployed due to the change in low-skilled labor
demand by the firm. Similarly, define Θih as the set of high-skilled workers in i.
There is one central government, and each region has its own local government. Both
the local and central governments have perfect information about workers’ working and
moving costs and regional productivity, and we explore the consequences of this assumption
in Section 2.5.3. Governments care about the consumption of their constituents, according
to the concave function G(c), where G′ > 0, G′′ < 0, and G′(0) < ∞. Total utility in r is
given by
∫
j∈rG(cj)dj, r = {1, 2, I}, i.e. each region maximizes the total utility of its own
residents, while the central government maximizes the utility of both regions. We assume
that G(ch) > 0 for any feasible policy so that high-skilled workers are valued and local
governments compete for them. Federal and local governments are either endowed or not
with the ability to set a minimum wage. There are four potential authority structures: (1)
only regional governments; (2) only central government uniform; (3) both central uniform
and regional governments; and (4) central non-uniform. Governments do not need to raise
revenue.
Equilibrium is determined in two stages. In the first stage, no government has minimum
wage setting authority; this is the competitive equilibrium. This gives each worker a res-
idence. In the second stage, some governments are endowed with minimum wage setting
power and optimally set their policy, given the policies of other governments, if applicable,
and the responses by firms and workers.
Definition 1. The economy is in equilibrium after the second stage for a given authority
structure if:
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1. Each government with minimum wage setting authority optimally sets its minimum
wage to maximize the welfare of its residents, given the policies of the other governments
with authority.
2. Firms maximize profits, taking the residencies of workers and government policies as
given.
3. Each worker optimally chooses whether to enter the labor force to maximize utility.
4. No high skilled workers want to move.
2.2.1 Decentralized Minimum Wage
We consider the conditions under which it is optimal for local governments to set a binding
minimum wage. Each jurisdiction i’s social welfare function is defined as







where cj = wj − θj for low-skilled employed individual of type θj, ch = wh for high-skilled
individuals, and cu is the consumption of the unemployed. Without taxes and transfers,
cu = 0. Since moving costs are only paid if residents leave, they do not directly enter




µ(θ)G′(cl)dθ/λ and gh = G
′(ch)/λ, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on
the Social Planner’s budget constraint.10
For a given level of the minimum wage in the other jurisdiction, w̄−i, i implements a







10The Social Planner’s budget constraint is (1− li)cu + licl + hich ≤ liwl + hiwh. Since the governments
in our model do not redistribute and only set a minimum wage, they do not have a budget constraint. Also
note that the construction of the g terms are analogous for the regional and central governments, although

























The first line represents the change in welfare induced by newly unemployed low-skilled
workers. ∆w̄iΘiu denotes the set of workers who become unemployed due to the minimum
wage w̄i, which depends on how workers are separated from the firm after the policy change.
Following Lee and Saez (2012), we assume efficient rationing, i.e. workers with the lowest
surplus from working involuntarily lose their jobs first. Under the assumption, ∆w̄iΘiu =
[γifl(l, h), θ(w̄)], where θ(w̄) is the largest θ worker who becomes unemployed. θ(w̄) depends
on the new policy level, the relative production functions in each jurisdiction, −i’s minimum
wage, and the amount of migration. For a very small binding policy, θ(w̄) = γifl(l, h).
Therefore, the marginal low-skilled worker who loses her job has cj = 0 before and after the
policy change. The second line represents the change in welfare from the still-employed in




> 0 by construction and ∂li
∂w̄i
< 0 since it is less profitable to employ




< 0 from the zero-profit condition.11 As the marginal product of
labor for high-skilled workers falls, some high-skilled workers leave, giving ∂hi
∂w̄i
< 0 as well.
For this reason, the third line of the first order condition only involves emigration and not
immigration. Since the local government only cares about its residents, i.e. natives less those
who move out, it does not internalize individual migration costs.
Proposition 1. If (1) there is efficient rationing; (2) the demand elasticity is finite; (3)
the supply elasticity of low-skilled workers is positive; (4) the government values additional
11With perfectly competitive markets and constant returns to scale, the zero-profit condition implies that
ldwl + hdwh = 0, giving the relationship between the minimum wage and high skilled wages. See Lee and
Saez (2012) Appendix A.1. for more information.
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wages to low-skilled workers more than the loss of wages to high-skilled (redistribution) and
outmigration, then it is total welfare improving for a jurisdiction to impose a (small) binding
minimum wage.
Proof. Our assumptions imply that the first two terms sum to 0 and the magnitude of the
third term is larger than the sum of the magnitude of the fourth and fifth terms. More
explicitly, using the above expressions and the zero profit condition, we can rewrite the last
three terms as liλ[gl − gh] + ∂hi∂w̄iG(ch). This is identical to proposition 1 in Lee and Saez
(2012) except jurisdictions are now also affected by potential outmigration, weakening the
incentive to enact a binding minimum wage.
Under these assumptions, this extensive margin decision to adopt a minimum wage de-
pends on γ, w̄−i, the elasticity of substitution between low and high-skilled workers, and
the mobility of the high-skilled. In section 2.4.2, we conduct a calibration exercise to better
understand how these parameters impact equilibrium, on both the extensive and intensive
margins.
We now consider how changes to the assumptions of Proposition 1 affect the desirability
of a binding minimum wage. Without efficient rationing, the first two terms do not sum to
zero for a small increase in the minimum wage because workers with a large surplus from
working lose their jobs. If workers were fired randomly after the increase in the minimum
wage, then social welfare would be lower in expectation as workers with positive value of
employment are separated rather than the indifferent marginal employee. However, even if
the lowest cost workers were separated first, a government may still implement a binding
minimum wage if the value of redistribution is sufficiently large.12 This reasoning leads to a
corollary to Proposition 1.
12Lee and Saez (2012) note that while this is the most favorable assumption for optimal policy, it may
not be realistic or may be costly to reach through queuing or search costs. However, there is some empirical
literature supporting this assumption. Neumark and Wascher (2007) find that the minimum wage has larger
impacts on teenagers and secondary earners who are more likely to have more elastic labor supply and
Luttmer (2007) found that reservations wages do not increase with the minimum wage.
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Corollary 1. Efficient rationing leads local governments to weakly prefer the highest mini-
mum wages, all else equal, relative to any other separation assumption.
Proof. Efficient rationing maximizes the sum of the first two terms, while not affecting any
other terms. Otherwise, there is a first order welfare loss from unemployment. The condition
is weak because a government may not desire a binding minimum wage for any separation
policy if the other conditions of Proposition 1 do not hold.
If conditions (2) or (3) do not hold, then the employment of low-skilled workers will
change too dramatically for the first two terms to sum to zero. Condition (4) may fail if
governments care too much about outmigration relative to redistribution, if they do not
care about redistribution, or if they only care about redistribution to the unemployed. As a




0 and there is no outmigration. In this case, the minimum wage is optimal if there is
efficient rationing as the government trades off the unemployment of marginal workers with
the additional earnings of all others. As the two types of labor become less substitutable,
increasing the minimum wage will lead to lower high-skilled wages and more outmigration.
Decreasing the elasticity of substitution will weaken the incentive to have a minimum wage,
all else equal.
To further understand the migration externality, consider the impact of raising the min-
imum wage on the other jurisdiction. If high-skilled workers migrate from jurisdiction i
because moving costs are sufficiently small on the margin, the marginal product of labor of
high-skilled workers in jurisdiction −i will fall. Government −i is made relatively better off,
all else equal, as there is a small change in high-skilled consumption, but a larger change in
welfare due to the additional high-skilled workers. This effect lowers the cost for −i to imple-
ment a binding minimum wage as fewer high-skilled workers will want to migrate compared
to the case where i does not have a binding minimum wage. In our model, the marginal
product of low-skilled workers increases when high-skilled workers immigrate, and wages and
employment both increase, leading unambiguously to higher utility for those workers.
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2.2.2 Mobility and the Minimum Wage
Throughout the model we assume that low-skilled workers are perfectly immobile for tractabil-
ity. While these workers tend to have relatively low mobility rates overall, Monras (2019)
finds that after a minimum wage increase, the relative share of low-skilled workers decreases
because of changes in low-skilled in-migration. This effect is potentially driven by immi-
gration from other countries. Cadena (2014) provides evidence that low-skilled immigrants
prefer states with unchanged minimum wages relative to those experiencing increases be-
cause of the disemployment effects. Since our static framework considers a fixed point in
time without population change, including from immigration, or shocks to workers that in-
duce migration besides directly from the minimum wage, this concern is not particularly
relevant in our highly stylized setting. Monras additionally finds no effect on out-migration.
Taken together, these effects on migration are consistent with moving low-skilled not choos-
ing to live in minimum wage areas, rather than migration due to changes in the minimum
wage itself. In a dynamic setting where households may move at any given time for any
reason, the immobility assumption becomes less plausible and more important.
We now consider the implications of relaxing the perfect immobility assumption.13 Low-
skilled workers initially sort in stage 1 so that wl is equal across jurisdictions. After a
minimum wage increase in i, the firm does not hire any additional low-skilled and some are
separated. Therefore, no low-skilled in −i have an incentive to immigrate to i after the policy
change. The unemployed in i emigrate if the new wage is higher than the sum of working
and moving costs. After a minimum wage increase, low-skilled employment weakly increases
in −i from high-skilled migration, but the model does not specify who is hired. If the firm
in −i only hires initially local low-skilled workers, then there is no incentive to move and
the immobility assumption does not impact our results.14 If the firm hires workers with the
13Fukumura and Yamagishi (2020) study government competition with low-skilled migration responses
from minimum wage changes. However, they focus on an economy with only minimum-wage workers and
identical regions.
14Phillips (2018) finds that low wage employers discriminate against applicants with a long commute,
which provides suggestive evidence for this assumption.
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lowest working cost, then the incentive to move depends on γ. Absent any binding minimum
wage policies, the marginal worker in jurisdiction A will have a weakly higher working cost
than the marginal worker in B since γ ≤ 1. Therefore, a minimum wage in A will not lead
to low-skilled migration, but one in B will if moving costs are sufficiently small. In general,
adding in low-skilled mobility has an ambiguous effect on the optimal minimum wage policy
that depends on the value of G(0) and whether the newly unemployed would be hired if they
moved.15
The main migration mechanism in the model is the link between regions created from
high-skilled. The extent to which high-skilled workers respond to local minimum wage poli-
cies, ∂hi
∂w̄i
, determines the effectiveness of local government policy relative to centralization.
If the derivative is zero, because moving costs are high or the marginal product of low and
high-skilled workers are unrelated, then our framework reduces to the single region case as
studied by Lee and Saez (2012). Monras (2019) estimates the relationship between wages and
high-skilled out-migration, finding negative or zero effects; however, they are not statistically
different from zero. Cadena (2014) also provides some suggestive, although mixed, evidence
that this derivative is in fact negative. Taking the point estimates across all specifications
at face value, he finds a negative relationship between the count of immigrants with at least
some college and the minimum wage in a given state.16 More generally, the high-skilled
migration externality represents the impact on endogenous business locations of low-skilled
employers which have been shown to be somewhat responsive to the minimum wage (Rohlin
2011 and Aaronson et al. 2018). Since our model treats the low and high-skilled as linked
through production, we think of the high-skilled as the managers of those firms, with the
very high-skilled not captured in our framework.
15If G(0) < 0, then local governments can set high minimum wages to induce the unemployed to migrate
and raise total social welfare in the jurisdiction.
16When controlling for state-specific trends in the main results, the point estimate becomes small in
magnitude and imprecise. The unweighted results are slightly larger in magnitude, but still imprecise.
Although he interprets this as the minimum wage having no effect on high-skilled migration, the result is
likely underpowered.
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2.2.3 Extensions of the Decentralized Model
In our baseline model, the results and conditions for a binding optimal minimum wage are
driven by the high-skilled migration externality: when a local government raises its minimum
wage some high-skilled workers move out. The size of the externality depends on the choice
of social welfare function and the production technology. We extend the model to see how
changes in these assumptions alter the conclusions. We consider a social welfare function
where governments only care about natives or maximize housing values, when there is a single
firm that operates in both regions, and the introduction of additional inputs to production.
2.2.4 Social Welfare Function
In our framework, we assume that the government only cares about the total utility of its
final residents in the second stage equilibrium. In the first part of this section, we consider
a government that only cares about natives, regardless of whether they move.17 When
governments maximize utility of their natives, the derivative of the social welfare function
shown in equation 2.2 no longer includes the final term: ∂hi
∂w̄i
G(ch). However, they internalize
migration costs. The government still trades off lower consumption of high-skilled workers
with higher consumption of the low-skilled through the minimum wage, but no longer faces
a first order cost from emigration. The implied minimum wages are higher compared to our
baseline model.
Proposition 2. If conditions 1-3 from Proposition 1 hold, the government cares only about
their initial residents, and it values additional wages to low-skilled workers more than the loss
of wages to high-skilled (redistribution) and moving costs, then it is total welfare improving
for a jurisdiction to impose a (small) binding minimum wage.
Proof. This is immediate from the first order condition, where the last term now concerns
moving costs and not outmigration. Under this new assumption on the social welfare func-
17See Wilson (2015) for an overview of different assumptions on government maximization with resident
mobility and Cremer and Pestieau (2004) for a review of the literature on government maximization with
factor mobility.
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Corollary 2. Local governments that care about their initial residents set weakly higher
minimum wage policies than those that care about their final residents.









dξ. By construction, ∂ξ
∂w̄i
= ξ if the worker moves and 0
otherwise, allowing us to rewrite the inequality as ∂hi
∂w̄i
G(ch) ≤ − ∂hi∂w̄iG
′(ch)E∆ξ(Θih)[ξ]. First
consider when −i does not have a binding minimum wage. Then ∂hi
∂w̄i
< 0, and the inequality
holds since G(ch), G
′(·), ξ > 0 by assumption. If −i has a binding minimum wage and its
initial residents return after i puts on a binding minimum wage, then both sides of the
inequality are 0, and it holds as well. If i residents migrate instead, then the argument from
the first case applies.
The preceding analysis assumed that governments are utility maximizers, but we now
consider a model where rent-seeking governments maximize property values.18 In the most
general application of this approach to our framework, all households and firms demand




d(w̄) be the change for workers who transition from type j to j′ due to the policy
change, or for firm f . We assume that housing demand is nondecreasing in income, and that
the elasticity of housing supply is finite. Then, for jurisdiction i, a binding minimum wage
18See Epple and Nechyba (2004) for a survey of these two different assumptions on the government’s
objective function.
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It is immediate that ∆llH
d(w̄) ≥ 0. Workers who remain employed after the wage increase
will have more income and demand more housing. Similarly, workers that lose their jobs will
demand weakly less housing, giving ∆ulH
d(w̄) ≤ 0. The magnitude of this term importantly
depends on how we treat the working cost. If θ is a real cost, then for a small binding
minimum wage, the workers who lose their jobs under efficient rationing will have zero
net income both before and after the policy change. If it is a utility cost, they will have
less income and demand strictly less housing. In the welfare maximization framework, this
distinction did not affect optimal policy. In the case where θ is a utility cost, the minimum
wage is less attractive because we no longer have an assumption akin to efficient rationing.
The always unemployed also have no change in income, implying ∆uuH
d(w̄) = 0.
Similar to our analysis in the utility maximization case, there is weakly less demand from
high-skilled workers when the minimum wage increases. ∆hshsH
d(w̄) ≤ 0 since their wages
weakly decrease and ∆
hs′
hs
Hd(w̄) ≤ 0 due to outmigration from falling wages. The changes
are zero in the extreme case where low and high-skilled labor are perfect substitutes.







, where L(l, h) is the total amount of land used by low and high-
skilled workers for production. We showed that ∂L(l,h)
∂w̄
< 0 as low-skilled workers become




> 0, and firm demand for land decreases. However, if the firm engages in
more land-intensive activity when it has fewer workers, then
∂Hdf
∂L(l,h)
< 0, and firm demand
for land increases.19 Summarizing the above analysis gives us the following proposition.
Proposition 3. A rent-seeking local government will implement a small binding minimum
19In Section 2.2.5 we derive the general effect of additional inputs on the optimal minimum wage.
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wage if conditions 1-3 from Proposition 1 hold and if the housing supply elasticity is finite,
housing demand is nondecreasing in after working-cost net income, and the net change in
housing demand from the low-skilled employed and firms is positive and larger than the
decrease in demand from the high-skilled.
Proof. Under the assumptions, the condition in equation 2.3 is satisfied as described above
since the first two terms are 0, and the sum of the remaining are positive. Note that the
final term can be either positive or negative.
The optimal minimum wage trades off more housing demand from the still employed
low-skilled with lower demand from the high-skilled due to wage decreases and outmigra-
tion. We discussed a comparable set of assumptions to the welfare maximizing case, (i.e.
efficient rationing with no change in housing demand for the newly unemployed, and no land
demand by firms), that leads to similar policies. We specify utility maximization in our main
theoretical and quantitative analysis because the results are theoretically similar and it does
not require us to also specify a specific housing market system. This allows us to focus our
analysis on the high-skilled migration externality.
2.2.5 Capital and Other Inputs
With two inputs to production and zero-profits, high-skilled wages decrease with the mini-
mum wage. We introduce elastically supplied capital, k, with required return, r̄, so that this











is relatively large in magnitude and negative, the marginal product
of high-skilled workers increases with the minimum wage. The increased marginal product
will induce migration into the jurisdiction as high-skilled workers move for higher wages. In
this case, it is Pareto efficient20 to implement a very small binding minimum wage since the
marginal low-skilled worker is indifferent between working and not due to efficient rationing,
and the wages of all other still employed low-skilled and all high-skilled workers increase.
20We are implicitly assuming that capital is paid its marginal product and always earns zero profit so we
do not need to worry about rents to capital owners.
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Raising the minimum wage further will not be Pareto efficient, and the government will
trade off additional consumption from the employed low-skilled and high-skilled, and mi-
gration into the region from high-skilled workers with reduced consumption from the newly
unemployed.
From the zero-profit condition, we can generalize dw
h
dw̄
when there are additional inputs,














Proposition 4. When there are additional inputs to production besides high and low-skilled
labor, a small binding minimum wage is Pareto Efficient if conditions 1-3 from Proposition







≥ 0, there is no outmigration, and by efficient rationing all workers are
weakly better off.
2.3 Alternative Configurations for Minimum Wage Setting Authority
Using our baseline model, we consider the implications of alternative minimum wage setting
authorities. As in the decentralized case, we develop conditions under which each type of
government finds it optimal to implement a binding minimum wage.
2.3.1 Only Federal Government
In this section, we consider optimal minimum wage setting when only the federal government











Note that in the federal government’s optimization problem, it cares about the utility of
all high skilled workers regardless of residence. Unlike in the regional government’s problem,
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when high skilled workers move, their utility still matters for the federal government. The
government also cares about the migration costs paid by individual workers.21
2.3.2 Federal Non-Uniform Policy
When the federal government can set a different policy in each region, the policies are given
by:
(w̄1, w̄2) = arg maxSWf (w̄1, w̄2) (2.6)




















































We also use the fact that moving costs are randomly assigned after households choose a
residence in the competitive equilibrium and that under our assumptions, there will be net
migration to jurisdiction 2. The FOC for w̄2 is defined analogously.
The first row of the FOC gives the welfare loss from newly unemployed low-skilled work-
ers in jurisdiction 1. The second row gives the welfare gain from new low-skilled employment
in jurisdiction 2. As high-skilled move to jurisdiction 2, the marginal product of low-skilled
labor increases, leading workers to enter the labor market. The third row gives the welfare
gain to the still-employed in both jurisdictions. The wage, conditional on employment, in-
21The final term of the government’s social welfare function therefore involves integrating over the types
of households in each jurisdiction.
22The last equality only holds if the lower bound on the moving costs are zero, which we maintain through-
out, and for a small minimum wage.
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creases in jurisdiction 1 due to the new binding minimum wage, while the wage in jurisdiction
2 increases because of induced high-skilled immigration. The final row gives the welfare loss
to high-skilled workers, due to both the change in wages and moving costs paid by those
who move to jurisdiction 2.
Proposition 5. If (1) there is efficient rationing; (2) the demand elasticity is finite; (3)
the supply elasticity of low-skilled workers is positive; (4) the government values additional
wages to low-skilled workers more than the loss of wages to high-skilled; and (5) the first
worker to move to the other jurisdiction has zero moving costs, ξ = 0, then it is total welfare
improving for the federal government to impose a (small) binding minimum wage.
Proposition 5 is the same as Proposition 1, except the central government only cares
about migration insofar as it affects efficiency and moving costs paid. Condition (5) is
similar to efficient rationing, but for moving, so that moving costs are zeros for a small
binding minimum wage. It implies that the lower bound on the moving cost distribution
is zero.23 Even without condition (5), the federal government may implement a binding
minimum wage if it values redistribution enough. An increase in the federal minimum wage
leads to lower high-skilled wages, regardless of moving costs, and is therefore not Pareto
improving. Comparing Propositions 1 and 5, we expect the federal government to prefer
higher minimum wages than regional governments, all else equal.
The case in which the federal government can set a different minimum wage in each region
is synonymous with the social optimum. The social optimum is defined in our context by
the sum of total welfare for all agents in all regions. This is exactly the function maximized
by the federal government. When its policy is allowed to be asymmetric, it has the flexibility
to reach the socially optimal minimum wage in each region.
23This assumption on the moving cost distribution is not realistic and is chosen to provide sufficient, but
not necessary, conditions for a federal minimum wage. However, in a long-run version of our model where
workers do not have a fixed residence, the moving costs can be interpreted as preferences for one region
compared to the other. In that case, it is plausible that some workers are indifferent, all else equal.
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2.3.3 Federal Uniform Policy
In this case, we restrict the central government to set a single uniform policy. The minimum
wage is given by:
w̄ = arg maxSWf (w̄) (2.7)
The FOC is quite similar to the non-uniform case, where the responses are given with
respect to w̄ instead of (w̄1, w̄2). When γ = 1, the solution will be the same in the non-
uniform and uniform cases. If γ < 1, then the competitive equilibrium low-skilled wages in
jurisdiction 1 will be greater than those in 2. Therefore, when considering a small binding
minimum wage, it will only be binding in 2. Under the assumptions of Proposition 5, the
Social Planner will always want a binding minimum wage in each jurisdiction, however it
may be the case that even when the assumptions hold, the federal government does not set a
binding minimum wage if constrained to only set a uniform policy. When the Social Planner
sets a binding policy in each jurisdiction, it can mitigate the welfare loss due to migration,
both moving costs and the suboptimal allocation of individuals across jurisdictions. When
the federal government can only set one policy and it is only binding in a jurisdiction, then
there is an externality imposed on the other. This is seen by noting that all of the components
of the government’s first order conditions depend on the enforced minimum wage in both
jurisdictions. For γ < 1, a small binding uniform policy is equivalent to the Social Planner
only setting a minimum wage in the low productivity region, which the previous section
showed is suboptimal.
Tiered System
The US has a tiered system in which the federal and local government both set minimum
wages, and the larger of the two is enforced. The federal government is restricted to set a
uniform policy. Based on our previous analysis, under the assumptions of Proposition 1, each
local government sets a binding minimum wage, and under the assumptions of Proposition
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5, the federal government also sets a binding policy for at least the less productive region.
As a result, there will be binding policy enacted in each. In the symmetric case, the federal
minimum wage will be weakly higher than both jurisdictions’ preferred policies because of
the differential effects of outmigration and moving costs. The effect of moving costs must be
less than outmigration by construction.
2.4 A Two Region Example
2.4.1 Parameterization
In the interest of exploring the relative welfare consequences of different configurations and
the relative advantages of decentralized and centralized policy setting, we consider a parame-
terized version of the model. The calibrated model illustrates the mechanisms highlighted in
the theory section, particularly regional heterogeneity and competition. In the previous sec-
tions, we are unable to give theoretical predictions for each policymaker beyond the extensive
margin conditional on the other policies. The calibrated simulations in the next section on
optimal policy provide results for the intensive margin decisions when governments compete
while factoring in the general equilibrium effects of their actions.
We specify the following functional forms. We assume f is a constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) production function with elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled
labor σ = 1
1−ρ and weight α on the low-skilled.
f(l, h) = (αlρ + (1− α)hρ)
1
ρ (2.8)
With this production function, ρ ≤ 1. If ρ = 1 the two types of labor are perfect substitutes
and if ρ = −∞ then the two types are perfect complements. Worker heterogeneity is
determined by the distributions on θ and ξ, which we assume to be θ ∼ U(0, θ̄) and ξ ∼
U(0, ξ̄). The sufficient conditions from propositions 1 and 5 require that the lower bounds
are zero. Alternative distributional assumption on the moving costs do not qualitatively
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affect our results.24




log(cj + ν)dj (2.9)
where ν is a utility function shifter. Since some low-skilled workers are always unemployed
with cu = 0, ν must be positive. log(ν) is therefore the value of unemployment to the
government. Smaller values of ν do not affect labor supply, but increase the social cost of
unemployment. We choose individual utility to be net, after migration and disutility from
working, consumption so that there are no income effects.
2.4.2 Calibration
We calibrate our model to match aggregate moments of the US economy. We have seven
parameters: α, γ, and ρ for the production function; h̄, θ̄, and ξ̄ to describe the worker
population; and ν for the social welfare function. We vary γ to see how different levels of
regional heterogeneity impacts our results; for the calibration, we set γ = 1, corresponding
to the symmetric case. Additionally, we let h̄ = 1 to reflect the fact that about one-third of
the population has a Bachelor’s degree (CPS), and ρ = 0.286, based on the estimate of the
elasticity of substitution between high and low-skilled workers in Katz and Murphy (1992).25
Based on the timing assumptions of our model, we calibrate the remaining parameters
in two stages. In the first stage of the calibration, based on the competitive equilibrium,
we set α and θ̄. We calibrate α to match the relative wages across skill types. Using
the Current Population Survey Outgoing Rotation Group microdata, the Economic Policy
24For example, modeling the moving costs as a type I extreme value idiosyncratic preference for region 1,
similar to our quantitative model in Section 2.6, does not affect the mechanisms highlighted here. In both
cases, low ξ high-skilled workers in i will move after an increase in the minimum wage in i. However, the
number of movers, and therefore optimal policy, depends on the distributional assumptions. We specify that
the moving costs are normally distributed so that all draws of ξ are non-negative for all values of γ. Under
the type I extreme value assumption with asymmetric regions, some individuals have negative moving costs
in the baseline. For the purposes of this exercise, we do not allow for that source of misallocation.
25For the purposes of the calibration, we set h̄ using college graduates to match the definition of high-skilled
in Katz and Murphy.
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= 1.82. We calibrate θ̄ to match the 2017 labor force participation rate of high
school graduates. Based on estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2017, the value
for high school graduates is 57.7%, while the value for those with only a Bachelor’s degree is
73.3%. Since our model assumes that high skilled workers are always in the labor force, we
scale up the high school rate to 57.7
73.3
= 78.7. ν is normalized to 1 so that the utility of the
unemployed is 0. It also ensures that G(ch) > 0
In the second stage, after all workers have established residencies from the competitive
equilibrium, we calibrate the upper bound on the moving cost distribution, ξ̄ to match the
elasticity of migration with respect to wages of 0.5 from Kennan and Walker (2011). For a
10 percent decrease in γ, ξ̄ is found so that there is an increase in the stock of high-skilled
workers in jurisdiction 1 of 5 percent.26
The parameter estimates are presented in Table 2.1. The estimate column gives the
values used in the welfare calculations and the residuals note the distance between the
model implied value and the target, when relevant.
From the baseline calibrated model, Figure 2.1 plots total social welfare in the economy
as a function of the minimum wage. In the left panel, the minimum wage is effective in both
regions and so this figure represents the problem of the central government restricted to a
uniform policy. A small binding minimum wage increases welfare since the government values
redistribution, the marginal separated low-skilled worker has 0 surplus from working, and
no high-skilled workers move since the regions are identical and a uniform policy is enforced.
As the minimum wage increase further to 102.5 percent of the competitive wage, welfare
also increases. After this point, the higher price floor causes relatively too much additional
unemployment and lost high-skilled wages. When the minimum wage is 5.6 percent above
26We interpret the Kennan and Walker (2011) partial equilibrium results as a productivity shock in our
general equilibrium model. The shock in one region affects high-skilled wages directly and through its effect
on low-skilled labor supply, while the general equilibrium migration effect moves in the opposite direction.
If instead we shock just high-skilled wages in one state holding everything else fixed, then ξ̄ would barely
change to 1.3140 instead of 1.3134.
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the competitive level, the policy is worse than no policy at all.
The right panel of the figure plots total welfare as a function of the minimum wage in
region 1 with no minimum wage in the other. If region 2’s government does not set a binding
policy, this figure depicts the decentralized problem for region 1. For a small binding policy,
total social welfare decreases in region 1 because the loss of high-skilled workers is more
than the value from additional wages to the low-skilled. Welfare in region 2 increases from
the inflow of new high-skilled workers, which increases the total population and low-skilled
wages but at the expense of high-skilled wages. The increase in region 2 is not enough to
offset the loss in region 1 and so a small binding minimum wage in only one region decreases
total welfare in the economy. The migration externality is too large relatively to the benefits
from redistribution.
2.5 Optimal Minimum Wage Setting
To supplement the theoretical work on the extensive margin, we use the calibrated model
to trace out the relative benefits of centralization verse decentralization as a function of
mobility and regional heterogeneity for optimal minimum wage setting. Our results illustrate
the trade-off captured by the decentralization theorem, where the federal government can
only set a single uniform policy and local governments can better adjust to their own needs.
We find that centralization of minimum wage setting authority is always weakly preferred
to decentralization in our baseline calibrated model, even when regions are heterogeneous,
because of interregional spillovers and the corresponding competition for high-skilled workers.
Local governments never want to set binding minimum wages, while the central government
loses its incentive to set a uniform minimum wage as heterogeneity across regions increases.
Panel A of Table 2.2 presents results for the symmetric case, i.e., when relative productiv-
ity γ = 1. The five rows correspond to the five different types of government structure that
we allow in our context. The top row is the competitive equilibrium with no government, and
the bottom row is the case of a benevolent central government setting non-uniform policy,
which is synonymous with a social planner solution. The middle three rows correspond to
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cases with local governments only, a central government restricted to uniform policy only,
and a US-style hybrid system with both of these types, respectively. Columns list the values
for unemployment, wages for high-skilled and low-skilled workers, and the fraction of (mass
1) high skill workers that sort to region 1. If the wages of a particular case match the wages
in the competitive case, then there is no binding minimum wage. The far right column lists
the welfare loss relative to the federal non-uniform or social planner.
In the symmetric case, local governments do not want to set a binding minimum wage
because the resulting outmigration is too large to be offset by the increase in wages for the
low-skilled. Condition 4 of Proposition 1 does not hold. In contrast, the central government
is not affected by this race-to-the-bottom behavior to keep high-skilled workers because
migration does not change the set of agents in the central governments welfare function. In
the symmetric case, the central government exactly matches the social planners policy, since
the social planner sets identical minimum wages in each region.
In our calibrated equilibrium, we find that the social planner and central government
set the optimal minimum wage to 102.5% of the competitive wage. The binding minimum
wage leads to a small total welfare increase over the competitive and decentralized cases of
0.23%. With higher low-skilled wages, the always employed low-skilled have a welfare gain
at least 2.14% that depends on their working costs. The gain comes at the expense of the
newly unemployed, whose welfare decreases by 100% as consumption drops to 0, and the
high-skilled, whose welfare falls by 1.65%. As more low-skilled workers become unemployed,
the marginal product of the high-skilled workers falls, leading to lower consumption. The
always unemployed are unaffected by changed in the policy.
With heterogeneous regions, the central governments ability to match the social planner’s
solution disappears. Panel B of Table 2.2 presents the outcomes when γ is reduced to
.995. With this very small productivity difference, the central government desires a binding
minimum wage that is between the social planners two policies: slightly too high for the
less productive region, but too low for the more productive area. The centralized and tiered
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environments both result in a positive welfare loss relative to the social planner, though
they are still preferred to the decentralized case where local governments do not implement
a binding policy.
Finally, we present results for γ = 0.99 in Panel C of Table 2.2. In this case, the local
and central uniform governments do set a binding minimum wage, while the social planner’s
solution sets a different binding policy in each region. As in the previous cases, the migration
incentive is too strong for the local governments to set a binding policy, and now that is also
the case for the central uniform as well. A small binding central uniform policy only affects
the less productive jurisdiction, which causes high-skilled workers to migrate. The migration
externality decreases welfare as total output in the economy shrinks, even more low-skilled
workers in region 2 become unemployed, and some high-skilled pay migration costs. In the
γ = 0.995 case, the jurisdictions were similar enough that the same policy implemented in
both did not cause too large of an externality. With large amounts of heterogeneity, like in
the US, central uniform policies are inefficient. The optimality of a central uniform minimum
wage is decreasing in regional heterogeneity. With two policies to set, the social planner is
able to set the binding minimum wage in each jurisdiction so that the populations remain
the same as in the competitive equilibrium.
2.5.1 Variable Mobility
The relative differences in government competition of mobile high-skilled agents drives our
main results in the previous section. Local governments are averse to minimum wage induced
outmigration, as it creates a first order welfare loss. The central government faces a much
smaller cost from migration, especially since the first workers who move have no migration
costs. However, both types of governments bear the burden of decreased total output as
households sort across jurisdictions. We now explicitly vary the mobility of the high-skilled
to better understand this mechanism. With high migration costs, the model captures the
short-run effects as workers are unable to move in response to the policy. As migration costs
decrease, the model better captures the long-run equilibrium effects.
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When migration costs increase, minimum wages become more desirable for regional gov-
ernments; when high-skilled workers are immobile, regional governments enact exactly the
social planner policy. Without migration, there are no interregional spillovers and the local
governments problems exactly match that of the social planner because the two economies
are additively separable in the social welfare function. From the baseline symmetric model,
if the minimum of the moving cost distribution is increased slightly to 0.0025 from 0, or
0.3% of the competitive high-skilled wage, then the decentralized outcome would match the
social planner as well. The lowest moving cost is large enough that the high-skilled are ef-
fectively immobile in equilibrium. As long as the minimum moving cost is more than 0.03%
of the high-skilled competitive wage, regional governments will enact binding policy in the
baseline model. Small changes in the moving cost have large implications for government
competition.
To understand the interaction between productivity heterogeneity and mobility, we set γ
to .95 and the minimum of the migration cost distribution to 0.0025. Table 2.3 presents the
results. As before, the social planner implements a different binding minimum wage in each
jurisdiction. In the decentralized case, migration costs lessen horizontal competition enough
so that both local governments set binding policies, but not enough to replicate the social
planner’s solution. The central uniform policy alone leads to greater welfare loss than the
decentralized policy setting because there is considerable heterogeneity, but the government
only has one instrument. However, the hybrid system captures the social optimum. When
the central government sets its policy equal to that of the social planner in jurisdiction 2,
it now becomes optimal for jurisdiction 1 to raise its policy. The local government faces a
smaller threat from outmigration than the decentralized case where the regional government
in jurisdiction 2 sets its policy too low. In this more realistic case, where jurisdictions are
heterogeneous and all migration is at least a little costly, the hybrid minimum wage setting
authority is welfare improving over either by itself. Centralized and decentralized policy
setting are strategic complements. This justifies the policies we see in Seattle, for example,
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while not supporting the policies by the Missouri state government of prohibiting its cities
from setting higher minimum wages or in Europe where many countries set a single national
policy.
At the other extreme, we consider perfectly mobile high-skilled workers. In this case,
the outmigration response to a minimum wage will be even stronger than in the baseline
case, such that local governments will have even less of an incentive to implement binding
minimum wages. For the central government, the effect is ambiguous. The lack of moving
costs means that migration is less costly, since what matters to the central government is the
costs paid by individuals rather than the loss of population. However, the central government
also cares about the total output in the economy, which is decreasing with migration. When
γ = 1, no households move as a result of federal policy, and the calibrated migration and
perfect mobility equilibria are identical. When γ = 0.95, the federal non-uniform optimal
policies are 0.379 in jurisdiction 1 and 0.340 in jurisdiction 2, compared to 0.383 and 0.343
in the baseline calibrated case. Higher levels of mobility push down optimal federal policy.
2.5.2 Alternative Social Welfare Functions
The previous quantitative results rely on a single specification of the social welfare function,
namely, U(c) = log(c+ν), where we set ν = 1. ν is a shifter on the progressivity of the welfare
function, with lower values corresponding to a more progressive desire for redistribution.
The right panel of Figure 2.2 presents the equilibrium minimum wages desired by local
governments and by the social planner as a function of the ν for the symmetric case holding
all other structural parameters fixed. Since our theory requires that G(ch) > 0, ν cannot
be too small in our baseline model. To fully investigate the importance of progressivity, the
left panel of the figure uses the social welfare function log(2(c+ ν)) so that G(ch) > 0 for all
ν > 0 since in the symmetric baseline equilibrium, ch > .6 for any feasible minimum wage
policy.
The optimal minimum wages are an inverted-U shape in progressivity. As ν approaches
zero, the welfare of the unemployed quickly heads toward negative infinity, such that adding
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to unemployment becomes increasingly costly from a social welfare perspective. Minimum
wages distribute from the high-skilled and the newly unemployed to the low-skilled employed.
If ν were 0, then the social welfare would be negative infinity for all policies, including no
binding minimum wage, since there will always be some unemployed workers in our model.
In that case, the optimal minimum wage would not be defined for any government. The
pattern is identical when γ < 1.
We now consider a utilitarian social welfare function. Since our agents maximize con-
sumption, this social welfare function is equivalent to maximizing the sum of wages minus
any working costs or moving costs paid. In the symmetric γ = 1 case, no binding minimum
wages are optimal for any government. With a relatively large amount of regional hetero-
geneity, for example when γ = 0.95, the social planner desires a small binding minimum
wage of about 0.3% over the competitive wage in each jurisdiction. Under our baseline so-
cial welfare function, when γ = 0.95, the social planner would set optimal minimum wages
of about 2.5% above the competitive.
In addition to the productivity heterogeneity explored previously, regions may also differ
in their progressivity. St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri as blue cities in a red state
may have set higher minimum wages because they value redistribution more. To test this
implication, Figure 2.3 varies ν for only jurisdiction 1, holding the value for jurisdiction
2 fixed at 1, and plots the equilibrium decentralized policies and the competitive outcome
when jurisdictions are otherwise identical. When ν is slightly less than 1, jurisdiction 1 values
redistribution sufficiently to set a binding minimum wage. Unlike in the baseline, condition
4 of Proposition 1 is now satisfied. Although the welfare cost of setting a minimum wage
for the government in jurisdiction 2 is now lower because the binding minimum wage in the
other region reduces the value of migration for the high-skilled, it remains at the corner of
no binding policy. It is not until ν in jurisdiction 1 falls below 0.7 that jurisdiction 2 sets a
binding minimum wage. As ν in jurisdiction 1 falls further, jurisdiction 2 is induced to set a
binding minimum wage. In this region of ν, governments engage in race to the top. When
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ν decreases even further, the benefit of setting a high minimum wage also decreases and the
policies begin to level off. Even when regions are equally productive, differences in the value
of redistribution can lead competing governments to set binding decentralized policies.
2.5.3 Information
In addition to mobility and regional competition, the relative information quality of different
levels of government affects the optimal minimum wage setting authority. Decentralized
policy setting may be preferred because local governments have better knowledge of the labor
supply, labor demand, and migration elasticities or local productivity. These parameters
jointly determine how employment changes after a minimum wage increase. In a 2019 report,
the CBO documented a large amount of variation in estimates of the employment elasticities
from the recent minimum wage literature from 0.4 in Cengiz et al. (2019) to -1.7 in Clemens
and Wither (2016). Which estimate should a government use when determining its policy?
In the context of our model, if a government thought the employment elasticity were positive,
then it would believe that a binding minimum wage is Pareto improving and only faces a
welfare trade-off when the estimate is negative. Therefore different estimates lead to very
different “optimal” policies. Local governments may additionally have better information
about the market structure, which we do not explore in this paper, or political beliefs leading
them to favor one estimate over another; for example, if it believes there is significant
monopsony power in the region, it may place more weight on positive estimates. If any
government has noisy or incorrect information about the regions or these parameters, then
it will not be able to set policy optimally.
While the previous analysis assumed that both levels had perfect information about
workers and regions, we now explore the consequences of misspecified policy.27 Panel (a) of
Figure 2.4 presents the welfare for different minimum wage policies in each region for the
baseline model normalized by the welfare in the competitive case with no binding policy.
27We do not make explicit assumptions about why the minimum wage differs from the optimal policies
found in the previous subsection but instead simulate how deviations affect welfare. These errors may be
due to a lack of information.
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In each row, the minimum wage varies from 0 to 10 percent above the competitive wage
in region 1. The columns vary the price floor in region 2. The grid therefore constructs a
discretized version of the social planner’s problem and it confirms that the optimal minimum
wage is about 2.5 percent above the competitive. Similarly, looking down the main diagonal
gives the optimal central uniform policy. Based on these simulations, we see that very large
uniform minimum wages can lead to lower total welfare than having no policy, which is
also the decentralized case. Importantly for policy-making, these results suggest that when
regions are symmetric, a minimum wage that is too high is better than one that is too
low. Specifically, we find that a minimum wage 0.5 percentage points too high yields higher
welfare than one that is 0.5 percentage points too low. The same is true when we compare
policies that are 1.5 and 2.5 percentage points off in either direction.28
Asymmetric policies for which the difference is more than 2 percentage points also lead
to lower welfare than having no policies at all. When the enforced minimum wage is too
different in otherwise identical regions, the migration externality overpowers the benefits
from redistribution. Since symmetric policies do not induce migration, relatively more of the
burden falls on high-skilled workers that the progressive government values less. However,
large differences in the enforced low-skilled wage across equally productive regions leads to
a large amount of migration. This exacerbates the disemployment effects of the minimum
wage in the region with a higher policy. In our simulations, we find that minimum wages
of 101.5 and 103.5 percent of the competitive performs worse than a uniform policy of 106
percent.
To understand how errors in optimal policy setting from a lack of information vary with
productivity and mobility, Panel (b) displays the relative welfare based on the simulations
shown in Table 2.3 where γ = .95 and min(ξ) = 0.0025. With perfect information, the
optimal uniform central policy is less than 101 percent of the competitive wage in region
2 and not binding in region 1 while the optimal non-uniform policy is about 102.5 percent
28We cannot compare more than 2.5 percentage points off of the optimal because then the low minimum
wage would not be binding.
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above each region’s respective competitive wage.29 Since moving costs are positive on the
margin, both regions set binding policies of about 1 percent above the competitive in the
decentralized case as well. The patterns are very similar to the baseline example except the
welfare matrix is no longer symmetric. Based on the asymmetry, we want to determine if the
government should be relatively more cautious in the high or low productivity region. Our
results indicate that setting too high a minimum wage in the low-productivity region while
setting too low a minimum wage by the same percentage points in the high-productivity
region is better than the reverse.
2.5.4 Taxes and Transfers
In the previous sections, we study the optimal minimum wage without taxes, which is an
“optimal suboptimal policy. When the federal government has access to linear income taxes
(a single income tax rate and a demogrant), it will always prefer linear taxes to a combination
of a minimum wage and linear taxes in our calibrated model. The proof of this numerical
result in our framework is presented in Appendix B.1. Lee and Saez (2012) prove in a model
without migration, when workers are not mobile across skill levels and non-linear taxes
and transfers are available, then it is not optimal to also have a binding minimum wage.
This is analogous to the no mobility case of our model discussed above. In a search-and-
matching framework, Lavecchia (2018) finds that both a minimum wage and optimal taxes
are preferred only if the government has very strong redistributive preferences.30 As shown
in the previous sections, the migration externality from any policy that restricts low-skilled
labor supply and induces migration is worse for the local governments than the federal, and
income taxes are no exception. This is intuitive in light of the literature which tends to find
29The diagonal of this figure does not give the optimal central uniform policy because regions have different
competitive wages. Since productivity in region 2 is much lower than 1, the optimal uniform minimum wage
is found by looking across the top row.
30Redistributive policies may also have an insurance component that high-skilled workers care about
(Hoynes and Luttmer 2012). If a high-skilled worker was separated from her job due to a shock, and then
was able to find employment at the minimum wage rather than the low-skilled competitive one, the insurance
value would be positive. However, in our static model with fixed worker skill levels, the high-skilled are made
weakly worse off from a minimum wage increase.
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that redistribution is better handled by the federal government (e.g. see Gordon and Cullen
2012).
If the government taxes income, then low-skilled workers will restrict their labor supply,
impacting the marginal product of all workers and lowering total output in the economy.
High-skilled labor supply is not perfectly inelastic to each jurisdiction, but it is perfectly
inelastic to the economy and the federal government. The government trades off redistri-
bution with efficiency. A binding minimum wage will increase low-skill labor supply, but
decrease labor demand, while an income tax will decrease labor supply and have no effect
on demand, potentially allowing the policies to be complements. While the optimality of
jointly specifying a minimum wage and linear income tax is uncertain, we show that under
the assumptions of our calibrated model, the federal government would never implement a
binding minimum wage if linear taxes are available.
Although it is not optimal to have both a binding minimum wage and a federal income tax,
we incorporate this into our model and recompute the equilibrium to compare the policies.
Our simulations confirm that the government does not want to set a binding minimum wage
when it sets the income tax optimally. In our baseline symmetric calibrated model, we find
that federal government would choose to set a tax rate of 24% and no binding minimum wage
in both jurisdictions, as expected. The policy dramatically increases unemployment to 35.5%
of the low-skilled workers from 26.2% under the optimal minimum wage. The restricted labor
supply leads low-skilled wages to rise to 0.390, and high-skilled wages to fall to 0.616. The
government trades off its redistribution incentive with decreased low-skilled labor supply
that leads to increased unemployment and falling high-skilled wages. As the income tax
increases, the marginal (zero consumption) low skilled worker exits the labor force. This
raises the marginal product of all the still employed low-skilled workers, thus acting very
much like a minimum wage, except now the government is also able to redistribute some of
the additional income to the unemployed.
The optimal linear income tax increases total welfare over the optimal minimum wage by
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2%. Compared with the optimal minimum wage model, where the utility of the unemployed
is 0 by construction, the utility of unemployed is 0.126. The low-skilled worker with the lowest
working cost sees her utility increase by 16.2% under the optimal linear income tax compared
with a minimum wage, which is a lower bound on the welfare increase for low-skilled workers.
High-skilled workers see their welfare fall by 5.1%, as the government redistributes total
wealth. If the federal government were able to set a different tax rate on each skill type,
it would tax low-skilled at 73% and the high-skilled at 100%, leading to a welfare gain of
8.5% over the optimal minimum wage. This result is driven by the fact that the high-skilled
workers supply labor inelastically to the economy. Since the government can use that revenue
to lessen the harm of unemployment, it then sets a much higher tax rate on the low-skilled
as well.
Throughout this section, we assumed that the governments tax income. However, if the
tax is on consumption, equal to income minus cost of working and migration, then there is
no labor supply response, and a federal government with a concave social welfare function
would optimally set a leveling tax so that all workers have the same utility. With a leveling
tax, a minimum wage is suboptimal as the induced unemployment lowers total output in
the economy that can be redistributed. A utilitarian government would have no desire to
redistribute through a consumption tax since the total output consumed would not change.
2.6 A Quantitative Model of Minimum Wage Setting
Our two region model demonstrated that decentralized and centralized minimum wage set-
ting are strategic complements and that the extent to which they are depends on regional
heterogeneity and mobility. While this approach highlights important mechanisms, we now
extend the model to the case of US states to quantify the welfare gain from the tiered policy
compared to other minimum wage setting authorities.
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2.6.1 Model
We consider a spatial equilibrium model of local labor markets as in Rosen (1979) and Roback
(1982) with two imperfectly substitutable types of labor, and state and federal governments.
High-skilled workers in state j have indirect utility given by
V hj = w
h
j + φj + κεj (2.10)
where whj is the high-skilled wage rate in j, φj is a state j parameter that captures amenities
and costs of living, and εj is an i.i.d. type I extreme value idiosyncratic preference for j, with
standard deviation κ. High-skilled workers pick the location that maximizes their utility,













Immobile low-skilled workers can be employed or unemployed. If a worker i is employed





wlj − θij + φj if employed
(2.12)
Low and high-skilled workers in the same state face the same cost of living and receive the
same amenities.
Each state has one firm that hires low and high-skilled workers with production function
fj(l, h) = γj(αjl
ρ + (1− αj)hρ)1/ρ (2.13)
85
This specification differs slightly from Equation 2.8 in that it allows both γ and α to vary
across markets. The government’s social welfare function is given in Equation 2.9.
2.6.2 Data and Calibration
We calibrate the model to the continental US states in 2015. In 2013 and 2014, Congress
considered the Minimum Wage Fairness Act, which would have raised the federal price
floor in 2015 for the first time since 2009. After this failed, President Obama continued
to push for an increase through 2015, although Congress did not act. Since the federal
government considered changing the minimum wage, but chose not to, we take the 2015
policy to accurately reflect the government’s preferences for redistribution. This allows us
to back out ν for the federal government from the observed equilibrium.31 While there has
been a continued discussion of increasing the minimum wage, the federal government has
not considered changing it since. We therefore use the 2015 American Community Survey
(ACS) to estimate the model parameters.
From the ACS, we observe individual level wages by education and labor force attachment
in each state. This gives the number of the low (high school equivalent) and high-skilled
(college graduates) employed workers, as well as their average wages, the number of unem-
ployed, and the number not in the labor force. Since many high school equivalent workers
earn more than the minimum wage, the model implied high-skilled wage equals the state’s
minimum wage times the high-skilled/low-skilled wage ratio in the data. θ̄j in each state is
picked to match the state’s high school equivalent labor force participation rate in the data.
Taking log of Equation 2.11, we first estimate κ given the observed population shares
and high-skilled wages in the data from the following regression equation:
log(pj) = β0 + β1w
h
j + υj (2.14)
31More specifically, ν is calibrated so that $7.25 is the welfare maximizing central minimum wage policy,
holding the state policies fixed at their 2015 levels. This implies a Nash equilibrium where the federal
government does not find it beneficial to deviate given the strategies of the states. However, the governments
may be more sophisticated and know that changes in federal policy will also impact the state’s optimal
policies. We address calibrating ν for all states in Section 2.6.5.
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where β1 = 1/κ. However, endogeneity from the correlation of amenities and wages as well
as measurement error will lead to a biased estimate of κ. We therefore instrument for the
high-skilled wage with the number of low-skilled residents. The model provides intuition
for it as a valid instrument. First, the marginal product of the high-skilled depends on the
number of low-skilled employed in a state, and so it should be correlated with the total stock
of low-skilled. We confirm this in the middle column of Table 2.4. Additionally, low-skilled
workers are immobile, and so the total number is exogenous in the model. We find that
κ is 1.048. As expected, the estimate is slightly larger than the value of 0.717 from Surez
Serrato and Zidar (2016), who conduct a similar analysis on county groups, a smaller unit
of geography, using a Bartik instrument approach. They similarly find an OLS/IV ratio for
κ of just above 3.
After estimating κ, we can recover φj up to a normalization that minφj = 0. Since
workers’ indirect utility is a function of φj, the normalization together with our estimate
of ν determine the concavity of the social welfare function. Under the functional form
assumptions, this does not affect high-skilled location choices and is chosen so that all workers
have non-negative utility. Since only φj + ν is identified, an alternative normalization would
only affect the magnitude of ν and not the results.
The calibration of the state specific production function follows Section 2.4.2. First,
we set ρ = 0.286 following Katz and Murphy (1992). We calculate αj to match the wage
gap between high and low-skilled workers and γj so the marginal product of the low-skilled
employed matches the state’s minimum wage. Given the model’s parametrization, the values
perfectly match the targeted moments. 32
After recovering the other parameters, we finally back out the federal government’s re-
distribution preferences ν so that the observed policy of $7.25 maximizes total social welfare
in the economy. We aim to minimize |7.25 − w∗(ν)|, where w∗(ν) is the optimal minimum
32For this calculation, we calculate the state’s wage gap as the ratio of college graduates and high school
equivalent or less in the ACS for employed workers between ages 16 and 70. Since the minimum wage is a
floor, the ratio of high-skilled wages to the minimum wage would overstate their relative marginal product
in the model.
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wage as a function of the concavity of the social welfare function. Table 2.5 summarizes the
parameter estimates. The model is unable to perfectly match the current federal minimum
wage for any progressivity shifter, although the residual is only about 1 cent. In the context
of the model where states are heterogeneous, the federal government and 21 states should
not coordinate on the same policy. However, $7.25 may be salient at a national level as a
reference point, or the federal government may understate regional heterogeneity because of
a lack of information.
2.6.3 Welfare and US Minimum Wage Setting Authority
Does joint state and the federal tiered minimum wage setting in the US increase aggregate
social welfare over centralized policy alone? While our previous theoretical results suggest
there should be positive gains, in the application, the sign is ambiguous since state are het-
erogeneous in their preferences for redistribution as well as their productivities. This implies
that the most productive states do not always set the highest minimum wages. The corre-
lation between the 2015 state policies and γj is only 0.53.
33 If a relatively low productivity
state sets too high a minimum wage relative to what is binding in others, too many high-
skill workers move. Since the state is of relatively low productivity, this disproportionately
harms its low-skilled workers by increasing unemployment. Given this tension created from
differences in preferences for redistribution, it is possible for optimal centralized policy to
lead to higher total welfare from the perspective of the federal government than the tiered
system.
To measure the potential gain or loss, Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 plots total welfare in the
economy under both minimum wage setting authorities. The solid line shows how welfare
in the tiered system changes as a function of the federal minimum wage. Based on the
calibration, when the states’ minimum wages are held at their 2015 levels, the federal gov-
33This calculation may overstate heterogeneity in preferences because states whose optimal policies are be-
low $7.25 have no incentive to set their own. Using the 2015 effective minimum wages, the correlation is 0.85,
but for similar reasons this likely overstates heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in other production parameters
matters as well. The correlation between αj and the state policies is -0.36.
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ernment optimally sets a minimum wage of nearly $7.25, which confirms our calibration of ν
is successful. The dashed line in the figure shows welfare as a function of centralized policy.
Without the state policies, the federal government optimally chooses a lower minimum wage
of $6.90. Panel (a) of Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between tiered minimum wages and
low-skilled wages under centralization.34 This result is in line with the previous findings that
state and federal polices are strategic complements. Higher state minimum wages reduce
the high-skilled migration externality and allow the federal government to engage in more
redistribution by setting a higher wage floor itself.
Optimal centralized policy has a welfare loss of about 0.006 percent compared to the
tiered system.35 Although the aggregate welfare change is small, state and federal minimum
wages together are better able to redistribute to the low-skilled employed, as shown in Panel
(b) of Figure 2.5. The figures also show that suboptimal policy in the form of low wages, for
example due to information frictions discussed earlier, has a higher social welfare cost under
tiered policy setting. This is because many states set their own policies at or above the
federal level. High state policies become more costly when the federal price floor falls. The
opposite is true when the federal governments sets too high of a minimum wage.36 However,
as the federal policy increases, the tiered and central uniform systems become more similar
since only the higher of the state and national policy is implemented. If the federal policy
were above $9.47, the two would be equivalent.
While the current US minimum wage setting authority yields higher welfare than cen-
tralized policy alone, it may be far from the social planner’s solution. The 48 states are
heterogeneous in their productivity and low-skilled working costs, but 21 have effective min-
imum wage policies of $7.25. This is in part because states face a different trade-off than the
federal government as emphasized in equations 2.2 and 2.5, and because some states may be
34Based on our calibration, the tiered minimum wages are binding in all states, while our simulations
predict that the optimal federal uniform minimum wage is only binding in 17 states.
35The competitive equilibrium has a welfare loss of 0.021 percent.
36When interpreting the value of the tiered system across different minimum wage levels, it is important
to note that the analysis in this section holds state policies fixed. If the federal minimum wage were to fall
(rise), states should lower (raise) theirs as well.
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more or less progressive. Panel (b) of Figure 2.6 shows the relationship between the observed
tiered policies, and those under federal non-uniform. States below the 45 degree line have
too high minimum wages under tiered policy setting. When not limited to a single policy,
the government can better differentiate among states. Those subject to the $7.25 minimum
wage in the tiered system have federal non-uniform policies that range from $7.14 to $7.53.
The federal government also sets slightly higher minimum wages for states with initially
high policies in this case since it is able to better internalize the spillovers from high-skilled
migration. Overall, current US policy closely matches the social optimum predicted in this
model with only a 0.05 percent welfare loss.
2.6.4 State Heterogeneity and Regional Redistribution
The minimum wage setting authority potentially impacts redistribution across states in ad-
dition to skill groups. Under centralization, the federal government has one policy lever that
only directly affects the lowest productivity states. Higher federal uniform policies will there-
fore redistribute to more productive states. To some extent, this can improve total welfare
because the more productive states are larger and have more low wage workers and unem-
ployed, but a progressive government does not value transferring wealth from low to high
income areas. Moving from centralization to the tiered system, there is an ambiguous effect
on activity across states that depends on the relative progressivity of different governments.
To measure how states would be differentially affected under centralization compared to
the current tiered system, the left three panels of Figure 2.7 show low-skilled employment,
and high-skilled location decisions and wages change under these two regimes. Under central-
ization, Panel (a) shows that low-skilled employment is higher in most places. It mostly, but
not exclusively, increases in states with low tiered minimum wages. The states experiencing
the biggest decreases from centralization, represented by points far below the 45 degree line,
are all relatively small, which reflects the government’s trade off of redistributing to large
workforces and low wage places. Without state minimum wages to reduce the high-skilled
outmigration externality, the low-skilled workers in the lowest productivity areas are hit the
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hardest.
There is very little state heterogeneity in the impact on high-skilled wages because these
workers are imperfectly mobile. If states became too different, some workers will move. Panel
(c) shows that wages are close to the 45 degree line, but nearly uniformly above. With only
a single low federal minimum wage of $6.90, aggregate low-skilled employment increases in
most states and drives up high-skilled wages. Centralization alone has only a small effect on
the high-skilled migration externality and therefore allows for less redistribution from high to
low-skilled workers, leading to higher average wages. However, since low-skilled employment
decreases in some states, high-skilled workers’ marginal products fall and they leave those
affected low productivity areas. For this reason, Panels (a) and (e) look similar.
The regional distributional consequences of federal non-uniform over tiered policy setting
are also ambiguous because states’ preferences may be very different from the federal govern-
ment. However, the optimal tiered minimum wages closely match the federal non-uniform,
and so the right three panels of Figure 2.7 also show very little difference in low-skilled
employment, and high-skilled location choices and wages.
2.6.5 A Brief Note on Decentralized Minimum Wage Setting
Competition between states for mobile high-skilled workers leads to low minimum wages
under decentralized policy setting. Local governments are therefore less able to redistribute
income from high to low-skilled workers. The amount of redistribution under decentralization
compared with other systems importantly depends on regional heterogeneity in ν. Following
the previous calibration for the federal government, we aim to estimate νj, j = {1, ..., 48},
such that the observed 2015 minimum wage in state j maximizes j’s welfare holding the
other minimum wages fixed, so that the 2015 tiered policies are a Nash equilibrium. Since
only 27 states set a binding minimum wage above $7.25, νj is not point identified for every
state.
In the calibrated model, there does not exist νj that replicates the state’s 2015 policies.
Under our assumptions and calibration, each state would prefer a smaller minimum wage,
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holding all other states’ and the federal government’s policies constant. That is, there
does not exist a progressivity level such that the current state minimum wages are best
responses. There are several possible reasons why the model is unable to match the data.
First, governments may be more sophisticated. If a states believes that others will set lower
minimum wages too when it lowers its own policy, then there are smaller gains from doing so.
The main advantage of a lower minimum wage is to attract more high-skilled workers, but
the amount is a function of low-skilled wages everywhere. Second, states could face political
frictions. They may not be able to set their policies on a continuum but are instead restricted
to a small grid. The observed policies may be optimal on the grid but not globally. Finally,
the model is potentially misspecified or, at least, states may have different beliefs about the
implied elasticities. In particular, the model implications for the effect of the minimum wage
on low-skilled unemployment and high-skilled wages may not be true, for example if workers
have monoposony power or the high-skilled have larger moving costs. More work is needed
in the future to better understand state competition and minimum wage setting.
While we are unable to compare the decentralized and tiered equilibria explicitly, we aim
to measure the relative trade-off of local and federal policy setting, holding preferences for
redistribution fixed. Only 23 of the 48 states set binding minimum wages under decentral-
ization when all governments have the same value of ν equal to 4.05. Without a binding
policy in many states from the federal government, the high-skilled migration externality is
large and states optimally set lower minimum wages. Figure 2.8 shows that the low-skilled
wages in every state are lower under decentralized policy setting compared to the current US
policies. However, total welfare under this version of decentralization is only 0.009 percent
lower than the tiered system, or slightly worse than the centralized policy.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to think about the interaction of minimum wage setting
and federalism. Previous optimal minimum wage research focuses on one jurisdiction, which
misses the implications of government competition. We first build on the theoretical model
92
of Lee and Saez (2012), extending it to a context in which high-skilled labor is mobile across
regions. We present sufficient conditions for the desirability of a binding minimum wage,
from the perspective of both a local and central government. Though minimum wages are
not optimal in the presence of even a linear tax system in our model, their prevalence in the
real world warrants consideration from an optimal policy perspective.
We calibrate a two-region model of a federation and compare minimum wage policies
across four types of government structures: decentralization, centralization with uniform
policy, a US-style combination of both, and a social planner. In our baseline model, the
desirability of centralized policy setting is increasing in mobility; when mobility is shut
down completely, decentralization obtains the social planners solution. However, when all
movers face positive moving costs, and regions are heterogeneous, then the decentralized
outcome leads to higher total welfare than federal uniform policy. Furthermore, suboptimal
policy takes the form of minimum wages that are too low, such that the tiered system we
observe in the US is weakly preferred to either decentralization or centralization exclusively.
In the tiered system, the central uniform policy lessens the externalities from horizontal
competition by local governments leading both types of governments to set policies more
closely aligned with the social planner. Decentralized and centralized policy setting are
strategic complements. When we extend our framework to US states, we find that the tiered
system closely matches the social planner’s solution. Our results indicate that higher levels
of government should not forbid lower levels from setting their own minimum wages. These
results are consistent across social welfare functions, although the effect of heterogeneity may
depend on the progressivity of the social welfare function.
Though the US system performs well relative to other potential systems, its ability to
efficiently redistribute income still falls short of a simple system of linear taxes. From the
perspective of our calibrated model, the existence of minimum wages and redistributive taxes
in the US remains a puzzle. Further research remains to be done on the types of models,
economic or political in nature, which might give rise to the joint optimality of both types of
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policies. It is likely that the income tax is not set optimally due to political frictions, which
lead to demand for other redistributive policies. For now, our results suggest the policy
makers should pay attention to the mobility implications of minimum wage policies, as well
as their interactions with the existing tax system.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Results
Authority u wl1 w
l
2 avg w
h h1 SW Loss
Panel A: γ = 1
Competitive .426 .361 .361 .657 .5 .23%
Decentralized .426 .361 .361 .657 .5 .23%
Federal Uniform .523 .370 .370 .643 .5 0
US .523 .370 .370 .643 .5 0
Federal Non-Uniform .523 .370 .370 .643 .5 -
Panel B: γ = .995
Competitive .429 .362 .358 .655 .506 .23%
Decentralized .429 .362 .358 .655 .506 .23%
Federal Uniform .533 .370 .370 .640 .509 .16%
US .533 .370 .370 .640 .509 .16%
Federal Non-Uniform .533 .372 .368 .640 .507 -
Panel C: γ = .99
Competitive .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
Decentralized .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
Federal Uniform .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
US .432 .364 .356 .653 .513 .23%
Federal Non-Uniform .522 .372 .364 .640 .513 -
Note: This table presents the simulated equilibria for our baseline calibrated model different minimum wage
setting authorities and levels of regional heterogeneity. The competitive equilibrium is provided for comparison.
Social Welfare (SW) Loss is defined relative to the Federal Non-Uniform, or Social Planner.
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Table 2.3: γ = .95 and ξ ∼ U [0.0025, ξ̄]
Authority u wl1 w
l
2 w
h avg h1 SW Loss
Competitive .456 .374 .334 .638 .566 .21%
Decentralized .497 .378 .338 .632 .566 .08%
Federal Uniform .466 .374 .336 .367 .566 .19%
US .542 .383 .343 .626 .566 0%
Federal Non-Uniform .542 .383 .343 .626 .566 -
Note: This table presents the simulated equilibria for the case where γ = .95 and ξ ∼ U [0.0025, ξ̄] for different
minimum wage setting authorities. The competitive equilibrium is provided for comparison. Social Welfare
(SW) Loss is defined relative to the Federal Non-Uniform, or Social Planner.
Table 2.4: High-skilled Migration Elasticity
OLS First-Stage IV
log(pj) High-skilled Wage log(pj)




Observations 48 48 48
Note: The leftmost column (OLS) reports the estimated effect of average high-skilled wages
in a state on the log of the percent of high-skilled workers in that state, using data from
the 2015 American Community Survey. The middle column reports the first-stage for the
IV regression in the rightmost column. Robust standard errors are reported in all columns.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: US Model Calibration Results
National Parameters Estimate Residual
ρ 0.29 -
ν 4.05 0.012





(a) Single Minimum Wage in Both Regions (b) Minimum Wage in Region 1 Only
Figure 2.1: Welfare and the Minimum Wage
Note: Both panels of the figure plot the total social welfare in the economy for various levels of the
minimum wage. The left panel plots welfare as a function of a single minimum wage applied in both
regions while the minimum wage only applies in region 1 in the right panel. Since the regions are identical,
the implications from a minimum wage in only 1 or 2 are the same. The vertical line denotes the
competitive low-skilled wage in the absence of any policy.
99
(a) Baseline model (b) Utility given by: log(2(c+ ν))
Figure 2.2: Optimal Minimum Wage as a Function of ν
Note: In the right panel, we vary ν from 0.4 to 1.3 using the baseline calibrated model. In the left panel,
we vary ν from 0.05 to 1.3 changing the social welfare function to log(2(c+ ν)) The low-skilled wage in a
jurisdiction is the maximum of the competitive wage and that government’s minimum wage policy. The
Social Planner’s optimal policy (solid line) equals the Central Uniform and Tiered optimal policies since
jurisdictions are symmetric.
Figure 2.3: Optimal Minimum Wage as a Function of ν in Jurisdiction 1
Note: We vary ν in jurisdiction 1 from 0.4 to 1.3 keeping ν in jurisdiction 2 fixed at 1. The low-skilled wage
in a jurisdiction is the maximum of the competitive wage and that government’s minimum wage policy.
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(a) γ = 1, min(ξ) = 0 (b) γ = .95, min(ξ) = 0.0025
Figure 2.4: Welfare and the Minimum Wage
Note: Panel (a) presents the total social welfare in the economy for different minimum wage policies in
both regions ranging from the competitive wage to 110 percent of the competitive. Welfare is normalized
so that it is 1 in the competitive case where neither region has a binding minimum wage. Panel (b)
conducts the same simulations but for the case where γ = .95 and min(ξ) = 0.0025 as in Table 2.3.
Minimum wage combinations with higher total welfare are shaded darker.
(a) Aggregate Welfare (b) Welfare by Worker Type
Figure 2.5: US Welfare and the Federal Minimum Wage
Note: Panel (a) plots total social welfare as a function of the federal minimum wage under tiered and
federal uniform minimum wage setting authorities. Welfare is normalized to be 0 under optimal tiered
policy setting with a federal minimum wage. Panel (b) splits welfare into the contributions from low and
high-skilled workers separately. Welfare is normalized to be 0 for each worker type under optimal tiered
policy setting.
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(a) Centralization (b) Federal Non-Uniform
Figure 2.6: Comparing US Minimum Wage Setting Authorities
Note: Panel (a) plots the low-skilled wages in each state under tiered and federal uniform policy setting as
well as a dotted 45 degree line for reference. Panel (b) similarly shows the relationship between tiered
policy and the optimal federal non-uniform.
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(a) Centralized Low-Skilled Employment (b) Federal Non-Uniform Low-Skilled
Employment
(c) Centralized High-Skilled Wages (d) Federal Non-Uniform High-Skilled Wages
(e) Centralized High-Skilled Residencies (f) Federal Non-Uniform High-Skilled
Residencies
Figure 2.7: The Impacts of Minimum Wage Setting Authorities Across States
Note: The left three panels compare tiered and centralized policy setting, while the right three compare the
tiered and federal non-uniform systems. All figures contain a a dotted 45 degree line for reference.
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Figure 2.8: Decentralized Minimum Wage Setting
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Chapter 3
College Choice, Private Options, and The Incidence of Public
Investment in Higher Education (with John Bound)
3.1 Introduction
Understanding who benefits and who bears the burden of public investment in higher educa-
tion is increasingly important for state and federal policy. Some states are greatly reducing
support, while many Democratic 2020 presidential candidates called for tuition-free public
college and an expanded Pell Grant. However, since the controversial findings of Hansen and
Weisbrod (1969), the merits of public higher education as a redistributive tool have been
called into question. They found that while higher education is mainly financed through
progressive income taxes, take-up is predominately by higher income households. This re-
sult was supported by subsequent work in Wisconsin (Hansen 1970) and Florida (Windham
1970). Pechman (1970, 1972), using the same data as Hansen and Weisbrod, and more re-
cently Bill Johnson (2006), using a nationally representative survey, argue that Hansen and
Weisbrod misinterpret their findings. When stratifying by income, Pechman and Johnson
show that net subsidies flow from high income families whose children often attend private
colleges to the moderate income whose children often attend the publics.
The previous approaches to measuring incidence implicitly ignore general equilibrium
considerations. Pechman and Johnson’s method uses an accounting-style approach that
sums the amount of money spent on an individual student from instructional expenditure
and capital costs at public institutions and subtracts the amount paid in public college
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tuition and taxes. As Johnson acknowledges, these calculations leave out possible general
equilibrium effects of state subsidies to public colleges. In particular, competition from
public colleges affects who the private colleges admit and the tuition they charge. States’
investments in public colleges have indirect effects on those who, in equilibrium, attend
private colleges. Public investment in higher education also increases the size of the college
educated workforce, affecting the relative wages of college and high school graduates.
How important are the general equilibrium implications of public investment for char-
acterizing incidence? For what types of students do these effects matter the most? We
build on the previous approaches to understand the redistributive implications of investing
(or divesting) within the context of a general equilibrium model of higher education based
on Epple et al. (2006, 2017, 2019) using a compensating variation (CV) framework. We
find that incidence importantly depends on how the private market responds to changes in
public funding, especially who private colleges admit and how they set their sticker prices,
and on the effect that such changes have on relative wages. We calibrate the model to match
national college attendance patterns and prices, which replicates the main findings from the
accounting-style approach. This stylized setting allows us to study the role of college choice
and market power for overall incidence in general equilibrium.1
Our framework addresses the previous concerns about the accounting approach by com-
paring the baseline college market equilibrium to one with lower levels of public investment
in higher education. CV therefore measures how much additional income a household would
need to be given, in excess of taxes, to be just as well off after a state spending decrease.
Like the accounting approach, this method measures the direct effect of public investment
on the value of enrolling in a public college. Our approach additionally captures the value
of changes in price, quality, admissions decisions, and the changes in the labor market– the
benefits are not only for those who attend.
We measure CV in two steps. First, we decrease state appropriations per student by 10
1We abstract from other relevant features like the importance of within and across state heterogeneity in
the college market. We plan to explore the implications of cross border externalities in future work.
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percent and hold private college sticker prices fixed. This exercise puts a lower bound on the
extent to which private market power increases because the colleges can only raise tuition
on a subset of students. However, with more aggregate demand, we expect the privates to
increase their maximum prices as well. We then allow the sticker prices to adjust to highlight
the importance of private market power for incidence. In doing so, we build on the previous
models in the literature (e.g. Epple et al. (2006, 2017, 2019); Rothschild and White (1995);
Chade et al. (2014), Fu (2014) and Fu et al. (2019)) by endogenizing sticker prices as a
function of state funding for public colleges.2
While our results also imply that public investment is weakly progressive, we find that
the accounting approach mischaracterizes incidence because the general equilibrium private
college and labor market responses are large. Using our framework, we show that high-
income-average-most-ability students benefit the most from public investment because they
are only admitted to the highest quality private colleges when state spending is sufficiently
high. As state spending decreases, the public universities charge higher tuition and become
lower quality, which especially leads the low-income-high-ability students to switch sectors.
The change in enrollment patterns from the spending cut crowds out the more modest-
ability students. However, since they are very likely to attend the privates under the current
spending level and pay high taxes, the accounting approach implies that they subsidize the
system, rather than benefit.
Our results for the high-income-modest-ability students are driven by private college
price setting behavior. The sticker prices imply that there is a minimum ability required
for admission. These students are crowded out of the private market unless they are able
to sufficiently compensate the colleges for their negative effects on peer quality.3 This is
only possible if the sticker price is high enough. As private market power and (sticker)
2Gordon and Hedlund (2018) also adapted this class of models to understand changes in tuition over
time.
3In the model, college quality is partially determined by average student ability, or SAT scores. Stu-
dents with ability above the college’s average therefore create positive peer effects, while those below create
negative.
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prices increase, the minimum ability thresholds fall for two reasons. First, students can pay
more in tuition to increase instructional expenditure and offset the negative peer effects.
Additionally, at higher prices, fewer low-income-high-ability students enroll in the privates.
Average peer quality does not increase as much and therefore neither do the negative peer
externalities. Using policy variation in state investment over time, we find that private
sticker prices only minimally increase when state support falls, and therefore these students
bear much of the burden of divestment.
In aggregate, changes in these enrollment patterns affect the labor market returns to
college as well. When state support decreases, the public colleges become more expensive and
lower quality, while the privates restrict access through admission and prices. This makes
college human capital scarce, driving up the college wage premium. When the privates
increase their sticker prices in response to the decrease in public investment, even more
students are priced out of the private market. This pushes up the college wage premium
further. As college wages rise, so does private college market power and vice versa. Therefore,
even students who never attend a public or private college benefit from the effects of public
investment on the private market.
The increases in private market power and the college wage premium from decreases in
state support have the largest benefit for high-income-high-ability students. These students
are always admitted to the high quality privates and pay the full sticker price. When state
support falls, their colleges become higher quality at a time when the labor market returns
to quality are higher but pay nearly the same tuition and less in taxes. These students look
very similar to high-income-modest-ability students based on the accounting approach, but
the frameworks provide starkly different estimates of the welfare implications for these two
groups. This is because the general equilibrium effects are large in magnitude, but the sign
varies with income and ability. Appropriately accounting for these effects is necessary to
measure incidence and the progressivity of public investment in higher education.
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3.2 Measuring Incidence
Much of the previous empirical literature on the incidence of public investment in higher
education (e.g. Bill Johnson 2006) uses an accounting approach. The net benefit captures a
transfer to those who attend, measured by the sum of subsidies received from instructional
and capital expenditure at public institutions less public tuition and tax payments. State
appropriations directly affect this transfer value of public college attendance because it affects
expenditure, tuition, and tax rates.
However, the accounting exercise misses important general equilibrium effects summa-
rized by Figure 3.1. It only considers the farthest left arrow– a decrease in state appropria-
tions creates a smaller transfer for those who attend public colleges. When the transfer value
decreases, fewer students enroll. Instead, the lower in-kind subsidy leads some switch to the
private sector (Peltzman 1973), while others do not enroll in any college. With increased
relative demand, the private colleges have more market power– they are now able to charge
tuition even further above marginal cost. A high quality, well-funded public puts competitive
pressure on private colleges, which creates benefits for those students. When fewer students
enroll after divestment, college-educated human capital becomes scarce and the college wage
premium rises.
These mechanisms on college choice, private college market power, and the labor market
returns to college importantly interact with each other, as indicated by the double sided
arrows in Figure 3.1. For example, changes in enrollment patterns from state divestment
affect college quality through peer effects, which further determines who the privates admit
and how much they charge. Some students are crowded out of the private sector, further
altering enrollment decisions. Implications in the college market then spill over to the labor
market. Increased relative wages for college workers increase demand for higher education
and therefore feed back onto private college market power. This compounds the effects on
enrollment patterns and restarts the cycle.
This paper proposes a framework to incorporate the general equilibrium implications
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of state investment in public higher education to measure incidence. We first build on a
stylized model of the higher education market from Epple et al. (2017). We then implement
a compensating variation (CV) measure in the model that captures the amount of money one
would need to give a household, in excess of tax and tuition revenue, so that it is indifferent
between the current state spending per student levels and a 10 percent decrease. From the
observed baseline setting, we simulate the general equilibrium effects of the divestment on
the college and labor markets, as well as student enrollment choices. CV then computes the
welfare effects by comparing these two equilibria.
Building on the accounting approach, the objective here is to measure the value inclusive
of the general equilibrium effects, ν, in dollars, of higher education appropriations rather
than just the direct transfer to those who attend. Let U(y, b; z) denote the utility of student
with parental income y and ability b when states spend z in appropriations per student. CV
for counterfactual spending 0.9z compared to the baseline level is then
CV = ν − (t(z)− t(0.9z))y − (T (z)− T (0.9z)) (3.1)
such that U(y, b; z) = U(y + ν, b; 0.9z)
where t(z) and T (z) are taxes and tuition paid to public colleges as a function of the state
spending, respectively.4 Our analysis is similar to Epple et al. (2019) who measure the
welfare effect of moving from a state with only the lowest quality public college to a state
with four different levels of quality. However, their analysis does not capture the general
equilibrium effects on the college and labor markets that are the focus of our analysis.5
4In our model presented in the next section, all state income taxes support the public colleges, but only
the fraction of federal income taxes used to finance financial aid at the public colleges does. Tuition paid
equals the sticker price minus federal financial aid received.
5Kasman and Guyot (2019) also investigate the implications of college subsidies using an agent-based
model, although their main interest is enrollment and their framework does not consider private college
market power.
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3.3 The Higher Education Market
We build on the general equilibrium model of higher education from Epple et al. (2017) with
two main extensions that highlight the importance of private college market power and the
labor market returns to college to measure incidence. First, we endogenize sticker prices.
In doing so, private colleges are better able to adjust their prices and admissions decisions
with changes in government policy to further increase their market power. Second, we model
the value of college as a function of the size of the college educated workforce. Changes in
aggregate enrollment affect an individual’s demand for higher education through its impact
on the college wage premium.6 We additionally specify a more flexible parameterization of
the model that is better able to match attendance by income and ability.
The market consists of three private colleges, one public college in each of two states, a
unit mass of households, and state and federal governments. We describe each in turn.
3.3.1 Households
There is a unit mass of households living in two identical states. Households are characterized
by their state of residence, s, parental income net of college expenses7, yp, and student ability,
b, which are drawn from a joint distribution f(b, yp). Students make college enrollment
decisions based on the wage adjusted value of human capital ysj from enrolling in j with
quality qj and the cost. College j costs the household psj(b, y) in tuition, and L in living
expenses. Federal financial aid of Asj is available to offset college costs. Households attend
6George Johnson (1984) shows that this general equilibrium effect can be so strong that non-college
enrollees prefer more government investment in public colleges than those who directly benefit.
7All dollar amounts are measured in tens of thousands.
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the option that maximizes their utility:
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3 if does not attend college
(3.4)
where αp and αs are weighting parameters that reflect the relative values of college costs
and future student earnings, ts, and tf are state and federal taxes, w is the wage value of
college or non-college human capital, and the disturbances εj are i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value
preference shocks for college j. The value of attending college depends on a student’s ability
and college quality, while the value of the outside option depends on ability and parental
income. Under standard regularity conditions on εj, as in McFadden (1974), we can recover
the probability that a student of type (b, y) attends college j, rsj, given the set of admitted
colleges J and the outside option of not attending college O.8
The labor market value of college human capital, wc, and non-college human capital, wh,
are determined by a CES production function in aggregate college and non-college educated











where s is the share on college human capital, ρ determines the elasticity of substitution, C













. If a student does not attend college, L, A and p are 0.
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3.3.2 Private Colleges
The three private colleges admit students and choose individual prices to maximize quality,
qj, subject to a budget constraint and a maximum or sticker price P
c
j . College quality is a





j , γ, ω > 0 (3.6)
Mean student ability and instructional expenditures per student are important inputs to the
education production function and common proxies for quality (Black and Smith 2006). The
colleges’ objective function is similar to prestige maximization, where each wants to enroll
high test score students that raise its national profile, while also collecting as much revenue
as possible that can be used to improve instructional quality or as merit aid to attract more
high test score students.
All colleges, public and private, have the same cost function,
C(k, I) = F + v1k + v2k
2 + kI (3.7)
where F are fixed costs, k is the number of enrolled students, and v are parameters to be
calibrated that capture the marginal cost of enrolling more students. Private college j has
exogenous endowment Ej to spend on instruction in addition to collected tuition. A student
with ability b and income y faces price psj that depends on her effective marginal cost,
EMCj = v1 + 2v2k + Ij +
∂qj/∂θ
∂qj/∂I
(θj − b) (3.8)






but must not exceed sticker price P cj (zs), which is a function of state appropriations, zs.
EMC depends on ability through peer effects. Private colleges want to charge high ability
students lower prices so that they are more likely to attend and raise θ. A student is admitted
if her marginal revenue (the minimum of the left hand side of (3.9) and the sticker price)
is greater than effective marginal cost. Colleges must satisfy their budget constraint. They
spend tuition and endowment income to cover custodial and instructional costs.
3.3.3 Public Colleges
Each state operates a public college. The public college in state s maximizes expected future
income of its state’s residents, ysj, subject to a budget constraint.
Public colleges also take appropriations, zs, to be exogenous. Given zs, the public college
in state s charges Ts to residents and Tso to non-residents. In order to raise sufficient funds
for instruction, colleges adjust tuition based on changes to zs. Colleges may also change the
relative proportion of residents and non-residents admitted. We assume tuition is a function

















where κ is the elasticity of tuition with respect to appropriations, and T represents baseline
equilibrium tuition level. This equation is only locally valid and is therefore only used
to understand tuition setting under small changes in appropriations. All students of the
same residency type at a public college face the same sticker price, although students with
different incomes pay different amounts due to differences in federal financial aid. Tuition
and appropriations per student fund instructional expenditure per student and custodial
costs.
Epple at al. (2017) show that the public college j admits all students with ability above a







min)/λ+ Ts + zs − EMCj(bsmin) = 0 (3.11)
Tso + zs − EMCj(bomin) = 0 (3.12)
where λ is the multiplier on the budget constraint. The non-resident threshold is a function
of tuition and the appropriations level, while the resident threshold also accounts for how
educating student with ability b changes the total stock of in-state human capital.
3.3.4 Federal and State Governments
The federal government distributes financial aid, Asj through a Pell Grant type program,
that takes into account expected family contribution as a function of income EFC(y). A
student can receive at most Ā in aid.
Asj = min{max[0, P cj + L− EFC(y)], Ā}
The state and federal governments must balance their budgets. Let Ys be pre-tax aggre-
gate income in state s.










where ks is the number of students who attend the public college in state s, regardless of
each student’s state of residence. State colleges can give admission and tuition preference to
residents but do not treat students differently after enrolling.
3.3.5 Equilibrium Definition
An equilibrium consists of a price and quality vector with corresponding college charac-
teristics (θj, Ij, kj) for all j ∈ J \ O; state admission criteria for all states for residents and
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non-residents; state of residence s for all households, which gives fs(b, y); and a set of student
choices for all (s, b, y) and j ∈ J and choice probabilities rsj(b, y) such that:
1. Private colleges choose who to admit and what prices to charge to maximize quality,
taking the prices and qualities of the other colleges, the student choice probability
functions, and public policies as given.
2. Public colleges choose who to admit to maximizes in-state achievement, taking the
prices and qualities of the other colleges, the student characteristics, and public policies
as given.
3. Household (b, y) pick where to attend to maximize utility, taking college prices and
qualities, public policies, and the decisions of other households as given.
4. State and federal budgets are balanced.
3.3.6 Brief Discussion of Model Limitations
The model outlined in this section is highly stylized, but the general equilibrium structure
allows us shed light on the importance of private college market power and the labor market
for measuring the incidence of public investment in higher education, which is missing from
the previous measures. Before discussing how the model is calibrated and the results, it is
important to understand some of the model’s key simplifications.
First, the public sector only consists of one college per state while states have several
colleges of varying quality. Including additional public colleges would provide more compet-
itive pressure on the private sector and therefore strengthen the mechanisms we highlight.
Similarly, public colleges do not offer institutional aid in the model, which also understates
the competitive pressure they provide. Cook and Turner (2021) show that public research
universities have progressive pricing policies, although that is not the case for non-research
universities. If the public universities could attract more high-ability students away from
the privates with subsidies, then the privates would have less market power. However, the
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opposite is true for the size of private sector– including more privates would increase the
competitiveness of market and therefore lower the value of public competition.
Related to our assumptions on the size of the market, we also assume colleges do not
face capacity constraints. With capacity constraints, public colleges have less resources to
spend on instruction but also no longer enroll the lower ability students who lower peer
effects but whose education raises average state achievement. This leads to an ambiguous
quality change and therefore an unknown change in public value and competitive pressure.
Private college capacity constraints also have an ambiguous effect on market power because
it restricts access but also lowers quality and therefore decreases both demand and supply.9
Most importantly for incidence, when private college demand increases after a state funding
cut, capacity constraints would lead fewer total students to enroll. Excluding this constraint
would lead to larger negative welfare effects on the baseline (z = z̄) marginal ability students
who have high effective marginal costs.
Our simplifications on the household side of the market are also important for incidence.
Households are only able to pay for college out of current income and so some low-income
households may be financially rationed out of the private market, especially when the returns
to college are high. We may therefore overstate the value of public colleges to the modest-
income-high-ability students who are always admitted to the privates but can only afford
to attend in our model with public competitive pressure.10 However, a loan market weakly
increases households’ willingness-to-pay for college and therefore also increases private college
prices and market power. Overall, we find that changes in private market power from
decreases in public investment mainly affect high-income-modest-ability students who are
always able to afford college without loans. A loan market would therefore give greater
college access to low-income-higher-ability students, exacerbating the main mechanisms we
study in this paper.
9Since the privates maximize quality in the model, a constraint necessarily would weakly lower quality.
10Our framework does not capture the impact of liquidity constraints and household borrowing for college,
which are likely important (see Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2012) and vary across the income distribution.
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3.4 Private Colleges and Incidence
Public investment in higher education creates general equilibrium implications for the private
college market. To measure the role private colleges play for measuring incidence, first
consider how appropriations, zs, affect their prices. For the purposes of this illustration, we
hold the labor market fixed. Given the model’s parametrization and Equation 3.9,
psj =
(1− rsj)αp
1 + (1− rsj)αp
EMCj(b) +
y − Lj + Asj






αp(y − Lj + Asj − EMCj(b))
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change in peer externality
(3.15)
and ∂rsj/∂zs is determined by the household’s utility function.
11 When appropriations fall,
instructional expenditure at the public colleges fall as well and tuition increases. Households
are more likely to enroll in the privates as a result. This implies ∂rsj/∂zs < 0 and ∂kj/∂zs < 0
as well. The first term in Equation 3.14 captures the first order effect of changes in the value
of a student’s other college options on private college prices. When the value of the public
universities decreases and they provide less competitive pressure, the privates gain market
power and increase prices.
The market level changes also create general equilibrium effects from student sorting,
reflected in the second term of Equation 3.14 and broken down into three components in
11The derivate is only defined for students who attend college j in the baseline. For those students,
y −L+Asj −EMCj(b) is positive since price is less than or equal to EMCj(b) and students only attend if
they can afford to.
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Equation 3.15. First, decreases in public college appropriations increase custodial or oper-
ating costs as long as the college has increasing marginal costs, so that v2 is positive. The
middle term reflects changes in instructional costs. If decreases in appropriations allow the
college to charge higher prices because ∂rsj/∂zs < 0, it will have more revenue to increase
instructional expenditure. The direct financial cost of enrolling students will increase. The
impact of changes in instructional expenditure on prices is weighted by a function of stu-
dent ability since instruction and average ability are linked through the quality production
function. Since expenditure and average ability are complements, the value to the college of
enrolling high-ability students or cost of enrolling low-ability students is larger when expen-
diture is higher.
The final term in Equation 3.15 captures how general equilibrium sorting of students
affects relative college quality from changes in peer effects. The sign of ∂θj/∂zs and the final
term therefore depends on who the marginal students to private colleges are. When the public
colleges become lower quality, low-income-high-ability students may then find it worthwhile
to pay for the more expensive privates. In that case, θj will increase. The opposite is true
if high-income-modest-ability students are on the margin. When θj is larger, θj − b is also
larger and low-ability students produce more negative peer externalities. They must pay
higher prices to compensate, although colleges are unable to raise tuition above a maximum
P cj . Overall, this discussion implies that the sign of ∂psj/∂zs is theoretically ambiguous and
potentially varies across the income and ability distribution. However, in our calibrated
model presented in the next section, we find that both ∂psj/∂zs and ∂EMCj(b)/∂zs are
negative for all students.
State investment in public higher education additionally affects who the privates admit.
Each private admits a student if her effective marginal cost is less than the minimum of
the optimal price given by Equation 3.9 and the sticker price, that is if min(P cj , psj(b, y)) ≥
EMCj(b). Students that pay more than their effective marginal cost but less than the sticker
price before a small appropriations decrease will still be admitted afterwards. The spending
119
shock has an ambiguous effect on welfare for these students since they now face higher prices,
but also benefit from higher quality private colleges.
The students most impacted by decreases in state spending are those who are no longer
admitted to the privates. The sticker price and effective marginal cost together imply a
minimum ability threshold at each college defined by EMCj(b) = P
c
j . Who is still admitted
after the state spending change depends on how both pieces respond. Holding the sticker
prices fixed, a decrease in appropriations will increase the minimum ability threshold if
∂EMCj(b)/∂zs < 0 for the marginal ability student. Students who can no longer attend their
best option face a potentially large welfare loss. How many students are affected depends
on the private college sticker price responses. If the privates also raise their maximum prices
when appropriations fall, ∂P cj /∂zs < 0, then more low-ability students can compensate the
privates for their high effective marginal costs. In the remainder of the paper, we calibrate
the model and present counterfactual simulations to understand the importance of these
mechanisms for incidence.
3.5 Calibration and Equilibrium Description
We calibrate the model to match the college going behavior across the income distribution
and previous estimates from the literature that describe how students and institutions re-
spond to different higher education policies. The estimates are presented in Table 3.1. First,
using information on the joint income-ability distribution from the High School Longitudi-
nal Study of 2009 (HSLS), we estimate the income distribution and the correlation between
income and ability, assuming that they are jointly log-normally distributed. Following Ep-
ple et al. (2017), we assume that the ability distribution has a mean of 1 and a standard
deviation of 0.15.12 We truncate the income distribution at the lowest bin we observe in the
data ($15K) so that all households can afford the in-state college option as well as $300K.
Many baseline parameters, specifically government policies, sticker prices, and endow-
12Using the PowerStat tool from the National Center for Education Statistics, data is available by the
following income bins: less than $15K; in increments of $20K up to $235K; more than $235K. We measure
ability using the mathematics quintile score. Income is scaled to 2013-2014 using the Consumer Price Index.
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ments, are directly observed in the data. The calibration uses the 2013-2014 academic year
to align with the HSLS. The Delta Cost Project has data on institution-level resident and
non-resident tuition, state appropriations, and private college sticker prices. We compute the
enrollment-weighted average for public four-year colleges and private not-for-profit four-year
colleges, divided into three groups by SAT scores. Living Expenses are from the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). Federal financial aid policies and private college
endowments follow Epple et al. (2017)13.
We calibrate the remaining household and college parameters, αs, wβs, φs, γ, ω, F , and
vs, to minimize the sum of squared percent deviations of: (1) average private college tuition
of $27220 (National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 2012, Epple et al. 2019 scaled to 2013-
2014 dollars); (2) private school enrollment as percent of total enrollment of 28.5 (HSLS);
(3) enrollment elasticity of institutional aid of 0.7 (Van der Klaauw 2002); (4-5) estimates
of the elasticity of aid with respect to ability and income from Epple et al. (2019); (6) the
20 percent earnings increase for the marginal-ability student from attending a public college
(Hoesktra 2009 and Zimmerman 2014)14; (7) public college instructional expenditure per
student of $10463 (Delta Cost Project); (8-13) the percent of students from each of 6 income
bins who enroll in any 4 year college weighted by the percent of students in each bin15; and
(14-18) the percent of students from each ability quintile who enroll in any 4 year college
weighted by the percent of students. We additionally set v1 to 0, based on previous results
from Epple et al. (2006, 2017). Appendix C.1 presents the model fit.
From the calibrated equilibrium, the returns to college quality and ability, βs, and the
labor market returns to human capital, ws, are not separately identified. While βs are
structural parameters, ws are equilibrium parameters and functions of public investment in
13The maximum federal aid is set to $4K to match estimates from the 2011-12 National Postsecondary
Student Aid Study for those who applied for federal aid.
14The model implies a minimum-ability threshold at public colleges. This creates a regression-discontinuity,
where students just above the threshold have access to the public colleges, but those below do not. We match
the model implied earnings gain from college attendance for these students, based on β, to the RD estimates.
15We combine the highest income bins to create $95K to $135K and more than $135K so that all bins
have at least 10 percent of the population. We exclude the lowest income bin of less than $15K since we
truncate the income distribution at that point.
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higher education. Assuming that the labor market value of human capital is determined by
a CES production function in college and non-college educated labor, we set ρ to 1.7 (Autor
2014). We then recover the share parameter, s, assuming that the entire baseline earnings
difference between workers is because of human capital differences or that wc/wh = 1.
16
Under these assumptions, we recover βs, wc and wh for the baseline equilibrium.
Finally, we calibrate how public and private college tuition respond to changes in public
investment in higher education. We set κs = −0.263 and κso = −0.066 based on Bound et
al. (2019).17 In the next subsection, we estimate the private college sticker price elasticity
with respect to state appropriations, κp.
3.5.1 Sticker Price Response to Public Investment
The model implied incidence of public investment in higher education depends on the re-
sponsiveness of private college sticker prices to changes in state funding. The progressivity of
public investment is a function of the magnitude of the elasticity since a larger price response
implies a smaller change in the minimum ability thresholds at the private colleges. We esti-
mate the elasticity of private college sticker prices with respect to state appropriations, κp,
from the following specification:








where P cj(s)t is the sticker price of private college j in state s in year t, zit is the average
appropriations in state i and year t, zj(s)t computes the relevant state appropriations for
college j by weighting zit by the fraction of j’s students from i in the baseline year 1998, and
16From the model’s calibrated equilibrium, we cannot recover both s and the college wage (per unit of
human capital) gap. However, since college educated labor is a scarce resource, we expect wc ≥ wh. From
calibration moment (6), the marginal student’s earnings gains also imply that wc ≤ 1.2wh if college weakly
increases human capital. We therefore choose wc/wh = 1 as a normalization. For a small policy change, like
in our counterfactuals to measure incidence, the equilibrium wage ratio is mainly determined by ρ.
17Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) find that for a $1000 increase in appropriations, resident tuition decreases
by $60, while non-resident decreases by about $222. Webber (2017) finds larger elasticities, especially for
more recent years, but does not differentiate between resident and non-resident tuition.
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πj(s) and ψst are institution and state-by-year fixed effects, respectively.
Equation 3.16 is similar to a shift-share design where zit captures yearly variation in
the effective treatment for college j and kij,1998/kj,1998 captures j’s dependence on students
from i. As appropriations and public college quality in i decrease, the demand for private
options increases, allowing those colleges to raise prices. The importance of a spending
shock in i to college j depends on how many students from that state tend to enroll.18 This
strategy exploits within state variation based on where private colleges draw their student
populations.
McDuff (2006) provides empirical support for these mechanism where students respond
to changes in public investment in higher education. He finds that a 1 standard deviation
increase in public college quality, which is measured as a combination of mean SAT scores,
freshman retention, and spending per student at the flagship, increases the percentage of
scores sent to in-state public schools by about 6 percentage points and the likelihood of
enrolling in an in-state public school by 5 percentage points. Increased demand in one sector
implies relative decreases in others, the private market or no college. McDuff also finds
that lower income households are more price sensitive, while the higher income are more
quality sensitive. This evidence is consistent with our calibrated model and we highlight its
implications for enrollment and incidence in the next section.19
We estimate Equation 3.16 using a balanced panel of Bachelor’s, Master’s and Doctoral
private colleges from 2000 to 2017. For each institution, the Integrated Postsecondary Ed-
ucation Data System (IPEDS) reports the college’s sticker price in a given year, as well as
the number of students from each US state who attend. Grapevine, an annual compilation
of data on state fiscal support for higher education, from the Center for the Study of Edu-
cation Policy at Illinois State University and the State Higher Education Executive Officers
18Contemporaneous measures of the share of students from each state would lead to an upward bias since
enrollments are also a function of the sticker prices. We therefore use 1998 as a base year to calculate the
weights.
19Bound et al. (2009) provide additional suggestive evidence that students responded to the decrease in
public college quality over time.
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(SHEEO) report the state-level average appropriations per student at public colleges. We al-
low κp to vary by quartile of SAT scores since our model predicts that the elasticity depends
on how close substitutes the public and privates colleges are.20 The results are reported in
Table 3.2. Our preferred specification is column (3) with state-by-year fixed effects. We
present specifications with only year fixed effects, and both year fixed effects and state lin-
ear time trends to show the importance of capturing business cycle fluctuations. When the
economy is doing well, states have more resources to spend on appropriations, but so do
households to spend on education, which would lead κp to be biased upwards.
Our results suggest that private colleges adjust their maximum prices to further increase
market power when state appropriations fall, but the effect is small in magnitude. A 10
percent decrease in appropriations would lead to less than a 1.3 percent increase in pri-
vate college sticker prices. The effect also appears to be concentrated in the upper-middle
quartile of selectivity, at institutions like Northeastern University. Colleges at this level of
selectivity are likely close substitutes for the publics. The student-weighted average SAT
scores at public colleges is at the boundary of the lower-middle and upper-middle quartiles
and well within the upper-middle for flagships. Our results may understate the effects at
less selective institutions since many draw students locally, which makes it difficult to detect
a response in our framework with state-by-year fixed effects. Some of these institutions are
also horizontally differentiated, religious colleges for example, and therefore may also not
directly compete with publics. Highly selective institutions compete less with the public
sector and respond less as well, based on our estimates.
Based on the results, we set κp = −0.126 for all private colleges in the model. This
subtle response may be consistent with quality-maximizing private colleges if high-ability-
low-income students’ application decisions are sensitive to the sticker price, as has been
well-documented (e.g. see Bettinger et al. (2012), Hoxby and Avery (2013), Hoxby and
Turner (2015), and Dynarski et al. (2018)). Some private colleges have recently lowered
20IPEDS reports the 25th and 75th percentiles of the math and verbal section of the SAT. We measure the
institution’s SAT scores as the average of all four components in 2001, the first year available in the data.
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their sticker prices in hopes of attracting more students (Anderson 2019). Colleges may also
have a different objective function for setting their maximum prices. Epple et al. (2006)
suggest that lower than quality-maximizing prices would reduce the number of low-ability
students who harm the college’s reputation, limit the private incentives of administrators to
admit students of wealthy households for personal gain, and lead to higher alumni giving.
Our results are also consistent with previous evidence on average prices, as in Fillmore
(2016). Using the National Postsecondary Student Aid Study, he finds that, all else equal,
colleges offer lower prices to students when they believes they face stiffer competition. Every
additional school listed on a student’s FAFSA is associated with a $373 increase in institu-
tional aid. This effect is primarily driven by private colleges and the estimated association
for very selective privates is more than $900 per additional school listed. Large changes in the
market that affect every student’s application portfolio should then have general equilibrium
consequences for the entire tuition distribution, pushing up sticker prices as well.
3.5.2 State Investment and The Higher Education Market
State investment in public higher education has important implications for the entire college
market and the labor market. Using the baseline calibrated model with state spending z̄ and
private sticker prices, P cj , we simulate the effects of a 10 percent decrease in public support
with and without endogenous sticker prices. Table 3.3 includes key features of the equilibria
to highlight the general equilibrium consequences of state divestment. The next section then
quantifies the magnitude of these different impacts across the income and ability distribution
to understand who benefits and who bears the burden of public investment.
Based on our calibration (column 1), the market consists of an open-access public college
in each state, two nearly open-access private colleges, and one selective private college. We
refer to the privates as LP, MP, and HP for low-quality, middle-quality, and high-quality
private colleges. When state appropriations fall to 0.9z̄ (column 2), the public colleges charge
higher tuition to recover lost revenue, but spend less on instruction. These two changes
depress aggregate public college demand and have two implications for private market. First,
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the privates charge higher prices to increase instructional expenditure and quality, further
driving up their own demand for most. However, prices increase too much for the low-income,
leading some to substitute to the in-state public, raising its average student ability.21 The
general equilibrium effects of state investment on the private market therefore feedback onto
the public colleges.
Second, some baseline public college students now enroll in the privates. In particular,
modest-income-high-ability students, who receive substantial private institutional aid, switch
sectors. The change in enrollments increases the average student ability at the highest quality
private, which raises the minimum ability threshold. Those between the 60th and 62nd
percentiles of the ability distribution can no longer sufficiently compensate the HP college
at the baseline sticker prices, and are crowded out.
Increased selectivity at the highest-quality private college creates negative spillovers on
the other privates. The modest-ability students, or those just above the 60th percentile,
no longer admitted after the state funding decrease are now likely to enroll in one of the
other privates, lowering their average student ability. This effect outweighs the increased
demand from the modest-income-high-ability students who attend the public colleges when
state support is high. Overall quality at 3 and 4 still increases because the colleges enroll
more high-income students and can charge higher prices from the change in demand.
Based on the implications for student sorting and college quality, state divestment in
public higher education decreases total college human capital accumulation. The implied
college wage gap increase by 0.4 percent induces some baseline non-college workers to enroll.
Even though enrollment goes up, most attend the now lower quality publics. Although more
students would want to enroll in the private sector, since the returns to any college and
college quality increased, the privates limit access through their admissions decisions and
prices.
When private colleges increase their sticker prices slightly after the decrease in state
21The shift of more lower income households to the the less expensive public sector or to no college also
decreases total federal financial aid.
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funding (column 3), more modest-ability students can sufficiently compensate the highest
quality private for their effect on θHP , and are now admitted. The minimum ability threshold
falls slightly but is still above the baseline. The threshold also falls because, at higher prices,
low-income-high-ability students are less likely to enroll. Fewer students are crowded out on
the admissions margin from the policy change, but more choose not to attend because it is
not worth the cost. From the enrollment and price changes, the college raises more revenue
for instruction, improving quality and thereby increasing demand and the entire distribution
of prices further. Moreover, with less crowd out of high-income-low-ability students, the
spillovers on the other privates are smaller.
The change in attendance patterns and quality from increases in private college sticker
prices has an ambiguous effect on the labor market. More students are admitted to the
highest quality college and the privates collect more tuition revenue to improve quality but
fewer choose to enroll at higher prices. We find that increases in private sticker prices
decrease total human capital in the economy. Therefore, the college wage premium rises
with private market power.
3.5.3 Equilibrium Impacts of Sticker Price Increases
As highlighted in Section 3.4, the sticker price elasticity’s effect on private college admission
has important implications for who benefits and who bears the burden of public investment
in higher education. The more the sticker prices increase, the more the privates can increase
their market power and modest-ability students can compensate for their negative peer
effects. The elasticity therefore determines who has access to the highest quality private
after a 10 percent decrease in appropriations per student (z = 0.9z̄).
Panel (a) of Figure 3.2 plots the change in HP college’s minimum ability threshold as a
function of the sticker price elasticity. As it increases in magnitude, the minimum ability
threshold falls. However, the elasticity would need to be less than -0.325 for the admission
threshold to be lower than the baseline, which is well outside the confidence interval of our
estimate from Table 3.2, shown by the virtual dotted lines. After the decrease in public
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investment, the highest quality private becomes more selective and some modest-ability
students are crowded out, although the number depends on the sticker price elasticity.
Increases in private college sticker prices also affect attendance by pricing lower income
households out of the market. Those students either choose to enroll in the lower quality
public colleges or do not attend any. Although the privates use the extra revenue to im-
prove their own quality and increase their students’ human capital, Panel (b) of Figure 3.2
implies that aggregate college human capital decreases after the cut to state spending and is
decreasing with the magnitude of elasticity. Increases in private college prices, and therefore
market power, exacerbate the college wage premium. Increases in the college wage premium
also drive up demand for the privates, allowing them to charge higher tuition, although they
are limited by their sticker prices. These two effects build on one another, but the extent to
which they do depends on the elasticity.
3.6 The Incidence of Public Investment
We consider several different methods of measuring who benefits and who bears the burden
of public investment in higher education. We begin by showing that the model replicates the
main findings of the accounting approach. We then present the model implied CV measure in
two steps to illustrate the general equilibrium mechanisms. First, the private college sticker
prices are held fixed. In this exercise, private college market power increases but only to a
limited extent. Then, sticker prices adjust based on the results from the previous section
to better understand the role of private college market power. In both CV exercises, the
labor market returns to college endogenously adjusts as a function of public investment and
private market power. Appendix C.3 additionally presents comparative statics to further
illustrate the key mechanisms of how changes in the college market affect incidence.
3.6.1 The Model Implied Accounting Approach
The model replicates Pechman’s and Bill Johnson’s accounting approach findings that spend-
ing is weakly progressive. Panel (a) of Figure 3.3 presents the distribution of net benefits by
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parental income, that is, instructional expenditure plus capital costs minus tuition and taxes
paid. Each open circle represents the average net benefits for a household of type (b, y).22
Based on the model implied accounting approach, the very low income do not benefit
since they are unlikely to attend given the costs even with the maximum amount of federal
financial aid. Slightly higher income households still receive the maximum federal aid at both
public colleges but tuition is less of a financial burden, leading to large attendance rates and
a positive mass around $40,000. As income increases, aid for the in-state public falls while
households still receive the maximum amount at the out-of-state option and the privates.
Net benefits decrease sharply since they are less likely to attend their in-state public college.
High income households have large negative net benefits since they are much more likely to
attend the private colleges but pay high income taxes.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.3 shows a weak, but negative, association between ability and net
benefits, or that lower ability students benefit more from public investment. The in-state
public is the best option for these students since they are not admitted to the highest-
quality private college, and have relatively high effective marginal costs and prices at the
others. Higher ability students receive merit aid at the privates, which makes those higher
quality colleges more affordable. Since income and ability are positively correlated, average
taxes paid are also increasing in ability. Taken together, there is a negative association
between net benefits and ability for higher ability students.
We additionally calculate the accounting measure for a 10 percent decrease in state
appropriations as the change in instructional expenditure minus the change in tuition and
taxes paid to support the public colleges, holding college attendance decisions fixed:23
(I(z)− I(0.9z))− (t(z)− t(0.9z))y − (T (z)− T (0.9z)) (3.18)
22The figures show the benefits by income and ability, averaging over 20 sets of idiosyncratic preference
draws, to emphasize the distributional effects of public investment. Appendix C.2 additionally presents the
accounting approach for each household-enrollment decision (b, y, ε).
23Note that since attendance decisions are fixed, so are capital costs.
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The decrease in appropriations has a direct effect on the college and state budget constraints,
affecting both instructional expenditure and tax rates. Public colleges also increase tuition
to recover some of the lost revenue. Some lower income households also receive additional
federal financial to offset the tuition increase. This equation is analogous to Equation 3.1,
which allows us to compare the two approaches for measure incidence and understand the
bias from ignoring the general equilibrium effects of public investment.
The distributional effects for a 10 percent decrease shown in Panels (c) and (d) are
qualitatively similar to the total net benefits. However, the share of the net benefits that
go to low income household shrinks because they now pay for a larger share of their lower
quality education. Additionally, slightly higher income households see no change in relative
net benefits because new federal financial aid largely offsets the increase in tuition. Higher
income households also have a similar share of net benefits.
3.6.2 The General Equilibrium Incidence of Public Investment
We now reexamine incidence using our model and the compensating variation framework
described in Section 3.2, since the accounting approach misses important general equilibrium
consequences of public investment in higher education. We first decrease state appropriations
per student by 10 percent, or about $700, holding private college sticker prices fixed. This
counterfactual corresponds to the equilibrium presented in Column (2) of Table 3.3. Panels
(a) and (b) of Figure 3.4 present the distribution of CV by income and ability, respectively.
A positive number indicates that a household is better off when state spending is high; she
would need to be given a positive amount of money to be just as well off after the decrease
in appropriations per student. Each open circle represents the average CV for a household
of type (b, y) based on 20 draws from the preference distribution. We focus on the average
CV to highlight the distributional effects.24
Public investment in higher education is weakly progressive, but high-income-modest-
24Appendix C.2 presents the results conditional on a household’s attendance decision based on the pref-
erence draws.
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ability students benefit the most. They are crowded out of the highest quality private since
more low-income-high-ability students now enroll. The implied change in the minimum
ability threshold generates the large positive spike in CVs in panel (b) near the 60th percentile
of the ability distribution. Many of these students lose access to their preferred college and
face a large welfare cost to move to their next best option. The negative welfare effects
from changes in admission are especially concentrated among the high-income because low-
income-modest-ability households are less likely to enroll in the high price privates where
they are charged the fill sticker price, and even those that do are not as harmed when moving
to the lower price public colleges. That is, given relative prices and qualities, the publics
and privates are closer substitutes for lower income households.
Most students who enroll in public colleges when state support is high are also negatively
affected by the appropriations decrease, but the welfare effects are smaller in magnitude
than those on the high-income-modest-ability. This mainly affects above median income
households who are the most likely to enroll in the in-state public, as seen in the small hump
in panel (a) from $50K to $100K. Their preferred baseline (z = z̄) college option becomes
lower quality and more expensive, implying a positive CV, especially for those that still
enroll. They are not very mobile across sectors because the privates are too expensive and
the returns to any college are high, and so they bear some of the burden of the policy change.
However, based on our parameterization and calibration, some lower ability students who
still enroll in the public colleges after the appropriations decrease are better off because the
value of the increased returns to college outweighs the decrease in public quality. By missing
the general equilibrium labor market effects, the accounting approach overstates the negative
effects on these students. Slightly lower income households are less affected because their
federal financial aid increases with prices.
Public college students can partially avoid the negative effects of higher tuition and lower
college quality by enrolling in the privates or not enrolling in any college. However, when
they leave the public sector after state divestment, they still face the general equilibrium
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effects on the private and labor markets. Changes in college choice, as a function of state
funding, are important for assessing who benefits and who bears the burden. The accounting
approach misses both of these margins. The low income are especially harmed because the
price increases push some of them out of the college market, and they then see their wages
fall from the decreases in both human capital and the returns to human capital as non-college
workers. The higher income, who are less burdened by the private price increases, are more
likely to shift to the higher quality colleges where they benefit from the increased returns to
college. The overall welfare effect is ambiguous in sign for these students, but since they no
longer pay public college tuition to help finance public expenditure, CV is often negative.
At the other extreme, high-income-high-ability students benefit the most from state di-
vestment in public higher education. As more high-ability students shift to the HP college
and all privates charge higher average prices from the increased aggregate demand, the col-
leges become higher quality. However, since these households are high-income, they always
pay the sticker price. They receive a higher quality education, when the returns to qual-
ity are higher, while paying the same tuition and lower taxes. Although missed by the
accounting approach, the general equilibrium consequences of public investment have large
and varied effects on the high-income. Overall, excluding these effects biases incidence in
both directions.
The equilibrium changes in the private and labor market from a decrease in state appro-
priations have an ambiguous welfare effect on lower income baseline private college students.
The moderate income households value the increased quality and returns to college more
than the added tuition costs, while the reverse is true for lowest income. The higher prices
even lead some students to enroll in the less expensive and lower quality public colleges or
not enroll in any college– increased private market power crowds out some low-income stu-
dents.25 For those who switch to the public sector from the privates, the welfare effect could
be positive or negative, depending on the individual’s benefits from the increased returns
25Very few students are no longer able to afford college from the price change. However, price increases
enough that the privates are no longer their best option.
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to college. However, CV is shifted up because they only pay public college tuition when
spending is low.26
Finally, the equilibrium labor market changes have a negative welfare effect on baseline
non-college workers. Their wages decrease as college human capital becomes more scarce
from the increased private college market power and decrease in public college value. There-
fore, the changes in the college market spill over to non-college workers since the two are
linked through the economy’s production function– with more public investment, non-college
workers benefit from less competition in the labor market. While the accounting approach
implies that these students have negative net benefits from paying taxes, our approach ad-
ditionally captures the added value from labor market spillovers. Ignoring these general
equilibrium effects leads the accounting approach to understate progressivity since these
households are more likely to be low-income.
Inframarginal college attendees in the baseline enroll in college after the shock because of
the decrease in relative earnings. The welfare effect is ambiguous in sign, similar to what we
describe for several other cases above, because both price and the returns to college increase
over the baseline. This trade-off is more likely to be a net benefit for the high-income baseline
non-college workers, who shift to colleges 3 and 4. Lower income, modest ability students
switch to the publics to avoid the low non-college wages and are worse off but often have
positive CVs because the policy change greatly increases how much they pay to help finance
public expenditure with tuition.
With increased demand for private colleges after the negative shock to state appropria-
tions, the privates will increase their sticker prices. Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 3.4 present
the distribution of CV allowing the maximum prices to adjust based on our estimates from
Table 3.2, as in Column (3) of Table 3.3. Since the sticker prices minimally increase, the
results are qualitatively similar to the previous case. However, the mass of positive points
for households in the top of the income distribution in Panel (c) is slightly smaller than in
26In practice, the difference between ν and CV in Equation 3.1 is small because the low-income receive
federal aid to cover their tuition expenses.
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Panel (a). For example, in panel (c), 1.03 percent of households in the top 10 percent of
the income distribution have positive average CV. In panel (a), the corresponding percent in
1.21. With higher sticker prices, more students are able to sufficiently compensate the high
quality private for their modest ability. Public investment in higher education is still weakly
progressive, but the largest benefits still go to modest ability students who only have access
to high quality private when state spending is high.
Sticker price increases also create other equilibrium changes in college price and quality,
the wage premium, and taxes that matter for incidence. Overall, these effects on individuals
are much smaller in magnitude than changes in admission, but impact all households. The
sign of these effects on welfare varies importantly with income and ability, but the implica-
tions for incidence are analogous to the fixed sticker price case because they all move in the
same direction from the baseline. Compared with the fixed sticker price case, high-income-
high-ability students receive much of the new benefits because HP college’s quality increases
along with the returns to quality. Since they are high income, they always pay (nearly) the
full sticker price so tuition only increases modestly. Most of the new burden from the sticker
price increases falls on the lower income, who are more harmed by the increase in prices than
the increase in private college quality or are even priced out of the private market.
Taking the results from the two counterfactuals together, we find that high-income-
modest-ability students benefit the most from public investment in higher education because
the general equilibrium effects on the private college and labor markets are large. The
externalities on these students from changes in the private market are smaller when the
privates raise their maximum tuition, but colleges only minimally increase their prices after
state divestment. Since these households are very likely to attend the privates under the
current level of state appropriations, z̄, the accounting approach would instead say that they
do not benefit but pay high taxes. However, these households only have access to the highest
quality private college when state spending is sufficiently high. By ignoring the impacts of
public investments on other parts of the economy, the accounting approach mischaracterizes
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incidence.
3.6.3 The Bias from Ignoring Equilibrium Effects
Since the accounting approach ignores the general equilibrium effects of public investment
on college enrollment, and the private college and labor markets, it mischaracterizes who
benefits and who bears the burden. To further highlight the distributional implications,
we consider two policy relevant measures of the bias. First, in Panel (a) of Figure 3.5, for
each income-ability decile, we present the average CV measure in dollars with endogenous
sticker prices and labor market returns to college minus the accounting approach for a 10
percent decrease in state appropriations (Equation 3.1 - Equation 3.18). In Panel (b) we
define the bias as the percent of households with a positive CV minus the percent with a
positive accounting measure. More negative values are shaded lighter and indicate that the
accounting approach overstates the benefits by more.
Overall, the accounting approach overstates both the average benefits and the number
of households that benefit from public investment in higher education, but the magnitude
varies importantly across the income and ability distribution because the general equilibrium
effects are large and ambiguous in sign. The largest differences in magnitude in Panel (a)
are for the highest income decile households. They benefit from the general equilibrium
implications of state divestment on private college quality and the labor market returns to
college. Ignoring these effects leads to substantial bias for measuring the average benefits.
The bias is large enough that the accounting approach also gets the sign of the welfare effect
wrong for about 16 percent of the highest income decile households.
The average net benefits and CV for the very high income households in the seventh
ability decile (between the 60th and 70th percentiles) are much closer in magnitude but only
because the welfare effects from changes in private college market power vary in sign. The
accounting approach misses several important equilibrium effects that act in opposite direc-
tions. High-income-modest-ability students between the 60th and 61st ability percentiles are
crowded out of the highest quality private when state funding decreases and are much worse
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off, while those above the 61st benefit from the increases in private quality and the returns
to college.
Slightly lower income households in the seventh, eighth, and ninth income deciles, are
similarly affected, although to a lesser extent, from the increase in private market power
and the returns to college. Increased private college market power leads to price increases
for these students since they are less likely to pay the full sticker price when state funding
is high. These households additionally have more negative CV, on average, because they
are especially likely to switch to the private colleges after the public funding decrease. This
allows them to avoid the negative effects of divestment on the public colleges, and they no
longer pay public college tuition. Those who remain at the public colleges also benefit from
the increased returns to college human capital. These three equilibrium effects are missed
by the accounting approach.
The difference between CV and the accounting measure is nearly uniformly decreasing
in ability for the relatively high income, except for the high-income-modest ability who
are crowded out of the highest quality private college. Both the human capital returns to
college quality and the labor market returns to college are higher for higher ability students.
However, the same pattern does not hold for the percent with positive benefits because public
college enrollment and the likelihood of moving from a public to private college after state
divestment are non-linear functions of ability, conditional on income.
The interaction between college choice, private college market power and the general
equilibrium labor market affects of state divestment are especially important for households
in the fifth and sixth income deciles. Many of these households only enroll in public colleges
when state spending is low. The private colleges become too expensive, and non-college
wages fall. The large changes in tuition from changes in college choice not captured by
the accounting approach have a large impact on CV. The accounting approach therefore
understates the percent of high-ability households in the sixth income decile who benefit
from public investment.
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These interaction effects are also important for slightly lower income households in the
third and fourth deciles. Since the cost of college imposes a large financial burden, the public
college price increases lead some of them to no longer enroll. They are made worse-off from
the decrease in relatively wages and loss of human capital. However, they only pay public
college tuition when state spending is high, which pushes CV down.
Finally, although the difference between the two approaches to measure incidence is small
for households in the bottom two income deciles, the composition of the total effects are dif-
ferent. These households are mainly affected by the tax changes, which both approaches
capture, as well as the general equilibrium labor market effects. Since fewer students enroll
in the public colleges after the spending decrease, states and the federal governments col-
lect less tax revenue. The accounting approach understates the corresponding decrease in
equilibrium tax rates because student enrollment decisions are fixed. This alone would lead
CV to be larger than the accounting measure. However, for these students, the accounting
approach overstates the total benefits because it does not include the negative labor market
externalities on mainly low-income non-college workers.
3.7 Conclusion
Previous measures of the incidence of public investment in higher education implicitly ignore
general equilibrium effects. We use a compensating variation framework in a general equilib-
rium model of higher education to understand how responses in the private college and labor
markets affect the distribution of benefits. We show that public investment puts competi-
tive pressure on the privates and reduces the college wage premium, which creates benefits
for students who do not currently attend public colleges. Unlike the previous accounting
approaches, our measures capture the effect of public investment on private college prices
and admissions decisions, student enrollment decisions, and the aggregate implications for
relative wages.
Building on a class of stylized models of higher education, we find that these general equi-
librium effects are large in magnitude and vary importantly with both income and ability.
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This makes signing the bias for overall progressivity from the accounting approach difficult.
Students who look similar based on their income and college attendance decisions at the
current level of state spending can face different consequences of state divestment that mat-
ter for incidence. For example, in our model, high-income-modest-ability students benefit
the most from public investment because they are only admitted to the privates when the
publics provide sufficient competitive pressure, that is, when state support is high. However,
the high-income, slightly higher ability students are not crowded out after a negative appro-
priations shock. They retain access to the highest quality private colleges when increased
private market power improves college quality and raises their wages.
While the role of private colleges and the labor market enhance our understanding of
incidence in this setting, both approaches focus on the private returns and cost. Higher
education impacts the distribution of human capital and therefore the tax base as well as
the demand for other public expenditure, like assistance programs. If the social benefits
mainly impact lower income households, then both measures understate the progressivity.
If the increase in human capital leads to lower tax rates on the wealthy, then we would
understate the regressivity. Further work is needed to understand how the social returns to
public investment affect incidence.
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Table 3.1: Calibration Parameters
Parameter Name Value
Households:
αp Parent Utility Shifter 20.832
αs Student Utility Shifter 25.320
wβc1 College Wage Shifter 2.614
wβc2 College Wage Ability Share 0.505
wβc3 College Wage Subst. Parameter -0.936
wβh1 Non-college Wage Shifter 2.359
wβh2 Non-college Return to b 0.111
wβh3 Non-college Return to y 0.138
L Living expenses $5479
b Ability Distribution ln(b) ∼ N(1.0, 0.0225)
y Income Distribution ln(y + 42470) ∼ N(11.500, 0.298)
corr(b, y) 0.359
Governments:
T s Resident; Non-Resident Tuition $7113; 19345
zs Per Student Subsidy $7062
EFC Effective Family Contribution max{0, .48y − 10300, .69y − 22500}
Ā Maximum federal aid $4000
κs;κso In/Out Tuition Elasticity -0.263; -.066
Colleges:
φ Private Productivities 1.089;1.118;1.182
γ Return on Peer Quality 0.049
ω Return on Instruction 0.065
Ej/kj Baseline Endowments/Student $221, 603, 3850
P cj Baseline Sticker Prices $24082; 31724; 34118
κp Sticker Price Elasticity -0.126
Costs:
F Fixed Cost $231
v1; v2 Custodial cost parameters $0; 18057
Labor Market:
ρ CES Substitution Parameter 0.412
s CES College Share 0.461
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Table 3.2: The Effect of State Appropriations on Private College Sticker Prices
(1) (2) (3)
Log Price Log Price Log Price
Lower quartile -0.003 -0.015 -0.042
(0.035) (0.035) (0.054)
Lower-middle quartile 0.020 -0.002 -0.031
(0.025) (0.026) (0.049)
Upper-middle quartile -0.069∗ -0.093∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗
(0.038) (0.036) (0.057)
Upper quartile 0.033 0.011 -0.024
(0.028) (0.025) (0.052)
Observations 14705 14705 14705
Year FE Yes Yes No
State Linear Time Trend No Yes No
State-by-Year FE No No Yes
Institution FE Yes Yes Yes
Note: Each column presents the coefficients from a regression of the log of insti-
tution relevant appropriations interacted with quartiles of SAT scores on the log
of private college sticker prices using a balanced panel of institutions from 2000
to 2017 with various institution and time controls. Standard errors clustered by
institution. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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j 0.9zs with P
c
j 0.9zs with (1− 0.1κp)P cj
Enrollment:
Publics 0.131 0.129 0.130
3 0.041 0.041 0.040
4 0.032 0.032 0.032
5 0.031 0.032 0.031
Expenditure per Student Ij ($10K):
Publics 1.044 0.993 0.993
3 1.551 1.619 1.630
4 2.023 2.086 2.098
5 2.988 2.995 3.032
Mean Student Ability θj (percentile):
Publics 65.017 65.099 65.147
3 79.838 79.560 79.765
4 83.184 83.012 83.182
5 89.965 90.139 90.007
Quality qj:
Publics 1.056 1.052 1.052
3 1.181 1.184 1.185
4 1.237 1.240 1.240
5 1.346 1.346 1.347
Minimum Ability Enrolled (percentile):
Public Resident 0 0 0
Public Non-resident 0 0 0
3 0.008 0.008 0.008
4 0.008 0.008 0.016
5 60.061 62.331 61.443
Average Tuition ($10K):
Publics 0.751 0.769 0.769
3 2.153 2.233 2.251
4 2.728 2.799 2.817
5 3.393 3.400 3.443
Percent Increase in Baseline Wages Per Unit Human Capital
wc - 0.239 0.253
wh - -0.178 -0.188
Tax rates
ts 0.025 0.022 0.022
tf 0.005 0.005 0.005
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Figure 3.1: General Equilibrium Implications of State Appropriations
(a) College 5 Admission (b) College Wage Premium Increase
Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Impacts of Sticker Price Increases
Note: Panel (a) plots the relationship between the sticker price elasticity and college 5’s minimum ability
threshold for a 10 percent decrease in appropriations per student. The horizontal solid line shows the
baseline admission’s threshold for reference. Panel (b) plots the college wage premium, wc/wh, for the
same decrease in funding as a function of the elasticity. In both panels, the vertical dotted lines show the
upper and lower bounds of the elasticity’s confidence interval from Table 3.2.
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(a) Total net benefits by income (b) Total net benefits by ability
(c) 10% decrease net benefits by income (d) 10% decrease net benefits by ability
Figure 3.3: Net Benefits for Public Higher Education Investment
Note: Each open circle represents average net benefits for one draw from the joint distribution of income
and ability using the accounting approach. For each household, we take 20 draws from the preference
distribution, find the implied college enrollment decision, and then average over the corresponding net
benefits. Panels (a) and (b) present the distribution for public colleges, while (c) and (d) for a 10 percent
decrease in appropriations. The dotted vertical lines represent the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles of the
income and ability distribution. A positive value implies that the average household of type (b, y) receives
more in college expenditure than it pays in tuition and taxes.
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(a) CV by income with fixed sticker prices (b) CV by ability with fixed sticker prices
(c) CV by income with endogenous sticker prices (d) CV by ability with endogenous sticker prices
Figure 3.4: Compensating Variation for Public Higher Education Investment
Note: Each open circle represents average compensating variation (CV) for one draw from the joint
distribution of income and ability. For each household, we take 20 sets of draws from the preference
distribution, compute the corresponding CV based on equilibrium changes and the enrollment decisions,
and then average over the 20 estimates. The dotted vertical lines represent the 20th, 50th and 80th
percentiles of the income and ability distribution. A positive value in panels (a) and (b) denotes that the
household is better off under the baseline than when appropriations decrease by 10 percent, holding private
college sticker prices fixed. Panels (c) and (d) allow private colleges’ sticker prices to endogenously adjust.
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(a) Average Benefits (b) Percent Positive Benefits
Figure 3.5: Difference Between CV and Accounting Approaches
Note: Panel (a) shows the difference between CV and 10 percent of net benefits from the accounting
approach in dollars by income-ability deciles. Panel (b) shows the difference in the percent of households





Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Service Plan Example
Before the failed Pflugerville annexation in 2017 the service plan included (Austin Commu-
nity College 2020):
• A workforce innovation campus/center to meet workforce needs in healthcare, IT,
and/or advanced manufacturing and transfer education courses in PfISD
• Student support services including advising, admissions and records, academic coun-
seling, career counseling, financial aid, and student life
• Customized training to assist businesses and organizations in their employee train-
ing; access to degrees and/or certificates in transfer, career pathways, and Continuing
Education non-credit
• Access programs such as English-as-a-Second Language (ESL), GED, and Adult Basic
Education to prepare people for entering college credit programs
• Credit or non-credit entry-level, and re-entry job-training programs that can be com-
pleted in one year or less
• Eligibility to vote in elections of the ACC Board of Trustees
A.2 Data Appendix
This appendix describes each data source used in the structural model.
A.2.1 Housing Prices
Data on housing prices consists of two sources: (1) Repeat-sale home price indices estimates
from Bogin et al. (2019); (2) CoreLogic Tax Roll Record File. The first source is used in the
event-study analysis and together with the second to estimate the structural model.
1. Home price indices for the event-study analysis and public good production function
estimation: Bogin et al. (2019) estimate repeat-sale home price indices for Census
Tracts in the United States. These estimates net out the characteristics of the home,
like the number of bedrooms, and provide a measure of the relative price of land in a
Census Tract over time. Census Tracts are mapped to school districts using information
provided by the Missouri Census Data Center.
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2. Community prices in the structural model: The cost of living in community j and
receiving public good gj is determined by the price of a unit of housing services, pj. pj
is estimated in 2015 using a hedonic regression framework following Sieg et al. (2002,
2004). This process nets out the structural characteristics of the home to capture the
value of living in a community, rather than the correlation between household income
and the size of the home.
Sieg et al. (2002, 2004) show that community prices in locational equilibrium
models can be recovered by regressing the rental value of housing on home charac-
teristics and community fixed effects. Their estimation framework is implemented in
this setting using the CoreLogic Tax Roll Record File from 2016. An observation in
the CoreLogic data is a parcel of land, for example a single family home, and contains
information on the characteristics, market value, and assessed value. The sample in-
cludes single family homes sold during or after 2013. Since the data do not have income
information for the owners, it is not possible to directly compute the rental value of
housing, Vr, from the market value and instead the estimation strategy includes year
fixed effects to capture i and ζ and control for the property tax rate tj. Table A.1
presents the estimates. The model also requires that prices are strictly increasing in
community income rank. Therefore, after estimating prices in each community-year,
they are smoothed using least squares splines, enforcing that requirement.
A.2.2 Amenities
There are several data sources used to compile the set of amenities for each Census Tract.
1. College spending: Community college instructional expenditure per student comes
from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). It is available
beginning in 1987. IPEDS also provides the coordinates of the college campus.
2. Distances: Distances to the community colleges’ main campuses are computed using
the geodist command in STATA based on latitude and longitude. Census Tract centroid
latitudes and longitudes are provided by the Missouri Census Data Center.
3. ISD spending: K-12 expedniture per student data comes from the Elementary/Secondary
Information System (ElSi), part of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).
The data is first available for the 1989-1990 academic year. It is next available for 1991-
1992. Beginning in 1994, the data is reported every year until 2016-2017. Census Tracts
are matched to ISDs using the mapping files from the Missouri Census Data Center.
4. Crime rate: Violent and property crime rates by police precinct for 1986-2014 come
from the Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics (UCR). After 2014, data come from the
Texas Department of Public Safety. Census Tracts are matched to police precincts
to minimize the distance from the center of the Census Tract using the geonear com-
mand in STATA. Police precinct latitudes and longitudes are provided by the Law
Enforcement Agency Identifiers Crosswalk.
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A.2.3 Household Information
The model uses several pieces of information on households: (1) residency choices; (2) income;
and (3) home values. Data is collected for the 39 school districts that are at least partially
in the Austin metropolitan statistical area, consisting of Bastrop, Caldwell, Hays, Travis,
and Williamson counties.
1. Residency choices: The American Community Survey (ACS) data are available at the
school district level from IPUMS. The number of households in each school district gives
the population or residency choices. The share of each community is then computed
as the percent of the households in each school district.
2. Income: The ACS reports the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentile of the household income
distribution for each ISD.
3. Rental Values: The ACS contains data on the binned distribution of home values for
owners and rental values for renters. Poterba (1992) describes how to convert home
values Vh to yearly rents Vr: Vr = [(1 − ty)(i + tj) + ζ]E[Vh|y = yi], where ty is the
marginal tax rate for household with income y, i is the nominal interest rate, tj is
jurisdiction j’s property tax rate, and ζ is the sum of the risk premium for housing
investments and the annual percentage rates of depreciation and maintenance less the
annual rate of appreciation of house value.
From Poterba (1992), the risk premium is 0.04, maintenance is 0.02, and depreci-
ation is 0.02. Following Epple and Sieg (1999) and the subsequent literature, ty is 0.15
since the data only provide the marginal distributions of income and housing values.
While income taxes are progressive, higher income households are more likely to earn
income from sources with lower tax rates, like capital gains. The 5 year average of CPI
inflation for Houston in 2015, the closest metro area to Austin for which the BLS data
are available, is 0.018. The nominal interest rate on fixed rate mortgages is 0.039 in
2015 based on estimates from Freddie Mac. Finally, I compute E[Vh|y = yi] from the
binned ACS data.
The tax rate tj for each ISD is based on the sum the school district tax rate and
the community college tax rate for those in the taxing district since those are the two
most important rates for households decisions. Households also face taxes from the
county and other special districts but these vary within school districts. To account
for these, the sum of ISD and CC rates are scaled by 1
.55
since the Texas Comptroller
notes that those two taxes comprise about 55 percent of the total property tax rate,
on average. After converting home values to rental values, I combine them with the
data on renters and compute the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of the implied rental
distribution.
A.3 Additional Impacts of Annexations
The effects on aggregate home values and the home price indices in Figure 1.1 are intended
to summarize the benefits to households from joining the tax base. However, even though
aggregate home values increased, policy makers may be concerned that the increased tax
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rates to fund the public good induces some households to leave. To proxy for the effect on
migration, Figure A.1 estimates the effect of joining the tax base on the number of single
family homes. Unfortunately, this data is not available for 1994, which limits the ability
to properly test for pretends since 28 of the annexations occur between 1995 and 1998.
However, the pattern suggests that joining the tax base did not decrease the total number
of households in the community.
Figure A.2 plots the effect of joining the taxing district on K-12 education spending per
student to understand how it impacts other locally provided public goods. The estimates
show no effect of annexation on spending.
A.4 Impact on Firms
While the focus of this paper is on household decision-making in the presence of spillovers,
firms are an important part of the property tax base to fund the public good. In 2016,
firms comprised 12 percent of total property value in the recently annexed communities, on
average. Firms in the taxing district may have access to higher income customers and a more
educated workforce, but face higher taxes. Since customers and workers are mobile within
the surrounding area, the benefits from being in the tax base are likely quite small for firms.
If firms exit or no longer enter after annexation, total property values can decrease, making
it more difficult to finance local services. To understand the effect of joining the tax base on
business activity, I estimate Equation 1.1 with the log of commercial firm property value as
the dependent variables and plot the coefficients in Figure A.3. The point estimates suggest
that there is no relationship between annexation and firm property value.
Table A.2 presents the impact on other communities to understand the spatial effects.
Column (1) shows a small positive but imprecise effect of the annexation on firms in the
original tax base. Column (2) shows the estimated effect on the remaining part of the service
area who still do not pay property taxes to support the community college. These commu-
nities benefit from having relatively lower tax rates and therefore the annexation leads them
to have increased firm property value. Overall, these results suggest that increased central-
ization leads to more firm activity that is concentrated outside of the annexed community,
which provides additional evidence that the tax base is too small. Voters in a community
considering annexation may not internalize these benefits to others.
A.5 Measuring Spillovers Decomposition
This section presents summarizes the partial and general equilibrium per capita welfare
estimates from a 10 percent increase in Austin Community College’s expenditure per student,
financed by an increase in property taxes to those in the taxing district.
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Table A.1: Price of Housing Services Hedonic Regression
Log Sale Price
Log Lot Size -0.086
(0.177)
Log Lot Size Squared 0.010+
(0.005)
Log Building Size 0.300
(0.207)




Log Age Squared 0.048+
(0.026)
Log Age × Log Lot Size -0.008
(0.008)
Log Age × Log Building Size -0.021∗
(0.009)






1 Has Fireplace -0.023
(0.040)
1 Has Pool 0.148∗∗∗
(0.016)
Log Property Tax Rate -0.829∗∗∗
(0.020)
Observations 110670
Note: The table presents the estimates from a hedonic re-
gression of the log of home sales on home characteristics. For
sales with missing values for any variable, the value is set
to 0 and a indicator for having a missing value is included.
The regression additionally includes year and ISD fixed ef-
fects. Standard errors are clustered at the ISD. The sample
is limited to homes sold since 2013. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.2: The Effect of Annexation on Firm Activity in Other Communities
Initial Tax Base Remaining Service Area
(1) (2)
Property Value Property Value
Log # Other School 0.265 0.231+
Districts in Taxing District (0.281) (0.129)
Observations 442 2158
Note: Column (1) shows the estimated effect of annexations on communities that were part of the tax base
in 1991. Column (2) estimates the effect on the remaining communities in the service area. All specifications
include year and ISD fixed effects. Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped with 999 replications, clustered
by school district.+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure A.1: The Effect of Annexation on the Number of Single Family Homes
Note: The figure plots the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the effect of
joining the tax base on the log of the number of single family homes in the school district using the sample
of school districts that are annexed between 1991 and 2016. Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped with
999 replications, clustered at the school district level. The solid black circles are from Equation 1.1, and
the clear squares additionally control for the log of the number of other school districts in the tax base.
The sample size is 1114.
Figure A.2: The Effect of Annexation on K-12 Education
Note: The figure plots the event-study coefficients and 95 percent confidence intervals for the effect of
joining the tax base on K-12 expenditure per student using the sample of school districts that are annexed
between 1995 and 2011. Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped with 999 replications, clustered at the
school district level. The sample size is 985.
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Figure A.3: Effect of Joining the Taxing District on Firms
Note: The solid black circle estimates plot the coefficients of an event-study specification as in Equation
1.1, with the log of firm value as the dependent variable. Year and school district fixed effects are included.
The sample size is 1114. Standard errors are cluster bootstrapped with 999 replications, clustered by
school district.
(a) Partial Equilibrium (b) General Equilibrium
Figure A.4: Welfare Decomposition
Note: Each figure is divided into the three community types: those in the current Austin Community
College taxing district, those annexed through centralization, and those not in the Austin Community
College service area but in the Austin MSA. Panel (a) decomposes the partial equilibrium welfare change
when households are immobile and Panel (b) shows the general equilibrium change when they are perfectly
immobile for a 10 percent increase in instructional expenditure per student. The left most bar plots the
average welfare per capita of baseline residents. The next three bars break down welfare into its
components, housing rents to landowners, compensating variation for the housing price change only




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Optimal Linear Taxes and Minimum Wage
When the federal government has access to linear income taxes, it will always prefer linear
taxes to a combination of a minimum wage and linear taxes under the assumptions of our
calibrated model.
Consider a binding minimum wage and tax policy w̄, t ≥ 0. Under the assumptions of our
model, mainly a perfectly competitive firm, this set of policy will induce additional unem-
ployment over the competitive equilibrium so that l(w̄, t) low-skilled workers are employed.
The minimum wage reduced labor demand while the tax reduced labor supply. The workers
earn w̄ and high-skilled workers earn wh(l(w̄, t)). The high-skilled wage depends on our
structural parameters and the stock of low-skilled employed workers. Now consider t? such
that l(0, t?) = l(w̄, t). It must be the case that t? ≥ t, as a binding minimum wage always
reduces low-skilled employment, as long as l(w̄, t) > 0. Since l is the same, wl, wh, and total
output are equal across the policies. However, t? ≥ t gives that the tax alone raises more
revenue. The additional tax revenue is, on net, redistributed to lower consumption agents
through the demogrant, increasing total welfare since the social welfare function is concave.
As the tax increases, low-skilled labor supply drops, increasing the low-skilled wage and
decreasing the high-skilled wage; when it reaches 70%, only 34% of the low-skilled workers
are employed, and the low-skilled wage is higher. We may be worried that since the low-
skilled face a working cost, they can be high-income but low-consumption and the additional
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redistribution is harmful for social welfare. However, at that point, income tax collected is
redistributed on net to the unemployed from the employed. Since the consumption of the
unemployed is always bounded above by the consumption of the employed, even with this
tax and demogrant, the tax policy always redistributes to the lower consumption agents.
We need to show that t? exists. As long as the low-skilled labor supply is not perfectly
inelastic, it will exist because as l→ 0, the marginal product goes to infinity, but increasing
the tax rate will weakly lower labor supply. When the labor supply is perfectly inelastic
(because the low-skilled workers do not face costs from working), then the government can
implement a levelling tax, since high-skilled labor supply is also perfectly inelastic to the
economy. The value of the levelling tax is maximized when output and labor demand is
maximized, i.e. when there is no binding minimum wage.
So the government will always prefer only a linear income tax when both a linear income
tax and minimum wage are available in our model.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Calibration Results
Table C.1 shows that the model matches our target moments well. The college market
moments are close to the data, although the private aid elasticities are just outside the
boundary of the targeted ranges. The model also approximates the distribution of college
attendance by income and ability. Our approach builds on Epple et al. (2017), but can
better match these patterns. This is mostly because we allow the no 4-year college option to
be a function of both income and ability, rather than fixed across the population. However,
our parametrization is highly stylized1 and the model understates enrollment for the high-
income and high-ability. This likely biases our findings against the mechanisms we highlight
because it implies that the model understates the value of college quality for the high-ability
(weakens the general equilibrium sorting effects), while overstates the value of no college
for the high-income (weakens the negative consequences of no longer being admitted to the
privates).
C.2 Incidence by Attendance Decision
We present our model implied net benefits and compensating variation for each household
of type (b, y, ε). Figure C.1 presents the net benefits from the model implied accounting
approach conditional on students’ enrollment decisions. In panel (a) shows that there are
1For tractability, the value of college and utility are continuously differentiable in income and ability,
where all households have the same preference parameters (e.g. αs).
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three possible values for net benefits based on a household’s income. For the very low income
who cannot afford the out-of-state public, there are only two possible values. This is because
public tuition, net of federal aid, and taxes are determined by income alone. The top line
represents those who attend the publics and pay low tuition but receive instructional and
capital expenditure, the middle line represents those who attend the privates or do not
attend college and therefore only pay taxes, and the bottom line represents those who pay
high out-of-state tuition plus taxes in exchange for the public college’s services. Although
this illustration is helpful for seeing the magnitude of net benefits based on enrollment,
it does not show the likelihood of taking up the services by income or ability, which are
important for incidence.
Figure C.2 conducts a similar exercise conditional on students’ enrollment decisions in
both the baseline and counterfactuals using the general equilibrium model and our CV
framework. Conditional on college enrollment decisions, CV is mostly linear in income and
ability which generates the horizontal lines in the figure. For example, the bottommost
line in all panels corresponds to students who attend the out-of-state public in the baseline,
but then enroll in the privates when state spending is lower. They are better off because
the returns to college quality increased while taxes decreased, and were nearly indifferent
between those two options in the baseline. CV for these students is especially low because
they no longer help finance public expenditure with high out-of-state tuition. Students who
lose access to the highest quality college have much larger CVs and are located above the
horizontal lines.
C.3 Incidence Comparative Statics
To further highlight how changes in the private college market affect the incidence of public
investment in higher education, we simulate the effect of a 1 percent increase in γ and ω
with endogenous sticker prices. Changes in these parameters affect student sorting through
the returns to attending a higher quality institution as well as private college admissions
decisions and pricing (Equations 3.8 and 3.9). In aggregate, these decisions affect the labor
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market returns to college as well but the effect is very small for only a 1 percent increase.
For each change in the structural parameters, we simulate the corresponding changes in
compensating variation (CV) for a 10 percent decrease in appropriations per student:
∆CV (γ) = CV (1.01γ)− CV (γ) (C.1)
∆CV (ω) = CV (1.01ω)− CV (ω)
and plot the results in Figure C.3. A positive value implies that a household has larger
benefits from public investment in higher education when the structural parameter, γ or ω,
is high.
Panels (a) and (b) show how CV changes for a 1 percent increase in γ, or the returns to
peer quality, by income and ability respectively. When γ is higher, there is an ambiguous
effect on private college access. The implied increase in demand for the highest quality pri-
vate, because the returns to quality are now higher, lead it to increase prices. Low-income
students are less likely to attend and θ5 falls slightly. At the same time, effective marginal
costs are increasing in γ for all students with ability less than the college’s average, θ5. We
find that the baseline (z = z̄) minimum ability threshold is lower, and the counterfactual
threshold rises more after the state spending decrease. Based on these two changes, Panel
(b) shows both a large negative and positive spike in ∆CV (γ). When γ is higher, addi-
tional students near the 60th percentile of ability are crowded out from decreases in public
investment, while fewer are near the 62nd percentile.
Panels (c) and (d) present the effect of a 1 percent increase in ω, or the returns to
instructional expenditure, on CV. When the privates value collecting tuition revenue more,
additional students with lower ability are admitted to the highest quality private in the
baseline with state spending is high. The minimum ability threshold falls, allowing more
high-income-modest-ability students to enroll. However, these students are crowded out of
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the market when state spending falls. More baseline private college students are affected
by the decrease in public investment in higher education when the returns to instructional
expenditure are high.
In both comparative statics, others students have a non-zero change in CV largely because
the increase in the structural parameters affects the likelihood they enroll in the publics.
This creates relatively large changes in public college tuition and relatively small changes
in the individual household’s value of public spending, ν. Since increases in the structural
parameters affect the returns to any college, the returns to college quality, and prices, some
students are induced into the publics while others into the private market, generating the
horizontal lines in all panels.
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Table C.1: Calibration Results
Moment Data Model
College Market Moments:
Average Private Tuition $27220 $26978
Private Enrollment as Percent of Total 28.5 28.6
Enrollment Elasticity of Aid 0.700 0.700
Additional Private Aid for 1 Std Increase in Ability (920,1960) 918
Additional Private Aid for $10000 Decrease in Income (210, 510) 516
Earnings Percent Increase for Marginal-Ability Student 20.0 21.9
Public College Instructional Expenditure $10463 $10436
Percent Enrolled in College with 2011 Income between:
$15k and $35k 25.6 21.9
$35k and $55k 32.6 40.2
$55k and $75k 41.2 42.2
$75k and $95k 47.8 49.8
$95k and $135k 54.2 54.9
more than 235k 65.5 62.9
Percent Enrolled in College by Ability quintile:




Fifth (Highest) 75.9 64.8
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(a) Total net benefits by income (b) Total net benefits by ability
(c) 10% decrease net benefits by income (d) 10% Decrease net benefits by ability
Figure C.1: Net Benefits by Attendance Decisions
Note: Each open circle represents average net benefits for one draw from the joint distribution of income
and ability using the accounting approach based on the household’s preference shocks and corresponding
enrollment decision. For each of 100,000 households, we take 20 draws from the preference distribution.
Panels (a) and (b) present the distribution for public colleges, while (c) and (d) for a 10 percent decrease in
appropriations. The dotted vertical lines represent the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles of the income and
ability distribution. A positive value implies that the household of type (b, y, ε) receives more in college
expenditure than it pays in tuition and taxes.
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(a) CV by income with fixed sticker prices (b) CV by ability with fixed sticker prices
(c) CV by income with endogenous sticker prices (d) CV by ability with endogenous sticker prices
Figure C.2: Incidence by Attendance Decisions
Note: Each open circle represents average compensating variation (CV) for one draw from the joint
distribution of income and ability. For each household, we take 20 sets of draws from the preference
distribution, compute the corresponding CV, and then average over the draws. The dotted vertical lines
represent the 20th, 50th and 80th percentiles of the income and ability distribution. A positive value in
panels (a) and (b) denotes that the household is better off under the baseline than when appropriations
decrease by 10 percent, holding private college sticker prices fixed. Panels (c) and (d) compute average CV
when private college’s sticker prices endogenous adjust.
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(a) 1 Percent Increase in γ by Income (b) 1 Percent Increase in γ by Ability
(c) 1 Percent Increase in ω by Income (d) 1 Percent Increase in ω by Ability
Figure C.3: Compensating Variation Comparative Statics
Note: Each open circle represents the difference in average compensating variation for one draw from the
joint income and ability distribution. For each household, we take 20 sets of draws from the preference
distribution, compute the corresponding CV based on the equilibrium changes for the structural parameter
and a 1 percent increase in the parameter, and average over the 20 estimates. The dotted vertical lines
represent the 20th, 50th, and 80th percentiles of the distributions. A positive value implies that a
household has larger benefits from public investments when the parameter (γ or ω) is high.
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